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INTRODUCTION
We live in a culture of symbols.' We speak not only through our
words but through symbolic gestures-our acts, our religious
symbols, and our associations. What we do, what we wear, how we
worship, and with whom we associate are all deeply symbolic
aspects of our cultural life. Despite this rich symbolism, what it is
that we say when we act, worship, and join has been a topic treated
substantially with indifference by courts and scholars. What does
it mean to burn a draft card or a cross, to sleep in the park, or to
dance in the nude? What does the display of a menorah, or creche,
or the Ten Commandments at the county courthouse signify? What
does it mean to join the Jaycees, the Rotary Club, or the Boy
Scouts? Although a diverse and complex symbolism inheres in the
First Amendment, courts have made little effort to translate or
interpret these and other symbolic gestures. Outside the realm of
"pure" expression, whose meaning is often self-evident, it seems
that judges are loathe to delve too deeply into symbolic meaning. As
a result, what we have now is a very thin doctrine of symbolic
gestures.2
This does not have to be so. Indeed, one recent exception to the
general disengagement from symbolic meaning stands out and
deserves particular attention. In Virginia v. Black,' the Supreme
Court held that cross burning could be prohibited, categorically, as
a "threat" outside the protection of the First Amendment.4 The
record facts in Black can be stated briefly. One man, leading a Ku
Klux Klan rally, burned a cross on private property some 300 feet
from the nearest public road and in view of his neighbors, while two
1. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and
State Holidays, and the Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 CI.-
KENT L. REV. 1079, 1107 (1995) ("Symbols are an important part of the cultural exchange
system that, among other things, establishes relationships of hierarchy and domination.").
2. The usual labels-%ymbolic conduct" or "symbolic expression"-are too limited for
my project, which includes, in addition to an analysis of symbolic conduct, the symbolism of
religion (sacred symbols) and symbolic membership. I use "symbolic gestures" to indicate
this more expansive coverage.
3. 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
4. Id. at 1547-49.
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other men, on a separate occasion, attempted to burn a cross in an
African American neighbor's yard.5 This conduct was said to violate
a Virginia criminal statute regulating cross burning undertaken
with the "intent of intimidating any person or group of persons."6
Although the Court concluded that the government could prohibit
cross burning as a form of threatening symbolism, it held that the
Virginia statute was procedurally flawed.7
The narrow holding is not significant. What is significant, or at
least potentially so, is how the Court was able to determine that
burning a cross could be interpreted as a constitutionally unpro-
tected symbolic threat. In order to educate itself, and the rest of us,
with regard to the symbolic meaning of burning a cross, the Court
had to go beyond the narrow conception of "the record."' In order to
recover the most plausible meaning of cross burning, the Court had
to ascertain what potential meanings such an act might have, and
then choose the meaning most consistent with, among other things,
participant behavior. The conclusion surely seems self-evident, at
least for those with even a rudimentary awareness of the historic
struggle for civil rights, and of the ideology and operations of the Ku
Klux Klan. But where meaning and interpretation are concerned,
courts ought not simply pronounce their own sense of the matter.
This is as true of interpretation of symbolic gestures as it is of
interpretation of constitutional text. Courts must state reasons for
their interpretations.
Drawing on a wealth of sociological, historical, and anecdotal
data, therefore, the Black Court produced a detailed account, a
monograph of sorts, of the practice of cross burning, from the
origins of the ritual in fourteenth-century Scotland, through the
violence and racism of the civil rights struggle, up to the present.9
The Black Court sought to recover the most plausible meaning of
cross burning by placing it in cultural context, consulting public
sources of meaning, and providing a detailed description of the
practice. What resulted was a translation of the gesture of cross
5. Id. at 1542-43.
6. Id. at 1541.
7. Id. at 1541, 1551-52.
8. See id. at 1544-47.
9. See id.
[Vol. 45:22612264
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burning into recognizable, if not ultimately incontestable, cultural
terms.
Black demonstrates that interpretation of symbolic gestures can
be demanding, and risky, work for judges. Courts have generally
avoided interpreting the meaning of symbolic gestures for two
reasons. First, they have failed to appreciate the importance of
symbolism to cultural expression. Indeed, normative bias against
unusual or unconventional forms of speech-symbolic protests and
nude dancing, for example-has led over time to a doctrine of
interpretive indifference. Second, courts tend to view symbolic
meaning as hopelessly indeterminate. They do not believe that, as
judges, they are capable of choosing from among the various
available meanings for polysemous symbols. Thus, concerns
regarding institutional competency have led, with respect to some
symbolic gestures, to a doctrine of interpretive avoidance.
It is precisely because of the indeterminacy of meaning that
Black will have detractors. For if the Court can denounce the
burning cross as symbolically threatening, what then of the Nazi
swastika and the Confederate flag? What Black portends need not
be viewed with trepidation or dread of slippery slopes. The ap-
proach taken can lead to a better understanding of symbolic
gestures across the range of First Amendment concerns-not only
symbolic action, but also sacred symbols and the meaning of
membership in associations. If properly pursued, an interpretive
turn for symbolic gestures will enable a discourse of symbols to take
place which has been silenced for too long. It will permit courts to
untangle and decipher the often ambiguous symbolic communica-
tions of cultures they do not inhabit.
This assumes much. It assumes, for one thing, that courts can
avoid acting as undisciplined, unprincipled arbiters of symbolic
meaning. Judicial interpreters simply cannot be permitted to rely
upon their own normative biases, for that is one of the troubles with
the current doctrine of symbolic gestures. There must be discipline
and principled interpretation; at the least, there must be a system-
atic method for recovering symbolic meaning.
This Article proposes that interpretive ethnography provides an
appropriate model for the interpretation of symbolic gestures in
First Amendment cases. Ethnographers are anthropologists who
2004] 2265
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systematically record the particulars of human cultures, usually by
conducting lengthy field observations. 0 Interpretive or hermeneutic
ethnography is a branch, or school, of anthropological thought
which emphasizes the cultural significance of signs and symbols.
The approach, popularized by its leading proponent, Clifford Geertz,
is semiotic in orientation;" it focuses on the interpretation of
symbols and symbol systems within a culture. 2 As Geertz himself
summarizes the agenda, interpretive ethnographers are "mostly
engaged in trying to determine what this people or that take to be
the point of what they are doing.""
This Article suggests that courts adopt a systematic, interpretive
orientation with respect to symbolic gestures. To be clear from the
outset, the Article does not suggest that courts actually "do"
ethnography in the sense of physically entering the field and
studying a culture over time. Institutional and other limitations
obviously preclude judges from becoming field scientists. As a
perspective, a process, and a method, however, interpretive
ethnography has much to offer a judicial approach to symbolic
gestures. Given its solicitude for symbols and symbolic meaning,
the interpretive model offers a lens, a perspective, through which
to view symbolic gestures anew. This perspective can be readily
10. See DAVID M. FETTERMAN, ETHNOGRAPHY STEP BY STEP 11 (1989) ("Ethnography is
the art and science of describing a group or culture."); see also THOMAS HYLLAND ERIKSEN,
SMALL PLACES, LARGE ISSUES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
1 (2d ed. 2001) ("Anthropology tries to account for the social and cultural variation in the
world ....").
11. Semiotics is the science of signs. Semioticians are interested chiefly in the study of
linguistic signs and sign systems, although the discipline is not limited to verbal signs. For
examples ofnonlinguistic approaches to semiotics, see generally ARTHURASA BERGER, SIGNS
IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE (1984); ON SIGNS (Marshall Blonsky ed., 1985); and SEMIOTICS
OF CULTURE (Irene Portis Winner & Donna Jean Umiker-Sebeok eds., 1979).
12. For expressions of Geertz's interpretive view, see CLIFFORD GEERT7, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973) [hereinafter GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES]
and CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (1983) [hereinafter GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE].
Geertz has been both widely influential and widely criticized in his field. For specific
criticisms, see, for example, ERIKSEN, supra note 10, at 198 (noting that Geertz "has been
criticised for exaggerating the importance of culture and symbols at the expense of
interaction and social structure, and for exaggerating the degree to which cultures are
integrated and coherent"). For specific criticisms of the hermeneutic aspects of Geertz's
method, see, for example, JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-
CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART (1988).
13. GEERTz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 12, at 4.
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adapted to combat the First Amendment doctrines of interpre-
tive indifference and avoidance. This Article, thus, utilizes the
Geertzian anthropo-semiotic approach as a foundation for reco-
nsidering symbolic gestures.
In pursuing the interpretive model or perspective, the first step
is to recognize that when courts encounter First Amendment
symbolism, they are, like ethnographers, called upon to consider the
cultural meaning of social action. The culture may be large, such as
a peace movement or a general public protest against government
policies; or it may be small, as where specific clubs, sects, or other
associations are concerned. Judges reside in the broad American
culture. They need not, therefore, as ethnographers often must,
learn a culture from the ground up. Judges are, however, often
"outsiders" to the subcultures in which symbolic gesturing takes
place. They do not, for example, engage in public protest, attend
strip clubs, or burn crosses. The challenge for courts, then, as for
ethnographers, is to decipher or translate symbolic meaning within
these partially foreign subcultures.
Taking interpretation as the goal, this Article maps the contours
of a model that can assist in reorienting the judicial consideration
of symbolic gestures. One of the elements ethnography and law
share is that they are both steeped in, and in an important sense
driven by, detailed factual inquiry. As a method, the ethnographic
model begins where any legal process should-with the collection
of data concerning the symbolic gesture. This often entails, as in
Black, venturing well beyond "the record" in an effort to situate a
gesture within a particular culture. Thus, the first convention of the
ethnographic model is rigorous factfinding.
Second, after rigorous factfinding, the ethnographic model calls
for what Geertz labels "thick description": essentially-although, as
will become apparent, it is much more complicated than this-a
detailed account of the symbol or gesture. 4 For ethnographers,
thick description can produce anything from a report or memoran-
dum to a monograph of several thousand pages. Of course, we
cannot hope for, nor do we desire, thousand-page judicial mono-
14. CLIFFORi GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture, in
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, supra note 12, at 3, 6. The notion of "thick description" was
first discussed by Gilbert Ryle. Id. at 6.
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graphs. Judges are, nevertheless, capable of rendering relatively
thick descriptions within the space ofjudicial opinions. Black itself
is evidence of this. 15
Ethnographers seek an understanding of cultures, and cultural
symbols, on their own terms. Sometimes rather carelessly described
as "going native," 6 this cultural perspective is the third element of
the interpretive model. Although the concept of emic, or insider,
perspective is a complex and contested one, the basic idea is that
ethnographers should strive as best they can to put aside any
bias or prejudgment of a culture's symbolic practices while they
interpret. 7 For ethnographers, this may entail living among a
people. For judges, the model requires a change in perspective,
not geography. Judges must suppress cultural and other biases
when approaching the interpretive task as, for example, when they
encounter the social protester or exotic dancer. As social scientists
have long known, absolute suppression of the interpreter's own
biases is not possible."8 But interpretive bias, once recognized as a
complicating factor, can be contained. The basic aim, or aspiration,
is to make sense of gestures from the perspective of those who
participate in the cultural exchange of symbolic meaning. 9 In sum,
the ethnographic model aspires to render "emic" (insider) descrip-
tions and interpretations, while acknowledging the influence of the
"etic" (outsider/analyst) perspective on the production of social
knowledge.20
What all of this factfinding, description, and attention to
perspective is leading up to, of course, is the fourth and final
element of the ethnographic model-an interpretation of the
meaning of the gesture. The interpretive ethnographer seeks to
render an interpretation of a particular symbolic gesture or symbol
system.2' Courts have faced similar challenges with respect to the
15. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
16. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, "From the Native's Point of View": On the Nature of
Anthropological Understanding, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 12, at 56-58; GEERTZ,
supra note 14, at 14.
17. See GEERTZ, supra note 16, at 56-57; GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 14.
18. See GEERTZ, supra note 16, at 58-59.
19. See GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 14-16.
20. See GEERTZ, supra note 16, at 56-58; GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 14-16.
21. It should be stressed at the outset that the goal is an interpretation, not the
2268 [Vol. 45:2261
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range of symbolic gestures. Where symbolic acts are concerned,
however, the judicial inclination is simply to assume that some
message is communicated, without delving into what the specific
message, or messages, might be. With regard to sacred symbols,
courts typically have concluded that nearby secular symbols have
drained them of their sacredness. Finally, the recent trend is to
defer entirely to associational leadership on the meaning of group
membership.
Each of these treatments of meaning is in error. Meaning is, of
course, unavoidable where, as in Black, categorical speech prohibi-
tions are concerned. No court can define a gesture as an unpro-
tected "threat" without first interpreting its meaning. But meaning
should not be treated with indifference or avoided in other First
Amendment contexts either. To treat meaning with indifference is
to mute the expression of those who are marginalized and must
resort to gesturing to make their point. Discounting this speech by
treating its specific meaning as irrelevant abates channels of
discourse that users of verbal expression typically enjoy. Similarly,
the symbolism of religion and of joining with others-two undeni-
ably constitutive cultural phenomena-deserves judicial consider-
ation. Sacred symbols have powerful meanings for those who
believe in them. And wholesale deference to leadership with regard
to the meaning of membership is inappropriate, as it will leave
putative members at the mercy of post-hoc and self-interested
associational interpretations. In sum, courts have an obligation to
attempt to grasp and render symbolic meaning in all of these
contexts.
Postmodernists especially will deny the plausibility of interpreta-
tion of symbolic gestures, citing, among other obstacles, the
polysemous nature of symbols and interpretive indeterminacy.
Indeed, some legal scholars have covered parallel ground in arguing
that constitutional interpretation-translation of the Constitution's
language symbols-is hopelessly indeterminate.22 This Article
interpretation. Interpretive ethnographers readily acknowledge that symbolic meaning is
contested; they strive, nevertheless, to render the most accurate, unbiased interpretation
that the data and the discipline will permit. Courts can do no more, but should do no less,
where symbolic meaning is concerned.
22. This debate was particularly acute in the 1980s, when originalists and non-
20041 2269
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
acknowledges and examines the indeterminacy argument but is
not deterred by it. Here it is important to emphasize that the
ultimate goal cannot be to announce the one "true" or "correct"
meaning for any symbolic gesture. This plays directly into the
postmodernists' indeterminacy argument. The goal must be, first,
to recover, for those affected and from the appropriate perspectives,
the various available meanings for a gesture and, second, to choose
the most plausible meaning. This means, among other things,
choosing meanings which are consistent with the actors' own
interpretations and behavior and with the overall cultural context.
This sort of interpretation is not new to the legal process. Courts
interpret actors' intent, for example, all the time. And they
interpret constitutional language, which is itself symbolic, as well.
The Article develops and applies the interpretive ethnographic
model in Parts I through III. Part I provides a background of
commonly encountered symbolic gestures and the current First
Amendment doctrines of interpretive indifference and avoidance
which have arisen from their consideration. Part II formulates the
ethnographic model, which, as suggested, consists of four elements
or conventions: (1) factfinding, (2) thick description, (3) perspective,
and (4) interpretation. To clarify how this model actually operates
for social scientists, the Article will develop and explain it through
a concrete example from the field of interpretive ethnography-
Geertz's famous monograph on the Balinese cockfight.23 To a
cultural outsider, placing two decorated fowl in a ring to fight to the
death, while betting on the outcome, might appear at best comical
and at worst barbaric. Geertz, proceeding on the supposition that
the Balinese cockfight must, to borrow a phrase from Aristotle, be
originalists clashed over interpretive method. Originalists believe that constitutional
meaning can be determinately affixed to constitutional language, either by reference to plain
meaning, original intent, or other sources. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849,849-65 (1989) (arguing in favor of interpretation based upon framers'
intent). Among skeptics, who focused on the existence of multiple interpretations, see Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 224-37
(1980). Owen Fiss, among others, passionately rejected the indeterminacy thesis of the
skeptics. See Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 742-62 (1982).
As will become clear from my presentation, I reject the position that objective interpretation
of symbolic gestures is impossible.
23. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight, in INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES, supra note 12, at 412-53.
2270 [Vol. 45:2261
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"saying something of something,"24 produced perhaps the best-
known ethnographic monograph of its genre. He described and,
more importantly, interpreted the Balinese cockfight as a form of
expression.25 This Article pays particular attention to the manner
in which Geertz was able to interpret the cockfight as expressing
something about Balinese culture.26
Part III reviews the doctrine of symbolic gestures through the
interpretive ethnographic lens. This Part applies the ethnographic
model's core descriptive and interpretive elements to several
symbolic gestures which have given rise to legal contests regarding
symbolic meaning. The Part responds to anticipated objections to
interpretation of symbolic meaning-namely, interpretive incompe-
tence, loss of institutional legitimacy, and the indeterminacy of
meaning. Part III is intended to demonstrate that the interpretive
ethnographic model is more than a disciplinary analog. The Article
urges courts to use the model, or at least the ethnographic perspec-
tive, when they encounter symbolic gestures. Application of the
interpretive model will alter both the way in which courts perceive
symbolic gestures and the constitutional doctrine pertaining to
them.
Part IV concludes with a summary of these hoped-for alterations.
The current doctrines, interpretive indifference and interpretive
avoidance, fail to advance discourses on free speech, religion, and
association. They encourage judicial reliance on aesthetic biases,
preferences, and presuppositions about the meaning of symbolic
gestures. By heightening awareness of the power of symbols to
convey meaning, and demonstrating, in short, that meaning
matters, the interpretive model will elevate symbolic gestures to a
plane commensurate with the most privileged of First Amendment
symbols-words. This recalibration of the First Amendment
hierarchy will lead to constitutional balancing without any thumb
on the scale, will rescue the sacred element of sacred symbols, and
will give a more accurate accounting of the meaning of membership.
If the Court pursues the interpretive ethnographic model, First
24. Id. at 448.
25. Id. at 444.
26. Id. at 443-53.
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Amendment doctrine will be richer, thicker, and, ultimately, more
protective of the freedoms of expression, religion, and association.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE CULTURE OF SYMBOLIC
GESTURES
Interpretive ethnographers recognize that cultures are laden with
symbolism. Some ethnographers, drawing on basic principles of
semiotics, view culture as a system of symbols and the mastery of
symbolic meaning as a key to personal development and cultural
robustness." The Supreme Court has considered symbolic gestures
on many occasions. In contrast with interpretive ethnographers,
however, the Court has treated symbolic meaning with indifference
or has sought to avoid interpretation of symbolic meaning alto-
gether. It has done so, as we shall see, out of aesthetic and other
normative biases, and because of an apprehension of the
indeterminancy of symbolic meaning. This Part traces the path of
symbolic gestures, which the Article will then revisit in Part III,
after the interpretive model has been expounded.
A. Early Statements on First Amendment Symbolism
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,8 the
Supreme Court, reversing a recent precedent, 29 held that the
government could not compel schoolchildren to salute the American
flag."0 Several Jehovah's Witnesses challenged the compulsory flag
salute as contrary to their religious teachings, which included a
prohibition on the worship of "graven image[s]."31 The Court held
that the symbolism of the national flag, whatever it was, could not
be forced upon the unwilling.12
With Barnette, the path of First Amendment symbolism was
forged at an early moment. As the Court explained:
27. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
28. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
29. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
30. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
31. Id. at 629.
32. Id. at 642.
2272 [Vol. 45:2261
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There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag
salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but
effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or
flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality,
is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political
parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty
of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design. The
State announces rank, function, and authority through crowns
and maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaks
through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine, and
clerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey political ideas
just as religious symbols come to convey theological ones.
Associated with many of these symbols are appropriate gestures
of acceptance or respect: a salute, a bowed or bared head, a
bended knee. A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts
into it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is an-
other's jest and scorn.3
From its earliest encounters with symbolic gestures, the Court has
expressed a certain ambivalence with regard to symbols: Symbols
are primitive but effective; they are shortcuts, but critical ties
which knit causes and even nations together; they are personal, but
are used also by the State, political parties, lodges, and churches;
and, finally, symbols are powerful, yet ultimately situated and
indeterminate-"what is one man's comfort and inspiration is
another's jest and scorn." "
The italicized language from the Barnette excerpt above repre-
sents the basic framework of the Court's current doctrine of
symbolic gestures, which has not changed significantly in six
decades. Courts acknowledge that symbols, which have come, by the
way, to be viewed more as "primitive" than "effective" signifiers, can
sometimes constitute expression. This normative bias in favor of
less "primitive" expression, namely verbal expression, accounts for
the current low status of symbolic speech. Further, the Court
generally shrinks from interpreting symbolic meaning, in part, as
suggested, because symbolism seems to be intensely personal and
indeterminate. Courts have found it much safer simply to assume,
33. Id. at 632-33 (emphasis added).
34. Id.
2004] 2273
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as did the Barnette Court, that a symbolic gesture expresses
something, without inquiring specifically as to the "said" of the
symbol.3 5 Let us examine the development of the doctrines of
interpretive indifference and avoidance with reference to the
various symbolic gestures which the Court has reviewed under the
First Amendment.
B. Symbols of Protest
Symbols are often used effectively during times of civil unrest.
Conventional means of expression often fail under these circum-
stances. Protesters, already hampered by their relative smallness
of number within the culture, often must reach for more powerful,
more emotive forms of expression. Thus, protests of segregationist
policies, mostly in the South, and of the Vietnam War everywhere,
relied heavily upon symbolism.
1. Peaceful Sit-Ins
Early cases involving sit-ins did not present much of an interpre-
tive challenge. In Brown v. Louisiana,36 for example, the Court
invalidated the convictions of five African Americans who engaged
in a peaceful sit-in at a Louisiana public library to protest their
exclusion from the library and the library's other segregationist
policies. 7 The Court was by then quite familiar with the cultural
35. In Barnette, the Court avoided interpretation of the flag by relying on the
fundamental tenet that the government cannot compel expression or belief. The Court found
that such coerced orthodoxy simply has no place under our Constitution. Id. at 642. The
Court similarly avoided interpretation of symbolic meaning in Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931). In Stromberg, the Court held that the government was not empowered to
prohibit the display of a symbol in order to protect itself from criticism. Id. at 369-70.
Stromberg "supervised and directed the children" at a summer camp to raise "a red flag, 'a
... reproduction of the flag of Soviet Russia ....." Id. at 362. She was convicted of violating a
statute which criminalized the display of "a red flag, banner, or badge, or any flag, badge,
banner, or device of any color or form whatever in any public place," inter alia, "as a sign,
symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government ...." Id. at 363. Given the cultural
anticommunist sentiment and Stromberg's rather obvious defiance of that sentiment, the
Court was not called upon to interpret the meaning of Stromberg's conduct. Moreover,
regardless of the specific message, it was settled that the government could not shield itself
from political criticism. Id. at 369-70.
36. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
37. Id. at 136-37, 143.
[Vol. 45:22612274
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milieu in Louisiana; in four of its previous five terms, the Court
reviewed a breach of peace conviction arising from peaceful sit-ins
and like protests in the state."8 Brown exhibited the cultural
symbolism of the segregated 1960s. Two bookmobiles, one red and
one blue, served whites and blacks, respectively. 9 Registration
cards issued to blacks were stamped "Negro," and borrowing
privileges for these cardholders were restricted.40
Judges, like ethnographers, bring this sort of cultural background
to their work. So the context in Brown was not lost on the Court. It
took no leap of interpretive faith to conclude that the protesters,
who sat "quietly, as monuments of protest against the segregation
of the library,"" were conveying a message of protest against
segregation. When the government sought to use the protesters'
silence, or the peace of their protest, against them by arguing that
there was no "speech," the Court readily rebuffed the argument.
The rights of speech and assembly, the Court replied, "are not
confined to verbal expression."42 Brown and other protest cases
established that symbolic acts could be deemed protected speech. 3
The "said" of the peaceful sit-in was not difficult to discover; it
required no digging on the Court's part. One can take two things
from Brown that bear on the development of the doctrine of
symbolic gestures: First, courts can and do rely upon background
cultural knowledge in interpreting symbolic gestures; and, second,
whatever the scope of the guarantee of free "speech," it cannot be
narrowly confined to verbal expression.
38. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
39. Brown, 383 U.S. at 136.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 139.
42. Id. at 142. As the Court acknowledged, FirstAmendment rights"embrace appropriate
types of action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest
by silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be, the
unconstitutional segregation of public facilities." Id. (footnote omitted).
43. The Court had recognized prior to Brown that symbolic protests were protected under
the First Amendment. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (finding the
arrest of South Carolina students, peacefully protesting the state's discrimination, to be
violative of the First Amendment); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (protecting the
right to picket).
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2. Symbolic Protests of Hostilities
As our society's recent experience with Iraq demonstrates, wars
often breed protests and symbolic acts of defiance. 4 Here, again,
protesters have been challenged to convey the depth of their resolve
by means other than verbal expression. United States v. O'Brien45
is perhaps the best-known of the symbolic antiwar protest cases, in
no small part because it spawned a new judicial test for regulation
of "symbolic speech."46 O'Brien publicly burned his draft card, as he
explained to the jury at his trial, "to influence others to adopt his
antiwar beliefs," and "so that other people would reevaluate their
positions with Selective Service, with the armed forces, and
reevaluate their place in the culture of today, to hopefully consider
[his] position."47 He was convicted under a federal statute that
prohibited the willful and knowing alteration, mutilation, or
destruction of a registration certificate."
Whereas Brown settled that "speech" can be more than verbal
expression, O'Brien suggested that the Court was wary of placing
symbols on a par with verbal or written expression. Chief Justice
Warren stated: "We cannot accept the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the
44. Some of these acts can seem rather silly, especially with the benefit of hindsight.
Government efforts to regulate them can seem even more bizarre to those who are cultural
outsiders. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), is a fine example. In Schacht, the
Court reversed the convictions of several actors which were based upon a statute prohibiting
the wearing of American military uniforms where the wearing "tend[s] to discredit' the
military." Id. at 62. The statute had been applied to actors who wore the uniforms in a
dramatic presentation criticizing the country's involvement in Vietnam. Id. at 60-61. The
Court concluded that whatever interest the government may have had in honoring the
uniform did not support these convictions.
45. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
46. Id. at 376. As the Court framed the newly announced standard, the government's
regulation of symbolic speech
is sufficiently justified if [11 it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [21 if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; [31 if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
47. Id. at 370.
48. Id.
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person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea."49 In what would become a common convention, the Court
proposed to bypass the problem by simply assuming that burning
a draft card was expressive of something, but adding that the "said"
of the gesture, whatever it was, resided at the outer reaches of the
First Amendment." The Court had little trouble finding that the
government's interest in the effective and efficient conduct of the
draft, an interest it found to be unrelated to the suppression of
expression, readily outweighed O'Brien's interest in symbolic
expression. Indeed, in the Court's view, O'Brien had been punished
solely for the "noncommunicative impact" of his conduct."'
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,52 protest of the Vietnam War went from the steps of the
public courthouse to the public school classroom. Nothing so
dramatic as burning government forms was at stake. A group of
students had met and decided to wear black armbands to school
during the holiday season to protest the conflict in Vietnam." The
school district, upon learning of this plan, adopted a policy to
prohibit the wearing of armbands to school with the ultimate
penalty of suspension for refusing to remove the emblem.54 When
the students refused to remove the armbands, they were, predict-
ably, suspended. 5
The Court agreed with the district court that, under the circum-
stances, wearing an armband "is the type of symbolic act that is
within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment."56 Indeed,
the Court concluded that this particular symbolic act "was closely
akin to 'pure speech' which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to
comprehensive protection under the First Amendment."57 The Court
held that under the circumstances, which entailed no violence or
disruption of classroom or other school activities, authorities lacked
49. Id. at 376.
50. See id. (noting that "a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating [a]
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms").
51. Id. at 382.
52. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
53. Id. at 504.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 505.
57. Id. at 505-06.
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the power to punish students "for a silent, passive expression of
opinion."58
The cases resulting from the protest of hostilities thus added two
further elements to Brown's early recognition that "speech" could
expand beyond the verbal and that judges bring background
knowledge to bear when confronted with symbolic gestures. These
developments had a tendency to shrink the constitutional protection
awarded to symbolic cuts. First, O'Brien established that the Court
was wary of too much flexibility in defining the parameters of the
"speech" guarantee. Not every symbol would be deemed worthy of
First Amendment protection. Indeed, the Court expressed a
wariness of interpreting such "primitive" gestures as draft card
burning. Better, the Court apparently thought, to simply assume a
message of some sort and proceed from there to balance. Second,
Tinker hinted at a hierarchy of speech, with "pure" expression being
entitled to the greatest solicitude, and symbolic expression entitled
to something less, perhaps much less, than that.
3. Symbolic Protests of Government Policies
There are many ways one might express disapproval of social
conditions and government policies. One might write a letter or
make a phone call to a government official. But particularly for
marginalized groups with little government support or beneficence,
and no access to media, symbolism is often the only effective means
of protest.
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,59 for example,
demonstrators protesting the plight of the homeless sought
permission to sleep overnight in Lafayette Park and on the National
Mall, both located in the District of Columbia. 0 The demonstrators
58. Id. at 508. The Court did not deny that school authorities had some reason to be
concerned, especially given the tumultuous cultural debate then occurring concerning
American involvement in Vietnam. The Court acknowledged that when the armband
prohibition was adopted, "debate over the Viet Nam war had become vehement in many
localities." Id. at 510 n.4 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp.
971, 972-73 (S.D. Iowa 1966)). In addition, there had been protest marches on Washington,
D.C., and "a] wave of draft card burning incidents protesting the war had swept the
country." Id.
59. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
60. Id. at 292.
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intentionally sought the permit for the first day of winter to
highlight the effects of inclement weather on the homeless.81 The
National Park Service denied the permit application based upon a
regulation that prohibited camping in certain parks, including
Lafayette Park and the Mall.62 The Park Service did allow, however,
the erection of two "tent cities," consisting of twenty tents in
Lafayette Park and forty tents on the Mall, which accommodated a
total of 150 demonstrators. 3 The demonstrators, fearing that their
message would be lost in this compromise, filed suit alleging a
violation of their First Amendment rights.
Following the approach it had adopted in O'Brien, the Court
concluded "that overnight sleeping in connection with the demon-
stration is expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First
Amendment. We assume for present purposes, but do not decide,
that such is the case."" Following an earlier precedent, 5 the Court
articulated a test for determining whether symbolic conduct was in
fact expressive. A symbol is expressive, the Court stated, if it is
"intended to be communicative and ... would reasonably be under-
stood by the viewer to be communicative.1
6
Even assuming these elements were present, however, the Court
was convinced that the "major value" of symbolic sleeping was
"facilitative"-without it, an insufficient number of demonstrators
would participate.6 7 This sort of interest paled in comparison to the
government's interest in maintaining Lafayette Park and the Mall,
"which are unique resources that the Federal Government holds in
trust for the American people."68 Besides, the Court noted, the
demonstrators had ample alternate channels, including the media,
for conveying their message, and sufficient symbolism remained in
61. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
62. Clark, 468 U.S. at 290.
63. Id. at 292.
64. Id. at 293 (footnote and citation omitted). Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence,
was not willing to make this assumption. He would have held that"[tihe actions here claimed
as speech entitled to the protections of the First Amendment simply are not speech; rather,
they constitute conduct." Id. at 300.
65. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam) (holding that the
display of a U.S. flag upside down with a peace symbol attached to it was a protected form
of expression).
66. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
67. Id. at 296.
68. Id. at 290.
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the tents, signs, and the demonstrators themselves to convey
whatever message was intended.69
In Clark, then, the doctrine of symbolic indifference began to take
firmer shape. There was the familiar assumption that a message of
some undetermined content was being conveyed through the
gesture. There was, in addition, a bit of added guidance, in the form
of a test for determining whether symbolism was, in fact, expressive
and, hence, deserving of constitutional protection. The test focused
on the gesturer's intent and the recipients' understanding. In Clark,
however, the Court made little effort to ascertain either the
gesturer's intent or the possible meanings the protest might have
had for viewers. Instead, the Court rather summarily concluded
that the protesters' choice of symbol was mostly facilitative or
functional rather than expressive. And, lastly, the Court opined
that these symbolic speakers had alternate channels by which to
convey the same message.
4. The Symbolism of the U.S. Flag
Symbolic protests have often focused on the U.S. flag, a symbol,
as the Court has acknowledged, which is "[piregnant with expres-
sive content."0 Protesters have often defaced the flag in protest of
government policies and actions. The issue, however, is not what
message the protesters intended to convey by their defacement, a
matter generally apparent from the immediate context and from
their testimony.7' The more interesting, and challenging, semiotic
issue is the message the flag itself conveys.
69. Id. at 295.
70. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989).
71. In Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam), for example, a college
student was convicted under a Washington flag misuse statute for hanging a U.S. flag,
upside down and with a peace symbol (made of removable black tape) affixed, out of his
window. The student testified that he displayed the flag in this manner "as a protest against
the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University.' Id. at 408. He "wanted
people to know that [he] thought America stood for peace.' Id. The Court noted the
significance of the context in which the communicative act had occurred, "for the context may
give meaning to the symbol.' Id. at 410. As the Court observed: "A flag bearing a peace
symbol and displayed upside down by a student today might be interpreted as nothing more
than bizarre behavior, but it would have been difficult for the great majority of citizens to
miss the drift of appellant's point at the time that he made it.' Id.
2280 [Vol. 45:2261
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Barnette acknowledged the symbolic power of the flag-its power
to unite a nation-without seeking to render an interpretation of its
meaning.72 The proposition was that whatever the flag conveyed,
the government could not coerce respect for its message. This is not
to say that the government is powerless to protect the flag's
symbolic value. The Court has held, for example, that a state could
prohibit commercial interests from using the flag, "a symbol of [the]
country's power and prestige" and "an emblem of National power
and National honor," to sell beer or other products." As the flag
unites a nation, so it would appear it belongs to a nation, and
cannot be cheapened or defaced by commercial appropriation.
Six decades after Barnette, symbolic protests involving deface-
ment and mutilation of the national flag made their way to the
Court.74 The government asserted an interest in shielding the flag's
symbolism from such defacement. This brought the Court to the
cusp of interpreting the national flag. But the Court consistently
has avoided embracing this interpretive task. The Court has offered
only the most rudimentary observations regarding the flag's
meaning. As the Court said in Spence v. Washington:
For the great majority of us, the flag is a symbol of patriotism,
of pride in the history of our country, and of the service,
sacrifice, and valor of the millions of Americans who in peace
and war have joined together to build and to defend a Nation in
which self-government and personal liberty endure. It evidences
both the unity and diversity which are America. 5
In light of this symbolic value, the government presumably has
some interest in protecting the flag from harm or defacement, as it
has in protecting it from commercial appropriation.
That interest, however, has not been deemed sufficiently weighty
to support prohibitions of physical defacement and mutilation of the
72. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
73. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 42 (1907) (upholding Nebraska statute prohibiting
commercial use of flag).
74. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (finding a Massachusetts statute
prohibiting contemptuous treatment of the flag to be unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (reversing conviction on ground that
broadly worded flag protection statute may have permitted conviction based on words alone).
75. Spence, 418 U.S. at 413.
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national flag. The Court has issued two recent holdings to this
effect. In Texas v. Johnson,76 the Court invalidated a Texas statute
which prohibited the desecration of the American flag and various
other"[v enerated [o]bject [s]."" Although the Court, making refer-
ence to the speech hierarchy, was willing to grant that the govern-
ment "has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it
has in restricting the written or spoken word," it required that the
government have an interest unrelated to the suppression of
Johnson's message.78 Neither of the interests advanced by the
state-preventing a breach of the peace and "preserving the flag as
a symbol of nationhood and national unity"-sufficed.79
As the record contained no evidence of a breach of peace, the
government was forced to rely solely upon its interest in preserva-
tion of the flag's symbolic meaning. The Court did not question the
importance of the flag as a national cultural symbol, declaring that
"[piregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily signifies
this Nation as does the combination of letters found in 'America." 80
But this did not permit the government to protect the flag's
symbolic meaning by allowing the symbolic use of the flag "only in
one direction.""' Mere offense at desecration was not sufficient, the
Court held, to prefer the government's message to that of Johnson.82
The dissenters in Johnson were of the view that the majority was
too dismissive of the flag's cultural meaning. To make their point,
76. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
77. Id. at 400 n. 1. Johnson had burned the flag as a means ofpolitical protest during the
1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas. Id. at 399. The flag burning followed a
demonstration protesting the policies of the Reagan administration and some Dallas-based
companies. Id. There was marching, chanting of political slogans, and "die-ins" staged to call
attention to the dangers of nuclear war. Id. The flag Johnson burned at the conclusion of the
rally, in front of Dallas City Hall, had been handed to him by a fellow protester. Id. Relying
on Spence, the Court concluded that Johnson's conduct was "sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication" to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 406 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 409). According to the Court, Johnson
had intended to convey "a particularized message" and that "the likelihood was great that
the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Id. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418
U.S. at 410-11). In any event, Texas had conceded at oral argument that Johnson's symbolic
conduct was expressive. Id. at 405.
78. Id. at 406.
79. Id. at 407.
80. Id. at 405.
81. Id. at 417.
82. Id. at 420.
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the dissenters provided a detailed history of the flag, through war,
in peace, in poetry, song, and other arts, and, finally, in law.8" But
to take this route, the majority responded, would require that
courts "decide which symbols were sufficiently special to warrant
this unique status."" To interpret meaning in this context, the
Court warned, would force judges "to consult [their] own political
preferences, and impose them on the citizenry, in the very way that
the First Amendment forbids [them] to do."8 For the majority, then,
interpretive avoidance was a constitutional necessity.
Undaunted, Congress, which had been considering flag protection
legislation for some time, enacted the Flag Protection Act of 1989,88
which subjected to criminal penalties anyone who "knowingly
mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor
or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States."87 In
United States v. Eichman,8s the Court invalidated the statute,
holding that it was indistinguishable from the statute invalidated
a year earlier in Johnson.8 9
In sum, the Court has rejected the government's efforts to
preserve the flag's status as a symbol of the nation and of certain
national ideals. While acknowledging the flag's power to convey
such ideals, and even to unite a nation, the Court steadfastly has
declined to protect this symbol based upon its message. The flag
cases add important insight into the doctrine of symbolic gestures.
Here, interpretation is avoided not because of a lack of respect for
the symbol or some normative bias, but because of the specter of
interpretive indeterminacy. How, the Court asks, are judges to
choose from among the many available meanings for this symbol?
The Court fears that interpreting meaning will force judges to
consult and rely upon their personal biases and prejudices.
83. See id. at 421-39 (dissenting opinions of Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, J.).
84. Id. at 417.
85. Id.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1989) (amended 2000).
87. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314 (1990) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 700(a)(1)
(1989)).
88. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
89. Id. at 317. Protesters had set fire to U.S. flags "on the steps of the United States
Capitol while protesting various aspects of the Government's domestic and foreign polic[ies],"
including racial discrimination and the plight of the homeless, and "in Seattle while
protesting the Act's passage." Id. at 312.
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C. Symbolic Eroticism: The Act of Dancing Nude
In a word, nudity has bedeviled the Rehnquist Court. There are
some on the Court who, quite simply, cannot accept that the state
of being nude is sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment
protection. Indeed, for some, the notion that constitutional protec-
tion extends to nudity trivializes the First Amendment. The Court
has allowed various restrictions on nudity, including zoning and
dispersion of "adult" businesses based upon their supposed negative
"secondary effects" in the community. Beyond this, however, the
Court has been unable to speak with a clear voice so far as
nonobscene nudity is concerned.
The Court has been particularly wary of interpreting any
message nude dancing-the striptease-may communicate. The
Court has held that dance itself, even where it occurs in a dance
hall, is not necessarily protected speech. In Dallas v. Stanglin,9" the
Court held that recreational dancing was not sufficiently expressive
to warrant First Amendment protection.91 Echoing the slippery
slope skepticism of O'Brien, the Court reasoned as follows:
It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every
activity a person undertakes-for example, walking down the
street or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall-but such a
kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection
of the First Amendment. We think the activity of these dance-
hall patrons-coming together to engage in recreational
dancing-is not protected by the First Amendment.92
Whatever message dancing, under these particular circumstances,
conveyed to patrons or to onlookers, the Court was unwilling to
expand the First Amendment to cover it.
What, if anything, does the state of being nude add to the
equation? Not much, at least according to a consistently divided
Supreme Court. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,9' for example, the
90. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
91. Id. at 25.
92. Id.
93. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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Court noted that it had already held that barroom nude dancing
involved "the barest minimum of protected expression."9 4 Beyond
this, the plurality, invoking the O'Brien convention, was willing to
do no more than assume that the striptease was expressive of
something,9" although what it "said" was not specifically deter-
mined. The plurality held that Indiana's statute was "justified
despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity."98 For
the plurality, prohibiting public nudity was properly aimed at
"protecting societal order and morality,"9 7 an important governmen-
tal interest unrelated to the suppression of expression.9" Even if
nude dancing conveyed an "erotic message," the plurality was of the
view that requring dancers to "don pasties and G-strings" merely
"makes the message slightly less graphic."99
As mentioned, the Court could not come to any consensus either
with respect to the rationale for upholding the statute or as to the
symbolic importance of nude dancing. Justice Scalia viewed the
enactment "as a general law," which he would not subject to any
First Amendment scrutiny at all. 100 The state was perfectly within
its powers, Scalia argued, in upholding cultural morality through
a ban on all public nudity. It could treat public nudity as contrary
to societal norms and values just as it could prohibit "sadomasoch-
ism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution, and
sodomy."'0 ' Justice Scalia made clear that his position was affected,
at least in part, by the opinion that the First Amendment does not
explicitly extend to expressive conduct, but in his view only "oral
and written speech. " 10 2 Justice Souter, by contrast, started from the
proposition that nude dancing, unlike ballroom dancing or aerobic
dancing, was expressive conduct.' ° He reasoned that "dancing as
a performance directed to an actual or hypothetical audience gives
94. Id. at 565 (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975)).
95. Id. at 565-66.
96. Id. at 567.
97. Id. at 568.
98. Id. at 569.
99. Id. at 570-71.
100. Id. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 575.
102. Id. at 576.
103. Id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring).
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expression at least to generalized emotion or feeling."104 Where the
dancer happens to be nude, Justice Souter continued, "the feeling
expressed" can be interpreted to be "eroticism, carrying an endorse-
ment of erotic experience." 05 In any event, Justice Souter would
have upheld the Indiana statute on the ground that it targeted
the harmful "secondary effects," such as prostitution and sexual
assault, purportedly associated with nude dance performances and
the establishments that offered them to the public.10 6
In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.,I°7 the Court examined Pennsyl-
vania's public nudity prohibition. The Court was unable to come to
the consensus that had escaped it in Barnes. A plurality was of the
opinion that Barnes was controlling. As for the "message" of nude
dancing, the Court noted that being nude itself "is not an inher-
ently expressive condition."' 8 Nevertheless, the plurality was
satisfied that nude dancing was "within the outer ambit of the
First Amendment's protection."0 9 Even so, the plurality held that,
like Indiana, Pennsylvania was entitled to protect public morality
by prohibiting, public nudity under all circumstances, without
regard to message. u °
Pennsylvania had not, according to the plurality, banned
eroticism in its entirety. The ban on public nudity, they stated,
merely "has the effect of limiting one particular means of
expressing the kind of erotic message being disseminated at
Kandyland.""' This was nothing more than a "de minimis""2
restriction; the dancers were "free to perform wearing pasties and
G-strings.""' Besides, the plurality intoned, "society's interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser,
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate."" 4 In
the view of the plurality, the right to view "specified anatomical
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 582-84.
107. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
108. Id. at 289.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 289-94.
111. Id. at 292-93.
112. Id. at 294.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)).
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areas exhibited at establishments like Kandyland" was hardly a
right worth fighting to preserve.115
In sum, the Court's treatment of nudity manifests three elements
of the doctrine of interpretive indifference. First, the Court
embraced the speech hierarchy it had announced in earlier cases;
the state of being nude is held to lie somewhere near the periphery
of the zone of First Amendment protection. Second, and related to
this hierarchical conception of expression, the Court embraced an
aesthetic and normative bias against the striptease-a form of
communication that is considered base, and not "worth" fighting to
protect. Finally, the Court treated the striptease, like the sleeping
protest, as merely one means of expressing a particular message,
not the conveyance of a message unto itself. Thus, the Court
opined, the dancers can express themselves in the same fashion
without in fact being nude.
D. Parades and Other Symbolic Gatherings
People often join together to communicate a common message.
They often do so out of strategic necessity, trying to make their
message stronger, louder, and hence more attractive to the
media. Protesters may benefit from the power inherent in sheer
numbers."' It may indeed be part of the message that others have
joined in the common cause. Picketing is a good example of such
strategic gathering.
17
Although parades can be an effective means of symbolic expres-
sion, sometimes their message can be difficult to ascertain. This
was certainly the case in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston,"' which involved a gathering and
parade in South Boston, an enclave of the city populated by Irish-
Americans. The case arose when parade organizers denied GLIB's
request to participate in the parade.
The celebration for which the parade was intended was twofold:
since 1737 residents had celebrated the feast of the apostle to
115. Id.
116. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (involving a peaceful protest at
which the bystanders threatened the marchers).
117. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
118. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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Ireland, and since 1776 they had commemorated Evacuation Day,
the day royal troops were evacuated from Boston." 9 The Court
made clear that parades are expressive events. "If there were no
reason for a group of people to march from here to there except to
reach a destination," the Court reasoned, "they could make the trip
without expressing any message beyond the fact of the march
itself."2 ' The Court noted that "[r]eal 'parades are public dramas
of social relations, and in them performers define who can be a
social actor and what subjects and ideas are available for communi-
cation and consideration.'" 2' To the Court, then, a "parade" meant
something specific-"marchers who are making some sort of
collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the
way."
122
So parades are expression, not merely motion. 12 As indicated,
however, deciphering the message of a parade can prove to be
difficult. What did this parade mean to its participants? The parade
was, in fact, a hodgepodge of "all sorts of messages (e.g., 'England
get out of Ireland,' 'Say no to drugs')."24 It was this hodgepodge
which GLIB wished to join, to add its message that some Irish
descendants were gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Was part of the parade's
message expressly homophobic? Perhaps, although the Court was
not willing to venture such an interpretation.
Indeed, the Court was not willing to interpret the symbolic
meaning of the parade at all. Here it used an assumption that some
message was intended to favor the speaker. Thus, the Court held
that for purposes of the First Amendment, parade participants need
not have a "narrow, succinctly articulable message" in order to
come within the protection of the First Amendment. 125 The Court
concluded that so long as there is some message being conveyed-a
near certainty given the Court's view of the parade-the organizers
119. Id. at 560. The record indicates that for many years the city itself sponsored these
celebrations, until in 1947 it granted this authority to the South Boston Allied War Veterans
Council. Id. at 560-61.
120. Id. at 568.
121. Id. (quoting S. DAVIS, PARADES AND POWER: STREET THEATRE IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 6 (1986)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 569.
125. Id.
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could not be forced to accept a message they did not wish to include
as part of the parade.126
Thus, in light of the inherent difficulty of interpreting the
symbolic meaning of the parade, the Court created doctrine that
avoids the interpretive task altogether. This approach mirrors that
taken in cases like Barnette, Barnes, Johnson, and Eichman.
Current constitutional doctrine thus reflects interpretive biases and
uncertainties. Normative preferences and concerns regarding the
indeterminacy of meaning have profoundly affected the contours of
the doctrine of symbolic gestures. Sometimes, as in Hurley, the
result is judicial avoidance of meaning altogether.
E. Symbols of Fear, Hate, and Violence
As the discussion of the national flag and nude dancing indicates,
symbols and symbolic acts are often intended to, and do in fact,
evoke a range of emotional responses. Symbols are often utilized for
their communicative impact. As a picture might be said to "say a
thousand words," symbols like the burning cross, the swastika, and
the Confederate flag speak volumes. What they say is assuredly
of interest to many cultural observers-to those who are threat-
ened, for instance, and those who police threatening occurrences.
The peace and tranquility of the larger culture thus depends on
interpretation of, and reaction to, these sorts of symbolic gestures.
The cross, as a symbol, carries a panoply of meanings. It is, of
course, a symbol of many religions, indeed a foundational one for
Christianity. But context matters, and the cross can be used in a
manner that calls forth other interpretations. In Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,'27 the Ku Klux Klan desired to
erect an unadorned cross in a plaza next to the state capitol. A
splintered Court, interpreting the cross as a religious symbol,' s
held that the state could not prohibit its display in a forum where
other content was permitted.'29 Justice Thomas disagreed that the
126. Id. at 580-81. The Court noted that the Council "disclaimled] any intent to exclude
homosexuals as such, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded from
parading as a member of any group that the Council ha[d] approved to march." Id. at 572.
127. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
128. Id. at 757.
129. Id. at 770.
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cross was a religious symbol in this context. To him, the erection of
a cross by the Klan was "a political act, not a Christian one."is As
support for this interpretation, Justice Thomas relied upon his
understanding that the "Klan's main objective [was] to establish a
racist white government in the United States."'31 He went on to
interpret the cross in light of Klan ceremony, specifically the Klan's
symbolic burning of the cross. This burning, Thomas explained, was
"an instrument of intimidation" used by the Klan to advance its
political goal of white supremacy.' 2 For Thomas, then, "[tihe Klan
simply ha[d] appropriated one of the most sacred of religious
symbols as a symbol of hate."33
Cross burning was not at issue in Pinette, although Justice
Thomas felt that this practice undercut any Klan message of
religious symbolism. Burning crosses as a symbolic act came before
the Court recently, in Virginia v. Black. 34 This Article will make an
example of Black in Part III, which turns to an application of the
interpretive model which is elaborated in Part II. In Black, the
Court invalidated a Virginia statute which made it a felony to burn
a cross with the intent to intimidate another.'35 The Court over-
turned the statute because it contained a procedural flaw. 136 But the
Court made it plain that cross burning with the intent to intimidate
another could be prohibited as a threat to peace and safety. 137 The
Court based its holding upon a detailed consideration of the social,
cultural, and historical significance of cross burning, which Justice
Thomas had merely alluded to in his Pinette concurrence. 13 What
makes Black potentially attractive is that the Court did not eschew
130. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
131. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 771 (Thomas, J., concurring).
133. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
134. 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003). In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the Court
invalidated'a city ordinance targeting hate crimes, as applied to a cross burning, on the
ground that the law was an impermissible content-based regulation of speech.
135. Id. at 1552 (agreeing with the Virginia Supreme Court in overturning Black's
conviction).
136. The Court invalidated the statute on the ground that it provided that the prosecution
could make out a prima facie case under the statute, including the defendant's intent, by
proving that a cross had in fact been burned. The Court held that the intent to intimidate
could not be inferred from the act itself. Id. at 1550-51.
137. Id. at 1549-50.
138. See id. at 1544-47 (describing the cultural history of the cross burning ritual).
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interpretation, but embraced it. In construing the ritual of cross
burning, the Court concluded: "The person who burns a cross
directed at a particular person often is making a serious threat,
meant to coerce the victim to comply with the Klan's wishes unless
the victim is willing to risk the wrath of the Klan." 39 The Court
noted that although burning a cross does not always or "inevitably
convey a message of intimidation, often the cross burner intends
that the recipients of the message fear for their lives. And when a
cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any messages are more
powerful." 4 ° The Court concluded, based upon this interpretation,
that Virginia was permitted to single out this "particularly virulent
form of intimidation."'
4 1
Black raises some interesting questions concerning other
"particularly virulent" symbols of hatred and intimidation.
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
symbolism of the swastika, for example, it and other courts have
been protective of the right to display the symbol, even in circum-
stances likely to cause fear of physical violence. Thus, Nazi
sympathizers were permitted to march with their flags and
swastika insignia through the predominantly Jewish town of
Skokie, Illinois. 142 There can be little doubt that the swastika is as
intimidating to some as the burning cross. Yet this symbol has not
been deemed beyond the protection of the First Amendment.
"Dixie," the Confederate flag, also evokes strong emotions,
particularly among African Americans. The perennial battles in
some southern states concerning the place of the Confederate flag
in our modern culture are a testament to the power of symbols to
convey deep and often disturbing messages. The courts thus far
have kept their interpretive distance. 143 If the burning cross can be
139. Id. at 1546.
140. Id. at 1546-47.
141. Id. at 1549.
142. See Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (reversing
injunction entered to prevent members of a political party from, inter alia, displaying
swastika).
143. In NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990), the court held that a state does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment by flying the Confederate
flag over the state capitol building. The state's message, the court reasoned, is equally
offensive to an array of people and is not based solely upon their race. Id. at 1562. Nor,
according to the court, did the display of the flag unconstitutionally "chill" the expression of
2004] 2291
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
interpreted and perhaps prohibited based upon judicial interpre-
tation, however, then perhaps the Confederate flag will be subject
to similar treatment.
Black and its implications are addressed in Part III. For now, it
suffices to point out that the burning cross appears to have given
rise to at least a limited exception to interpretive indifference.
Black is unique for three reasons. First, the Court acknowledged
the inherent power of the symbol to convey messages. Second, the
Court sought access to competing available meanings of cross
burning. Finally, the Court appeared to avoid any aesthetic or other
bias toward the symbol in rendering its interpretation. Black thus
may suggest a promising way forward where symbolic gestures are
concerned.
F. Sacred Symbols
Perhaps nowhere is interpretation more challenging, or more
charged, than where courts confront sacred symbolism. The display
of religious symbols such as crucifixes, creches, and menorahs is
hotly debated, especially, but not exclusively, each holiday season.
The reaction to the recent decision in Alabama to require the
removal of a display of the Ten Commandments in a state court
building is only the most recent evidence that sacred symbols touch
some very deeply.'"
The constitutional issues that the display of sacred symbols on
public property raise have been addressed under the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause.'" Under the Establishment Clause,
African Americans in the state. Id. at 1565.
144. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Judge Suspended for Defying Court on Ten Commandments,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 2003, at A7 (reporting suspension of Chief Justice Roy Moore from the
Alabama Supreme Court for refusal to remove display ofTen Commandments from Supreme
Court lobby); Jeffrey Gettleman, Supporters of Ten Commandments Rally On, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2003, at A20 (reporting demonstration by supporters of Chief Justice Moore and the
display).
145. I will limit my discussion of sacred symbols to the Establishment Clause issues sacred
symbols raise. The Court has addressed religious rituals under a set of free exercise rules
that permits government to burden religion, at least so long as there is no intent to adversely
affect religious practice and observance. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(addressing the use of peyote); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993) (addressing animal sacrifices). Where "neutral" laws of general applicability
are at issue, the symbolic meaning of religious rituals is more or less irrelevant to the
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the constitutional "sweet spot" resides somewhere between
governmental acknowledgment of our religious culture and the
establishment of an official, state-sponsored religion.1" The Court
has tried to locate this sweet spot in two cases involving sacred
symbols-Lynch v. Donnelly47 and County ofAllegheny v. ACLU. 148
Given the task at hand, it is perhaps no surprise that the Court's
efforts to resolve the constitutional issues have pleased no one.
In Lynch, the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island erected an annual
Christmas display, and included in the display a creche, or Nativity
scene. 49 As the Court noted, Pawtucket's display "is essentially like
those to be found in hundreds of towns or cities across the
Nation--often on public grounds--during the Christmas season."50
This particular eclectic display contained, among other items: "a
Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped
poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cut-out figures representing such
characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of
colored lights, a large banner that reads 'SEASONS GREETINGS,'
and the cr~che."' 5' The creche itself included the usual, traditional
figures-"the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds,
kings, and animals, all ranging in height from 5" to 5'."152
The Court held that the display comported with the test it had
articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 5' The Court failed to find any
constitutional question. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-80 (holding that a state may require
compliance with neutral laws of general applicability). Prior to Smith, the Court had not
shied from delving into certain religious cultures. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972), the Court provided a detailed account of the Amish religion, an effort
intended to demonstrate the significance to the Amish of freedom from compulsory education
laws.
146. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,614 (1971) (stating that religion clauses of the
First Amendment are designed "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [the
church or the state] into the precincts of the other," but recognizing that "total separation is
not possible in an absolute sense").
147. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
148. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).




153. Id. at 685. The Court held in Lemon that in order for a law challenged as a violation
of the Establishment Clause to survive scrutiny, it must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) not
have the "principal or primary effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) not foster
or create excessive entanglement of government with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971).
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sectarian purpose in placing a creche in the center of a holiday
display.' Nor did display of the creche, according to the Court,
have the effect of establishing religion.'55 Critical to these holdings
was the Court's interpretive perspective, which elided any consider-
ation of the sacred origins of the symbol. The Court referred to the
crbche as a "passive symbol"'56 commemorating an historic event,
comparing it to, among other things, a painting and the use of a
chaplain for legislative ceremonies.'57 This "passive symbol" was
readily desacralized by its local context-reindeer, elephants, and
the like. The Court found that the display, viewed as a whole,
merely, and harmlessly, "engender[ed] a friendly community spirit
of goodwill in keeping with the season."158 Any aid to religion was,
therefore, "indirect, remote, and incidental."
59
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch has gained some
traction as an alternative approach to Lemon in sacred symbol
cases. Although she reached the same result as the Court, her
approach bears brief consideration. In her concurrence, Justice
O'Connor set forth the "endorsement" 60 approach to sacred
symbols, the core of which is the following principle: "The
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adher-
ence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in
the political community."' 6' Endorsement of religion is prohib-
ited, according to Justice O'Connor, because it "sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community." 6 ' "Disapproval," of course, "sends the
opposite message."
63
The endorsement test expressly requires consideration of
meaning, which includes both an examination of the government's
154. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685-86.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 686.
157. Id. at 685-86.
158. Id. at 685.
159. Id. at 683.
160. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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intent in displaying the symbol and the "'objective' meaning of the
statement within the community."16 4 Under the endorsement test,
meaning is "in large part a legal question to be answered on the
basis of judicial interpretation of social facts."16 As said, Justice
O'Connor, despite offering a new approach that called on courts to
interpret meaning, reached the same result as the majority. 16 6 Like
the majority, she avoided the cr~che's sacred, theological origins,
focusing instead on the "overall holiday setting."
16 7
In County of Allegheny, the Court invalidated a stand-alone
crbche display sponsored by the Holy Name Society, a Catholic
group, on the grand staircase of the county courthouse.168 Relying
in large part on the approach articulated by Justice O'Connor in her
Lynch concurrence, the Court held that the unadorned display of
the creche violated the Establishment Clause.16 9 Here, the Court
noted, "nothing in the context of the display detracts from the
creche's religious message."1
71
In addition to the creche, however, there was a second display at
issue in County of Allegheny. The City-County Building, located a
block from the county courthouse, had its own holiday display. 1'
A forty-five-foot tree decorated with lights and ornaments was
placed outside, at one of the building entrances.7 2 In addition,
the city placed, at the same entrance, an eighteen-foot Chanukah
menorah. "3 The menorah, which was owned by a Jewish group, was
placed next to the tree. 7 4 A sign near the display entitled "Salute
to Liberty," which bore the mayor's name, encouraged city residents
to recall that they were "the keepers of the flame of liberty and our
legacy of freedom. " 17 5
164. Id. at 690. The two inquiries are essentially the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the
Lemon test. See id.
165. Id. at 694.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 692.
168. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 578-79
(1989).
169. Id. at 598-601.
170. Id. at 598.
171. Id. at 581-82.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 587.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 582.
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The Court held that the tree-and-menorah display did not
offend the Establishment Clause.'76 This time the plurality,
through Justice Blackmun, did not shy from examining sacred
origins. It conducted an extensive review of the Talmudic origins of
the menorah and the cultural and historical background of the
Chanukah holiday.'77 Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing that in
doing so, the Court had set itself up as a "national theology
board."178
The plurality was unapologetic, stressing that a review of the
"factual record" regarding the religious object was imperative, and
that secondary sources could be consulted as well in pursuit of an
interpretation of the object. 79 To proceed otherwise, the Court
noted, would be a "prescription of ignorance" which would serve
only to "bias this Court according to the religious and cultural
backgrounds of its Members." 8 ° The plurality reminded Justice
Kennedy that under the endorsement test, whether a religious
object communicates an endorsement of religion is "in large part a
legal question to be answered on the basis ofjudicial interpretation
of social facts."''
The plurality answered this question as it had in Lynch. Like the
crbche in Lynch, the menorah was held to have been desacralized
by its surroundings.8 2 The Court held that a symbol with obvious,
and acknowledged, sacred origins and meaning, when placed next
to a forty-five-foot tree and a hortatory sign, became a passive,
desacralized acknowledgment of the holiday season.'83 What was
being communicated with the menorah and the tree, according to
the Court, was "a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an
acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative
tradition."84
176. Id. at 615, 620-21.
177. Id. at 582-87.
178. Id. at 678 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 614 n.60.
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
182. Id. at 616-21.
183. Id. at 620.
184. Id. at 618.
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The sacred symbol cases manifest both the doctrine of interpre-
tive avoidance and the doctrine of interpretive indifference. In
Lynch, the Court avoided the theology of the creche altogether. In
County of Allegheny, by contrast, the Court delved into the sacred
origins of the menorah only to hold that the symbol was cleansed of
sacred meaning by the presence of the tree and the sign. What both
approaches share in common is an interpretive indifference to the
sacred aspect of symbolic meaning. The Court's Establishment
Clause semiotics holds that elephants, reindeer, and trees can
negate any favoritism to religious insiders and remove the sting or
stigma of sacred symbols for religious outsiders. What is left
uninterpreted, and hence ultimately unappreciated, is the constitu-
tive meaning sacred symbols have for those who truly believe in
them.
G. Symbolic Membership
As the discussion of the symbolism of parades indicated, we
communicate in many ways, including by the company we keep. As
the Court has recognized, First Amendment rights to worship,
speak, or petition the government "could not be vigorously pro-
tected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom
to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaran-
teed."'85 The constitutional right of association, at least as the
courts have interpreted it, essentially boils down to the right to
maintain certain intimate relations ("intimate association") and,
beyond that, the right to communicate some message through our
memberships in secondary and tertiary associations ("expressive
association")."8 6
This right sometimes comes into conflict with the right to
equality. Groups are generally free to discriminate in the selection
of members, unless there are "compelling state interests" to prevent
their doing so.'87 State public accommodation laws prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, and
other classifications. Where the state's interest in preventing the
185. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
186. Id. at 618.
187. Id. at 623.
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discrimination is compelling, and where the association fails to
demonstrate that forcing members upon it will interfere with its
expressive rights, the state may compel the admission of members
the group wishes to exclude.
Thus, for example, the Court held in Roberts that application of
the Minnesota public accommodations law to compel the Jaycees to
admit women to full membership status was not a violation of the
group's First Amendment rights."~ There was little in the way of
judicial inquiry into the message of the Jaycees-its "expressive
interest," in First Amendment parlance. The Court matter-of-factly
acknowledged the organization's bylaws, which stated plainly the
organization's objective to "promote and foster the growth and
development of young men's civic organizations in the United
States"" 9 and to provide an "opportunity for personal development
and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participation by
young men in the affairs of their community."'9 Allowing women to
join as full members, the Court opined, would not affect the group's
ability to engage in expressive activities, and would, in the Court's
view, occasion "no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the
interests of young men."191 Any argument to the contrary, the Court
felt, was rebutted by the fact that women were already permitted
to join the Jaycees as nonvoting members.' 92
Perhaps the Jaycees were arguing contrary to their own past
practice. But there have been more difficult cases. Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale' demonstrated once again the difficulty the courts
have in avoiding the meaning of symbolic gestures. In Dale, the Boy
Scouts expelled an assistant scoutmaster after he announced
publicly that he was homosexual."94 The Court held that application
of the state public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to
188. Id. at 621.
189. Id. at 612.
190. Id. at 613.
191. Id. at 627.
192. Id. Regardless of any incidental impact on the Jaycees' message, the Court held that
the state's compelling interest in prohibiting gender discrimination in public accommodations
easily outweighed any expressive burden on the Jaycees. Id. at 628.
193. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
194. Id. at 645.
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retain a gay scoutmaster violated the association's expressive
rights.
95
In order to reach that conclusion, the Court had to interpret the
meaning of Scout membership. Although purporting to undertake
an independent review of the record for this purpose, 9 ' the Court
relied almost exclusively on Scout leadership's assertions and
litigation-inspired interpretations. The Court essentially deferred
to Scout leadership's assertion that the Scouts' "system of values"
was wholly incompatible with permitting homosexuals to hold
leadership positions.' 97 This was so despite the fact that the
association's foundational documents-the Scout Oath and the
Scout Law-made no reference whatsoever to sexual orientation.
98
The Court stated: "We accept the Boy Scouts' assertion. We need
not inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts'
expression with respect to homosexuality.
" 199
Cases like Roberts and Dale indicate that the Court would like
nothing more than to avoid associational meaning. There is little in
the way of systematic analysis of the associational messages in
these cases. Dale, in fact, indicates that the association is free to
define the meaning of membership, with little in the way of judicial
review. This is so even though the resources needed to examine the
meaning of its membership--documents, statements, policies, and
the testimony of the rank-and-file-are or could be readily avail-
able.
H. Summary: Current Doctrine and the Way Forward
Current First Amendment doctrine regarding symbolic gestures
is characterized by doctrines of interpretive indifference and
avoidance. Since Barnette, symbolic acts have been treated as
"primitive shortcuts" for the expression of ideas and information. 2"0
This perspective has led, over time, to two judicial conclusions.
First, the Court has come to view symbolic conduct as residing at
195. Id. at 644.
196. See id. at 648-49.
197. Id. at 650.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 651.
200. W.Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943).
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the periphery of the First Amendment.2"' Second, in most cases the
Court rather grudgingly seems to accept that symbolic conduct
conveys something, but generally declines to consider specifically
what that something might be.202 These conclusions more or less
pre-determine the merits in most symbolic conduct cases. Whatever
expressive interest sleeping protesters or nude dancers might have,
for example, is readily outweighed by more legitimate and impor-
tant governmental interests.2 " Further, the Court almost always
concludes that whatever message these speakers wish to convey can
be just as readily and effectively conveyed through available
alternative channels of communication.
In other symbolic gesture cases, the Court avoids interpretation
of symbolic meaning not because of aesthetic or other normative
biases, but out of concern for the indeterminacy of meaning. Thus,
the symbolism of sacred symbols, for example, is only superficially
examined for fear that the Court will become a national theology
board. Even where interpretation of meaning seems unavoidable,
as where the expressive interests of associations are concerned, the
Court assiduously avoids a detailed examination of the symbolism
of membership by deferring to leadership interpretations.2 4 As a
result of this widespread indifference and avoidance, our knowledge
concerning symbolic gestures is exceedingly thin and shallow. 205
In proposing an interpretive ethnographic perspective or model
for symbolic gestures, the remainder of this Article hopes for two
results. The first is an elevation of symbolism, and symbolic
gestures, in the hierarchy of speech. One of the benefits of the
ethnographic perspective is its appreciation for the constitutive
nature of symbolic gestures. Courts must recognize that cultures
speak as much through symbols and systems of symbols as they do
201. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
205. Two institutionaljudgments seem to account for this interpretive void. The first takes
the form of a judicial predisposition, sometimes expressly stated, to treat the First
Amendment as fully concerned with only verbal-written or oral-speech," while providing
some lesser protection to nonverbal gestures. The second judgment appears to arise from
concerns over institutional authority and competence to interpret meaning. I will examine
these judgments infra at Part III.
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through verbal speech.2 °6 An appreciation for the utility and power
of symbolism is long overdue in First Amendment doctrine.
The second positive effect the Article hopes for is analytically
sound judicial interpretation of symbolic meaning. Courts will not
be convinced to abandon interpretive indifference and avoidance
unless they are confident they can recover the available meanings
of symbolic gestures and choose among them. The interpretive
ethnographic model provides method and discipline which will lead
to sounder and more legitimate judicial interpretations of symbolic
gestures.
II. AN ETHNOGRAPHIC MODEL FOR SYMBOLIC GESTURES
Why ethnography? What does the study of cultures, and groups
within cultures, have to do with symbolic gestures? The first step
in revisiting symbolic gestures, and overcoming interpretive bias,
fear, and indifference, is to recognize that courts encounter and
interpret cultural meaning all the time. This is especially true in
constitutional cases involving individual rights like speech,
equality, and privacy. More and more often, it seems, judicial
opinions not only comment upon but influence cultural attitudes
and social action on subjects as momentous as race relations, the
death penalty, and, most recently, sexual orientation.20' Similarly,
when courts encounter symbolic gestures, they are called upon to
examine and interpret the symbolic acts, rituals, and associations
of particular subcultures. They are called upon to interpret social
meaning. Thus, courts are, in a broad sense, engaged in the same
206. This is not to say that things like draft card burning and nude dancing cannot be
regulated because they contain expressive elements, that religious symbols necessarily offend
the Establishment Clause, or that expressive associations must be prohibited from excluding
others. Rather, by rendering an informed interpretation of meaning, courts will be better
positioned to determine whether the gesture regulated is being regulated because of the
message it conveys; whether a religious symbol, viewed in full context, offends the
Constitution; and whether an association is being hampered in its expressive activities.
207. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (invalidating a Texas sodomy
statute as a violation of the liberty right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause). Lawrence has been credited (or denigrated, depending upon one's view of
the outcome) as spawning a new cultural openness to homosexuality, including increased
visibility in areas such as entertainment.
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fundamental endeavor in these cases as are ethnographers-
cultural interpretation. °8
To be sure, the perspectives and motivations of ethnog-
raphers and courts differ markedly. Ethnographers are anthro-
pologists; they are interested generally in the science of man.20 9
Ethnographers usually examine foreign-to them and us-cultures
for the purpose of offering empirically valid cross-cultural compari-
sons. 210 Courts interpreting the First Amendment or other constitu-
tional provisions, by contrast, already reside in the American
culture, and they aim at nothing so grand as the uncovering of
cross-cultural similarities and divergences among peoples, or the
explication of a general science of man.2" They aim, as they do
elsewhere, primarily to resolve specific legal disputes- with regard
to symbolic gestures, relatively narrow, but significant, constitu-
tional disputes concerning free speech, religion, and association.
Still, on some level, courts are asked to participate in a dialogue or
discourse with cultures and subcultures about meaning. In order to
do so, courts need to find a way to access the meanings of symbolic
gestures.
In proposing an alternative to the doctrines of interpretive
avoidance and indifference, this Article draws on ethnography
generally, and interpretive ethnography in particular.2 1 2 What is
208. See CLIFFORD, supra note 12, at 39 ("Ethnography is the interpretation of cultures.').
209. See FETTERMAN, supra note 10, at 11.
210. See MICHAEL H. AGAR, SPEAKING OF ETHNOGRAPHY 12 (1986) (stating that an
ethnographer must "encounter[] alien worlds and ... make sense of them").
211. This is not to say that constitutional interpreters are wholly uninterested in, or
insensitive to, foreign legal developments and outside cultural mores. In Lawrence, the
Supreme Court examined Western attitudes regarding sexual orientation. Lawrence, 123 S.
Ct. at 2481, 2483. The Court has done likewise with respect to the administration of the
death penalty. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316-17 n.21 (2002) (noting that many
countries prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded).
212. As one might imagine where the subject-the study of man and culture-is so vast,
anthropologists have engaged an array of ethnographic approaches to seek to understand
diverse cultures. The various frameworks or paradigms cover the disciplinary landscape,
everything from evolutionary to diffusionist to functional to structural to socio-biological. See
ERIKSEN, supra note 10, at 9-23. As these labels imply, few, if any, of these disparate
approaches offer an appropriate model for the task at hand-interpreting symbolic meaning.
In advancing an interpretive model, I am not suggesting that any of these other approaches
are inadequate-only that they are inadequate to the task at hand. If Geertz, as some have
suggested, overemphasizes symbols, see id. at 198, the courts, in my view, underemphasize
them. The interpretive method offers a means of getting back some of the symbolism the
First Amendment has lost. I will focus primarily on Geertz's work for two reasons. First, he
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proposed here is a model, a perspective, a paradigm-not a
blueprint or straitjacket to narrowly constrain judicial recovery of
meaning. The appeal of the anthropo-semiotic, or interpretive,
model is based upon two considerations relevant to the current
dysfunction of the doctrine of symbolic gestures: First, the model
appropriately values symbols and symbolic meaning; second, the
model does not shy from interpretation, but rather embraces it,
although with full awareness of the limitations of the interpretive
endeavor.
A. A Semiotic Conception of"Culture"
Since cultural exposition and a dialog of social meaning are the
tasks at hand, the perspective proposed must necessarily begin with
some conception of "culture." As ethnographers are all too aware,
this is no mean feat, as "culture" is a hotly contested concept.213
Part of the allure of Geertz's interpretive approach, insofar as the
First Amendment is concerned, is its appreciation for the power and
significance of symbols and symbol systems within cultures. With
the hope that it will encourage courts to begin to engage symbolic
meaning, this Article emphasizes this semiotic concept of culture as
a starting point.
1. The Cultural and Constitutional Significance of Symbols
Geertz defines culture as "an historically transmitted pattern of
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate,
is generally credited with founding the interpretive approach, and has done the most to
advance it. See id. at 21-22. Although there are many others who are associated with this
particular school of anthropological thought, Geertz remains its leading voice. Second,
Geertz has been a prolific author and researcher; his works alone suffice to provide both a
framework for and examples of interpretive method. See id.
213. Geertz advanced a concept of an integrated, synthetic culture which can be identified
and defined by reference to its constituent parts. See CLIFFORD, supra note 12, at 31
(criticizing portrayal of a "coherent world" in which parts of society are viewed as
"microcosms or analogies of wholes"). Postmodern ethnographers like Clifford have raised
the specter of ethnocentrism in Western descriptions of "the Other." See id. at 22 (claiming
that "the West can no longer present itself as the unique purveyor of anthropological
knowledge about others").
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perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes
toward life."214 This is a semiotic215 conception of culture which
defines social action through the interpretation of meaning.
Geertz's definition of "symbol" is straightforward, and it is broad
enough to encompass the symbolic gestures which are the subject
of this Article. For Geertz, a symbol is "any object, act, event,
quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for a conception-the
conception is the symbol's 'meaning."216 A symbol can be "anything,
in fact, that is disengaged from its mere actuality and used to
impose meaning upon experience."217 In constitutional terms, this
is a significant starting point; it means that symbols other than
language are used to convey ideas, attitudes, and emotions. When
they are used to communicate or express, symbols are not merely
objects in themselves; they are "representative of something else.""'
Geertz, for example, points to the significance of "gestures,
drawings, musical sounds, mechanical devices like clocks, or
natural objects like jewels."219 These communicative methods and
objects are integral, not merely marginal or insignificant, elements
of an expressive culture. The Constitution, of course, places no
value on things such as clocks or other natural objects, whatever
they may signify as objects. But objects that individuals utilize in
order to communicate some idea, concept, or emotion are assuredly
within the ambit of the speech guarantee. One who waves, or burns,
a flag is communicating; as is one who participates in a parade, or
erects a sacred symbol, or, perhaps to some lesser extent, joins an
association. Symbols thus often serve an "expressive function."220
Symbolic communication takes place through cultural interaction
by way of shared understandings of the communicative content of
214. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Religion as a Cultural System, in INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES,
supra note 12, at 87, 89.
215. Semiotics, simply put, is the science of signs. See JORGEN DINES JOHANSEN & SVEND
ERIK LARSEN, SIGNS IN USE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMIOTICS 3 (Dinda L. Gorle & John Irons
trans., 2002) ("In its broadest sense, semiotics comprises all forms offormation and exchange
of meaning on the basis of phenomena which have been coded as signs.").
216. GEERTZ, supra note 214, at 91.
217. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man, in
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, supra note 12, at 33, 45.
218. See ALFRED SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD 118-19 (George
Walsh & Frederick Lehnert trans., 1967).
219. GEERTZ, supra note 217, at 45.
220. SCHUTZ, supra note 218, at 119.
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these objects, acts, events, and institutions.221 Geertz conceives
of all human behavior as "symbolic action-action which, like
phonation in speech, pigment in painting, line in writing, or
sonance in music, signifies."222 If one accepts Geertz's view that all
action, and all gestures, signify something, then the task of the
ethnographer is to get at what is being signified or said. This same
task-to get at what is "said" by gestures-confronts courts where
symbolic acts, symbols, and institutions are concerned. Courts,
however, have largely avoided this task or have been indifferent to
it.
In explaining the anthropo-semiotic approach, Geertz borrows the
example of the rapid contraction of the eyelids. What is this
event-an "involuntary twitch," a "conspiratorial signal to a friend,"
an imitative parody, or perhaps even a rehearsal of the parody
itself?223 Geertz posits that the winker "is communicating, and
indeed communicating in a quite precise and special way: (1)
deliberately, (2) to someone in particular, (3) to impart a particular
message, (4) according to a socially established code, and (5)
without cognizance of the rest of the company."224 The wink is
experienced by social actors; it is understood by them according to
a "socially established code." The "thing to ask" about winks and
gestures, Geertz posits, is "not what their ontological status is," but
"what their import is: what it is, ridicule or challenge, irony or
anger, snobbery or pride, that, in their occurrence and through their
agency, is getting said."225
The translation of cultural symbols is a central component of
interpretive ethnography.226 Indeed, the semiotic conception of
221. See id. at 118 ("It is quite immaterial to the understanding of expressive acts whether
they consist of gestures, words, or artifacts. Every such act involves the use of signs.").
222. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 10.
223. Id. at 6-7.
224. Id. at 6. This analysis is similar to the functional and constitutional definitions of
"speech." The Spence Court's conception of speech involves a speaker purposefully
communicating some message, and an audience likely to understand that some message is
being conveyed. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
225. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 10 (emphasis added); see also SCHUTZ, supra note 218, at
112 (arguing that interpreters should seek "genuine understanding" of the meaning of social
action-that is, identifying what the speaker intended to communicate by his actions).
226. See C. OGDEN & L.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 9 (7th ed. 1945)
("Symbolism is the study of the part played in human affairs by language and symbols of all
kinds, and especially of their influence on Thought.").
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culture places symbolism at the heart of culture. One cannot
survive in a world that relies on symbolic currency unless one can
differentiate among winks, fake-winks, and practice winks. To take
a more practical example, one must be able to interpret street signs
and other traffic symbols in order to travel safely from place to
place. Thus, interpretation and understanding of symbols is
essential for cultural formation, discourse, and, sometimes, even
survival.
An interpreter of social action cannot understand a culture
without attempting to recover the meaning of its symbols and
symbol systems. Indeed, Geertz's semiotic approach is based upon
the supposition that man, unlike other animals, depends upon
knowledge of symbols and symbol systems, the accumulation of
which constitute a culture, for his very survival. These gestures are
public, and their understanding is based not upon any "genetic
sources of information," but rather upon the shared social conven-
tions of the people to whom they are directed.227 Semiotic "compe-
tence" is critical to cultural survival: "Man is so in need of such
symbolic sources of illumination to find his bearings in the world
because the nonsymbolic sort that are constitutionally ingrained in
his body cast so diffused a light."2" For recipients, gestures are
informative, persuasive, derogatory, threatening, etc. Members of
a culture must be competent in translating these gestures because,
like words, they orient-they help to make sense of the chaos of
events which surround us.
For Geertz, a world without "culture patterns-organized
systems of significant symbols"-would be bleak.229 Man's actions
would be "virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts
and exploding emotions, his experience virtually shapeless."23 °
Without symbols and gestures, then, we are "mental basket
cases."23' We are "not merely a talented ape ... a kind of formless
monster with neither sense of direction nor power of self-control, a
chaos of spasmodic impulses and vague emotions."2 2 Or, as Geertz
227. GEERTZ, supra note 217, at 45.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 46.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 49.
232. GEERTZ, supra note 214, at 99.
[Vol. 45:22612306
TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT ETHNOGRAPHY
darkly summarizes his point, "[w]ithout men, no culture, certainly;
but equally, and more significantly, without culture, no men."233
In terms of First Amendment symbolism, individual survival
generally does not hang in the balance. To be sure, for those who
are the targets of threatening gestures like cross burnings,
understanding the meaning of a gesture can be a matter of life and
death. But in the main, our survival is not threatened by a lack of
understanding of symbolic gestures like flag burning, nude dancing,
or sacred symbols.
This does not mean, however, that these and other gestures are
any less worthy of attention or protection. Culture would survive
without some protected verbal speech as well, including many
falsehoods and tasteless political parodies. Even such crude verbal
signs and symbols, however, are considered worthy of respect and
protection. Symbolic communication is no less worthy. Art of all
stripes, and music of varying degrees of refinement, are part of the
cultural makeup. The use of fire, nudity, crosses, creches, and
memberships also signifies something about our culture. These are
sometimes unconventional public manifestations of cultural
activity. But along with more conventional signs, like language,
they comprise a culture.
Expressive acts are not only culturally significant; they are part
of the First Amendment marketplace of ideas. Sit-ins and protests,
for example, serve educational and sometimes transformative
cultural functions. There is a foundational right not to have one's
expression silenced or limited absent weighty governmental
reasons. 234 Before one is silenced, or held to have sufficient alterna-
tive modes for the conveyance of a particular message, it is
imperative to understand what the message in fact is. As a culture,
we ought to know which messages are being silenced or diluted,
which are favored by the government, and which are disfavored.
With regard to sacred symbols, there is the right not to be treated
as a cultural "outsider," and a corresponding limitation on the
government granting cultural "insider" status to religious adher-
ents.235 In order to police this symbolic boundary, it is necessary to
233. GEERTZ, supra note 217, at 49.
234. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
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understand the messages sacred symbols might be communicating
to cultural participants. Rights of association sometimes clash with
rights to be free from discrimination, necessitating a consideration
of the meaning of associational membership. None of these basic
constitutional rights can be properly protected and enforced without
a consideration of symbolic meaning.
More broadly, what is at stake, insofar as the First Amendment
is concerned, is a cultural discourse of symbols in which courts
are routinely asked to participate, as moderators, but for which
they have neither the inclination nor the tools to enter the expres-
sive arena. As a result, there are subcultures whose expression is
devalued for its apparent primitiveness, but for which there are
no meaningful alternative outlets. People of faith are engaged in a
discourse with the government to which courts are not privy.
Associations may be allowed to discriminate based upon messages
and meanings which are in fact inconsistent with their own
institutional cultures. This symbolic discourse, which deeply
impacts constitutional rights, is currently inaccessible to courts.
There is, as a result, a serious gap in cultural discourse and
understanding.
One of the most valuable insights from a semiotic approach to
culture is that a constitutional doctrine of speech which limits "full"
protection to verbal symbols is grossly inadequate. Symbols are
centrally, not peripherally, located, whether the interpreter finds
them aesthetically agreeable or not. Symbols are what we say; they
are how we worship; they are why we join together. Interpretive
ethnographers grasp this fundamental point. They want to know
what a symbol signifies to its participants and observers. This same
inquiry is appropriate, indeed necessary, to the judicial examination
of symbolic gestures.
2. "Sacred Symbols"
Geertz has discussed specifically how his anthropo-semiotic
framework might advance the study of "sacred symbolsr-religious
icons and rituals including creches and other religious displays.
This Article proposes to apply the interpretive approach to sacred
symbols. Hence it is worthwhile to examine, if very cursorily,
Geertz's approach to religion and religious symbols. Insights from
2308 [Vol. 45:2261
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Geertz's analysis will be drawn upon in Part III, when First
Amendment sacred symbols are reexamined utilizing the
ethnographic model.2" 6
For Geertz, "religion" is "(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2)
establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motiva-
tions in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of
existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of
factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely
realistic."" v Thus, like his definition of culture, Geertz's definition
of "religion" is grounded in the centrality of symbolism.
The cross, or crucifix, is a paradigmatic sacred symbol. It is
obviously more than an object, a thing, to some subset of believers
within a culture. The cross stands for, or represents, something
else-an idea, a belief or set of beliefs, a roadmap for life. Sacred
symbols, according to Geertz, "function to synthesize a people's
ethos-the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and
aesthetic style and mood-and their world view-the picture they
have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most compre-
hensive ideas of order."" s Sacred symbols, then, are like others in
that they help us to make sense of the culture in which we live.
But Geertz's definition of "religion" indicates that sacred symbols
are even more powerful. These symbols form the basis for an entire
"order of existence," and they legitimate "moods and motivations,"
making them seem "real" even if they in fact are not at all an
accurate perception of "reality." The cross and other sacred symbols
can, for some believers, literally explain the inexplicable-concepts
like suffering, or evil, for example.2" 9 They "sum up, for those for
whom they are resonant, what is known about the way the world is,
the quality of the emotional life it supports, and the way one ought
236. See infra Part III.
237. GEERT2, supra note 214, at 90. I do not intend to defend or critique this definition,
which is contested in the discipline of anthropology as well as in the discipline of law. I
simply wish to draw on insights borne of Geertz's experience with interpreting the religious
aspects of cultures.
238. Id. at 89.
239. See id. at 103-08 (discussing suffering and evil).
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to behave while in it." 2" Sacred gestures speak to believers; what
they speak of is faith, divinity, spirituality.241
We need not simply take Geertz's word for this. The power of
sacred symbols is apparent in our culture. It explains why the cross
is carried at pro-life rallies. The pull of sacredness accounts, in
large part, for the powerful reaction of some faithful to the recent
removal of the Ten Commandments display from the Alabama
Supreme Court building.242 The dramatic displays of devotion and
spirituality that accompanied the removal of this symbol demon-
strate that, for some, the Ten Commandments are more than
granite and text. The faithful, who were previously anonymous,
reacted in a very public manner to the threat to this symbol. They
identified themselves as the "insiders" to whom the commandments
spoke.
Geertz posits that it is "the imbuing of a certain specific complex
of symbols---of the metaphysic they formulate and the style of
life they recommend-with a persuasive authority which, from an
analytic point of view, is the essence of religious action."243
"[C] eremonial form," Geertz notes, even something as simple as the
"decoration of a grave," seems to induce belief (what he calls "moods
and motivations").244 Depending upon the context, a sacred symbol
may induce moods and emotions that "range from exultation to
melancholy, from self-confidence to self-pity, from an incorrigible
240. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Ethos, World View, and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols, in
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, supra note 12, at 127 ("Sacred symbols thus relate an
ontology and a cosmology to an aesthetics and a morality: their peculiar power comes from
their presumed ability to identify fact with value at the most fundamental level, to give to
what is otherwise merely actual, a comprehensive normative import.").
241. Geertz posits that the anthropology of religion, still a thriving subdiscipline, should
proceed on a two-front agenda: "[Flirst, an analysis of the system of meanings embodied in
the symbols which make up the religion proper, and, second, the relation of these systems
to socio-cultural and psychological processes." GEERTZ, supra note 214, at 119. The first
prong of analysis, then, proceeds along the same path as the analysis of other cultural
symbols and gestures. This is the path I will pursue for symbolic gestures, including sacred
symbols. The second prong is far more ambitious, however-literally an analysis of the
complex process whereby sacred symbols induce "belief" in worshipers. Developments in
cognitive science and psychology, which may inform this inquiry, are beyond my scope. What
I hope to draw upon from Geertz's approach to sacred symbols is, first, the primacy of those
symbols, and, second, a legitimate means for interpreting their meaning.
242. See supra note 137.
243. GEERTZ, supra note 214, at 112.
244. Id.
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playfulness to a bland listlessness."2' This power to induce moods
is especially pronounced where public rituals or rites-masses,
ceremonies, etc.-or what Geertz calls "cultural performances" are
enacted.2 4' A visitor may appreciate the aesthetics of religious
symbolism or ceremony-its music, for example-but "for partici-
pants they are in addition enactments, materializations, realiza-
tions of [religion]-not only models of what they believe, but also
models for the believing of it."247 "In these plastic dramas," Geertz
writes, "men attain their faith as they portray it."
248
What all of this suggests, even if one is not willing to accept the
full force of Geertz's analysis, is the need for increased attention to
the sacredness of symbols and gestures which invoke and shape
religious beliefs. An interpretive, semiotic approach to sacred
symbols must take into consideration the "moods and motivations"
sacred symbols can evoke in the faithful.249 It is precisely that
accounting, or appreciation, which is missing from the current
constitutional doctrine of sacred symbols.
B. The Mechanics of the Interpretive Perspective
Thus far, the Article has posited that symbolic gestures lie not on
the periphery of culture, but nearer its core. If the reader does not
accept a parity of verbal and nonverbal expression, perhaps it has
at least been established that gestures cannot be dismissed without
making at least some effort to engage their meaning. The judicial
object, like the ethnographic, should be "a stratified hierarchy of
meaningful structures in terms of which twitches, winks, fake-
winks, parodies, rehearsals of parodies are produced, perceived, and
interpreted."25 ° Only then can we have an honest airing of the
symbolic discourse that permeates our culture.
This raises some substantial pragmatic concerns. For if courts
are to alter their longstanding perspective with regard to gestures,
they will require systematic methods and tools with which to do the
245. Id. at 97.
246. Id. at 113.
247. Id. at 114.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 119.
250. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 7 (emphasis added).
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necessary interpreting. This section develops the interpretive model
which is proposed for symbolic gestures. The development proceeds
by way of a concrete example from the ethnographic literature.
Geertz's monograph on Balinese cockfighting is perhaps the best
known ethnographic description ever rendered. The monograph is
well worth reading, if only for its erudition and entertainment
value. It is featured here, however, as an example of the perspective
that courts should adopt when they encounter symbolic gestures in
First Amendment cases.
1. Data Gathering-Building Cultural Context
Law and ethnography unquestionably share one thing in
common-an attention to factual detail.25' The raw data that make
up this detail are referred to as "facts," a term as familiar, and often
as contested, for ethnographers as for lawyers. Together the
common currency of facts account for a significant portion of the
"context" of a legal dispute or a cultural research program. As
sciences or, as some would prefer, disciplines, law and ethnography
depend upon facts as much as, if not more than, theory. Theory is
of little use without some concrete context in which to apply it,
something solid from which to build knowledge and test theoretical
concepts. So ethnographers, like lawyers, need facts in order to do
what they do. In both disciplines, the facts required are tied to some
particular perspective or ultimate end-a theory of culture,
perhaps, or a legal "theory of the case."
The first element or convention of the ethnographic model is thus
quite familiar to law-an accumulation of facts and data about a
gesture. Now, it must be conceded that the manners in which law
and ethnography gather facts about cultures, and symbols within
cultures, differ in some marked respects. The ethnographer, for
example, first looks for an "entry" into the culture of interest,
then establishes rapport with the people, or "informants," and next
proceeds to transcribe what occurs over the course of an extended
period of time. The convention is generally known as "participant
observation," and it has formed the basis for ethnographic
251. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative
Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 12, at 167.
2312 [Vol. 45:2261
2004] TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT ETHNOGRAPHY 2313
professionalization, and, for some, interpretive authority, since at
least the end of the nineteenth century.252
Thus, before observing the ritual of the Balinese cockfight, Geertz
had to become, at least in some artificial sense, a "member" of the
village community. 2 3 But whereas the ethnographer typically,
though not always, enters the field and literally lives among the
"natives," becomes "embedded" (to use the recently popularized
wartime term), lawyers and judges obviously cannot take such a
direct route to symbolic meaning.2 4 Fortunately, there is more
than one way to gather facts and, ultimately, to establish
interpretive authority. The law has its own-sometimes archaic,
often bewildering-rules and procedures for gathering facts and
"local knowledge." Appropriately enough, we call this process
"discovery."255 Moreover, unlike ethnographers, who must scratch
and claw for interpretive authority, the interpretive authority of
judges does not depend on "being there" in the sense of living among
252. See CUFFORD, supra note 12, at 24 ("Participant observation obliges its practitioners
to experience, at a bodily as well as an intellectual level, the vicissitudes of translation."). For
a summary of the origins and practice of participant observation, see id. at 26-32.
253. It happens that Geertz managed this not always easy task in a rather unusual, and
serendipitous, fashion. When the police came to raid the cockfight, an event that is illegal in
Bali, Geertz scattered and ran from the authorities like the rest of the villagers. GEERTZ,
supra note 23, at 413-15. According to Geertz, he became, if only in some artificial sense,
Balinese. Thereafter, according to Geertz, he was able to move about in the village culture
without attracting undue attention. See id. at 414-15.
254. Some ethnographers maintain that "classical ethnography" requires at least six
months and up to two years of field observation. See, e.g., FETrERMAN, supra note 10, at 18.
This is neither possible nor necessary in all cases. The classical view applies most strongly
to the observation of foreign cultures, and "it may be an overstatement for work conducted
in one's own culture." Id. at 19.
255. Unlike ethnographic discovery, legal discovery tends not to be freewheeling, or at
least is not intended to be so. Lawyers generally lack the ethnographic luxury of time, and
their discovery is much more structured, guided, and even constrained by rules, expense, and
other conditions. Factfinding, in the legal sense, is, or at least should be, focused on what the
decision maker will need to render a judgment, or an interpretation. Nor, I would point out,
is legal fact-gathering first-hand, as judges necessarily depend upon facts which sometimes
have been severely filtered, or packaged, by advocates with an interest in the outcome of the
dispute. Judges often must choose from among various interpretations presented to them.
But ethnographers do not receive "clean" facts either; the facts they gather are often just as
situated as those produced by legal process. As Geertz notes from the ethnographer's
perspective: "[Wihat we call our data are really our own constructions of other people's
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to." GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 9.
Judges and ethnographers deal in the same factual trade-as Geertz sums up the
situatedness of facts: "Winks upon winks upon winks." Id.
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protesters, nude dancers, and the like. Interpretive authority comes
with the office. In short, ethnographers must justify their basic
claim to interpretive authority; courts need not.
What is central is that both disciplines value specifics, contexts,
and the accumulation of detail, and that lawyers have their own
tools for unearthing the relevant facts-even if courts cannot come
as close to local contexts as many ethnographers." 6 The specific
recording of events we call "the record" might be analogized to the
ethnographer's field notes, the bread and butter of ethnographic
participant observation. Geertz, for instance, took copious notes as
he observed daily life in the Balinese village."' His notes, like those
of all ethnographers, are meant to capture the details of the village
at a specific point in time-its myths, rituals, gestures, relations,
structures, and sacred symbols. The object, as in legal discovery, is
to "interrogate" witnesses, collect documents, and take down as
much as one can; there will be time enough later to sort through the
data in an effort to make some sense of it all.258
Ethnographers, like lawyers and judges, handle a variety of
sources of information-"observation, conversation, interview,
archive, or literary text" all contribute to an understanding of
symbolic gestures and other cultural events. 59 The lawyer gathers
facts in a similar fashion, and in a multitude of forms, from writ-
ten statements, to videotapes and recordings, to documentation
256. The distance, in time and space, that characterizes legal factfinding has been
narrowed substantially by technology. For example, judges who cannot, or choose not to,
patronize a nude dancing establishment to see a performance live can view and experience
a tape of the performance without losing much in the translation. Nearly everything-
demonstrations, rallies, protests, displays, dances, functions, cross burnings-can be readily
captured in living color and preserved. Recall, in addition, that these gestures do not take
place within wholly foreign cultures, as they often do for ethnographers, but within what we
might characterize as subcultures within our larger culture. Judges, unlike ethnographers,
do not start from a position of utter ignorance with respect to the gesture under
consideration. Unlike Geertz, a court wishing to render an interpretation need not spend
time infiltrating a culture, learning its language, customs, myths, and rituals.
257. See, e.g., GEERTZ, supra note 23, at 412-15 (providing a detailed account of some of
Geertz's experience in Bali).
258. The juridical analogy was prevalent in some early ethnographic work. Marcel
Griaule, for example, "interrogated" his informants and concentrated not only on vigorously
interviewing (deposing) them to expose the "truth," but also compiling reams of documents
to support his interpretations of their culture. See CLIFFORD, supra note 12, at 67-74
(describing Griaule's methods of observation).
259. AGAR, supra note 210, at 36.
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concerning events and circumstances. For example, an ethnogra-
pher interested in studying membership in the Boy Scouts would,
perhaps in addition to living among the Scouts, consult not only
leaders' statements about membership, but also oaths, creeds,
membership rituals, and statements by the members themselves
about membership in the Scouts. A lawyer or judge studying this
same membership presumably would follow roughly the same
course without, of course, becoming a Scout or living among them.
The judge must rely, to an extent ethnographers sometimes do as
well, on others' accounts and studies. In general, the ethnographer
usually creates studies; thejudge locates studies and resorts to them
in rendering an opinion.
It is important to recognize that in building context,
ethnographers do not limit themselves to a narrowly empirical
version of "the record." They cannot limit factfinding to the
observation and recording of the twitch, the event, that gives no
clue of meaning. The history of a gesture, what others have said
about it, or felt about it, its general place in the context of the
specific culture under examination, and in the larger culture, are all
part of the relevant, expanded "record."
Thus, Geertz did not limit his inquiry into cockfighting to the
specific events of the cockfight-the roosters, the bettors, etc.-
although these were, of course, part of the record. The context went
much deeper than this. It included, among other things, facts about
the history of the cockfighting ritual, its influence on everyday
expression in the village (imagery and double entendre were
common, as one might expect), its connection to commerce, its
influence on artistic expression (cockfighting was a popular subject
for poetry), and past efforts by authorities to regulate the event.26 °
Judges, too, may have to go outside the record to locate and
consult information about a gesture. Complex gestures require
moving somewhat beyond the judicial comfort zone. But judges are
not, as a general matter, limited to "the record" assembled by
lawyers "in the field." There are a host of extra-record sources of
information for courts to consult and plenty of help as well from
260. GEERTZ, supra note 23.
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interested third parties, like amici, who often provide the details
and data the parties overlook or choose not to present.261
Law, then, like ethnography, starts from the premise that
"the shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local, indivisible
from their instruments and their encasements." 262 Lawyers and
ethnographers alike refer to this local encasement as "context."
Whether ethnographer or judge, the goal of the factfinder is to fill
in the contextual blanks so that readers, or viewers, can make the
best sense of enigmatic gestures like nude dancing, the burning of
draft cards, flags, crosses, the display of a menorah, and member-
ship in a particular association or group. In ethnography, as in law,
there "has always [been] a keen sense of the dependence of what is
seen upon where it is seen from and what it is seen with."2 61
Thus far, the interpretive ethnographic model provides the
insight that in order to understand a gesture or symbol, the judge
first must find out as much about it, and its surrounding culture,
as possible within the parameters of the judicial function. Rigorous
factfinding and extra-record context building make up the first
element or convention of the interpretive model. The Article turns
next to what the ethnographer, and the court, are supposed to do
with all of this data, as they progress from gesture toward possible
meanings.
2. "Thick Description"
If the goal is to render, to interpret, symbolic meaning, there
must be a method by which the interpreter can access or expound
upon meaning. Ethnography is not, in Geertz's view, the "tech-
niques and received procedures" of factfinding and participant
observation described above.26' What defines the discipline, he says,
"is the kind of intellectual effort it is: an elaborate venture in, to
borrow a notion from Gilbert Ryle, 'thick description.' 265
261. There are limits, of course, no matter what the discipline, as to what information
might be available. Where courts make it plain that they expect to find facts on an issue in
the record, however, there is some assurance that lawyers in the field will at least attempt
to produce this information.
262. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 12, at 4.
263. Id.
264. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 6.
265. Id.
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"Thick description" has been a central concept in ethnography
since Geertz popularized the phrase in the early 1970s. Thick
description is writing that exhibits an accumulation of detail, a
focus upon the material, specific, contingent, and incidental aspects
of cultural context. To begin to flesh out this convention, think
again of the winking example. A "thin" description would simply
note the empirically observable physical properties or constituent
elements of the event or motions-a person has contracted her
eyelids.266 A "thick" description, by contrast, includes a description
of context, circumstances, apparent motives and purposes, and the
history of the gesture itself.6 7 It makes use of the whole of an
expansive contextual record. Assuming the contraction was not
caused by a speck of dust in the eye, what is the winker trying
symbolically to communicate? As lawyers build cases and proofs,
and judges build arguments and rationales, ethnographers
build descriptions. These are the evidentiary particulars that will
ultimately be used to support an interpretation of symbolic
meaning.
Winks and blinks are one thing. It may take little analysis to find
out what is intended by these simple gestures. We might, after all,
simply ask the winker what was intended. 68 This same tact may
work for some symbolic gestures as well, such as placing a peace
symbol on a flag or wearing a black armband to school. With some
rudimentary context, meaning can be readily recovered. But what
of more complex, contested symbolic gestures? What of burning
crosses, nude dancers, or religious displays?
Attention to the specifics of Geertz's cockfight monograph will
assist in explicating further the concept of "thick description."
Having joined the village, established some rapport with its people,
and engaged in rigorous and systematic fact-gathering, Geertz next
sets out to describe, in a very detailed fashion, what it is that he
has witnessed. 269 He begins, properly enough, with a description of
266. Id. at 7.
267. Id.
268. Indeed, as far as litigation is concerned, this would be the preferred course-to take
testimony concerning intent. As I will posit below, this is probably sufficient for legally
uncontested gestures. But it is epistemologically inadequate for rendering interpretations
of legally contested gestures, which raise an issue of communicative intent which cannot be
resolved except by attention to context. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
269. It is important to note one of the differences between judicial opinion writing and
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place-Tihingan, a small, remote Balinese village of about 500
people" ° Now it is significant that the cockfight was not the first
thing Geertz observed in Tihingan-far from it, in fact. He had a
vast knowledge of Balinese village culture before he observed the
cockfight and finally prepared the monograph.27' So Geertz's
description is highly informed-it is "deep" as well as "thick."272
Part of the underlying context Geertz describes, as he moves,
both textually and conceptually speaking, in concentric circles about
the cockfight ritual, is the vast influence cockfighting has on village
culture. At a general cultural level, as mentioned earlier, cockfights
have been celebrated in Balinese art, including poetry. Through
thick description, the reader learns, in addition, of the villagers'
reverence for roosters; these are valued pets, with special diets and
grooming rituals that would make the most indulgent American pet
owner feel shamefully inadequate.Y The reader begins to sense, in
the midst of this description, that the cockfight ritual is a signifi-
cant event in village culture. The ritual seeps into the nooks and
crannies of various cultural webs. Cockfights, as symbols, are used
to refer to "[clourt trials, wars, political contests, inheritance
disputes, and street arguments."27' So, Geertz leads the reader
to understand, cocks are themselves symbolic of something-
"expressions or magnifications of their owner's self, the narcissistic
ethnographic writing. As Geertz notes, for the ethnographer, "[wianderings into yet smaller
sideroads and wider detours does little harm, for progress is not expected to be relentlessly
forward anyway, but winding and improvisational, coming out where it comes out." GEERTZ,
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 12, at 6. Legal writing in general, and opinion writing in
particular, must come to the point rather more quickly, and generally comes out where the
author intends to head. Still, that is not to say that judges could not learn something from
,a less directed, improvisational writing technique. Judges might be surprised to find, in
symbolic expression cases for example, that they have come to some clearer understanding
of a gesture by writing thickly about it, without essentially predetermining its meaning or,
what is worse, ignoring meaning altogether.
270. GEERTZ, supra note 23, at 412 (describing Balinese village).
271. For a sampling of Geertz's other writings on Balinese culture, see, e.g., CLIFFORD
GEERTZ, 'Internal Conversion" in Contemporary Bali, in INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES,
supra note 12, at 170; CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali, in
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, supra note 12, at 360.
272. As said, this is the sort of background preparation judges do not need to engage in,
since they are not complete strangers to the culture. As do ethnographers, however, judges
bring this background information to bear on their interpretations.
273. See GEERTZ, supra note 23, at 419.
274. Id. at 418.
2318 [Vol. 45:2261
TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT ETHNOGRAPHY
male ego writ out in Aesopian terms." 75 This is the first piece of the
cultural puzzle to be filled in through the descriptive convention.
The first hint at interpretation is Geertz's statement that "it is only
apparently cocks that are fighting there. Actually, it is men." 76
This last observation is merely an interpretive tease, however, for
more must be known and understood about the ritual before it can
be interpreted as something other than a duel between animals,
conducted for sport, entertainment, or perhaps even sheer cruelty.
There must, of course, be a description of the fight itself. Geertz
provides this description in characteristically thick detail. The
reader is transported, through exacting description, to the village
square, where a ring of about fifty square feet has been constructed,
interested villagers have gathered, and the participants (man and
beast) await the umpire's signal (as it happens, the dropping of a
coconut with a hole punched in the middle into a bucket, this to be
used also as a timing device for the match).277 There are several
matches, each arranged, we are told, on an ad hoc basis. 27" To add
an element of pageantry (for the crowd) and danger (for the birds),
spurs (tadji) measuring four to five inches are affixed to the cocks
by villagers expert in the fitting of such armaments.279
Then, finally, the moment of truth-the matched cocks are placed
in the center of the ring. The combatants typically fly at each other
within seconds "in a wing-beating, head-thrusting, leg-kicking
explosion of animal fury so pure, so absolute, and in its own way so
beautiful, as to be almost abstract, a Platonic concept of hate."2 80
There is a tragic ending, for one rooster anyway. 21 This gladiatorial
death is sanctioned; it occurs pursuant to well-defined rules,
"written down in palm-leaf manuscripts ... passed on from genera-
tion to generation as part of the general legal and cultural tradition
275. Id. at 419.
276. Id. at 417.
277. Id. at 421-22.
278. Id. at 421.
279. Id. at 421. The spurs are themselves symbolic objects, treated as sacred by the
villagers. Geertz tells us that they are "handled, both in use and out, with the same curious
combination of fussiness and sensuality the Balinese direct toward ritual objects generally."
Id. at 422.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 423.
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of the villages."2 82 And, like most sports, it takes place under the
supervision of an "umpire," whose authority, Geertz explains, is,
quite remarkably from the standpoint of our ultracompetitive
American culture, unquestioned. 283
Although the reader is thus transported to a new level of
understanding about the ritual, there still must be a means to
separate the cockfight from other sports or social diversions. The
violence is not pointless, or sadistic, but what does it signify? To
find out, Geertz next embarks on a thick description of cockfight
wagering, which, as it turns out, will be central to his interpreta-
tion. There is a central wager, made by the handlers and their clans
and associates, and, secondarily, a series of "side" bets made by
interested villagers and other onlookers. 284 At this point, Geertz
describes data, which he collected and recorded, regarding fifty-
seven matches.28 5 What the data show is that the wagering differs
depending upon whether the wager is central or a side bet.28 ' Geertz
explains that the central wager, arranged quietly and without
fanfare, is at even odds and is typically large relative to the
villagers' income. 287 The side wagers, by contrast, are chaotically
arranged, at various odds, and tend to be much smaller.288
The villagers Geertz describes are engaged in serious wagering,
sometimes betting as much as several days' wages on a single
cockfight.289 Because Geertz sees the enormity (relative to income)
of the central wager as irrational, it becomes a focus of his descrip-
tion. Although these wagering systems appear at first glance to be
distinct, even incongruous, Geertz brings the reader, through
description of his data, to an understanding that the systems are,
in fact, part of a unified system of wagering. 290 Everything is
centered upon, and controlled by, the central wager, which the
villagers seek to make as interesting, or "deep" to use Geertz's term,
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 425.
285. Id. at 426.
286. Id. at 426-28.
287. Id. at 425-26.
288. Id. at 426.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 431.
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as possible.29' This, at last, raises the issue of interpretation: Why
do the villagers engage in this seemingly irrational wagering
behavior? The question brings Geertz, and the reader, to the
convention of symbolic interpretation. But it is too soon for our
purposes to consider interpretation. The matter will be taken up
presently.
As for thick description, the presentation above is obviously only
an abbreviation of the art, a snapshot of the convention. The
numerous paths and alleys Geertz travels to interpret-to attempt
to see the cockfight as the villagers see it--cannot be fully conveyed
in this space. In literary terms, Geertz provides a "close reading" of
the "text" of the cockfight. His strategy is to "stay ... within a single,
more or less bounded form, and circle steadily within it."292 This
circling is not limited to the gesture itself, but encompasses the
general place of the gesture within the culture under examination.
Of course, there is the question how much circling, and how much
description, will be enough to generate a defensible interpretation
of meaning. Here again, where courts are concerned, institutional
limitations obviously preclude the production of hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of pages. There is, alas, no magic parameter
for thickness. The description of a symbolic gesture must be thick
enough to permit the accumulation of "piled-up structures of
inference and implication through which an ethnographer is
continually trying to pick his way."29 It must be enough, in short,
to permit the interpreter to recover as many of the available
meanings for a particular symbol or gesture as possible.
3. On "Going Native".- Emic and Etic Perspectives
Thus far, the ethnographic model consists of two elements
which need not be viewed as foreign to the judicial craft-
rigorous factfinding and "thick" description. The model's third
291. Id. Here Geertz is drawing on JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORYOFLEGISLATION (C.K.
Ogden ed., 1987). "Depth" in gaming is a concept that has economic, utilitarian import.
Jeremy Bentham used the concept to describe play or sport in which "the stakes are so high
that it is, from his utilitarian standpoint, irrational for men to engage in it at all." GEERTz,
supra note 23, at 432.
292. Id. at 453.
293. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 7.
2004] 2321
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
element-interpretive perspective-will be more difficult to
implement. It requires, at a minimum, a transition from entrenched
and pervasive judicial indifference to and avoidance of symbolic
meaning. More specifically, the element of perspective requires two
things ofjudges: First, psychologically, that they seek on some level
to converse and empathize with gesturers, to understand where
they are "coming from," and, second, that judges seek to recover
sufficient ethnographic and other knowledge about a gesture so that
they can access a cultural understanding of it.
With regard to perspective, the distinction to draw upon, in
ethnographic terms, is one between "emic" accounts, or descriptions
as they seem to participants, and "etic" accounts, or descriptions as
they seem to an outsider.294 Simply stated, the goal of interpretive
and other ethnographic approaches is to render an interpretation
of what actions, sacred symbols, institutions, and other gestures
mean to those who act, join, worship, or signal. This is sometimes
mistakenly referred to as "going native." Ethnographers do not
actually seek to become natives, only to understand them-more
specifically, as Geertz points out, "to converse with them."295 To
achieve an emic, or insider's, understanding, Geertz writes, "our
formulations of other peoples' symbol systems must be actor-
oriented."2 96 To engage in this fictional discourse, ethnography
294. Alfred Schutz discusses this interpretive dilemma in terms of objective and subjective
meaning. An "objective meaning is grasped by the sign-interpreter as a part of his
interpretation of his own experience to himself." SCHUTZ, supra note 218, at 124. Subjective
meaning is "an indication of what actually went on in the mind of the communicator." Id. In
the ethnographic disciplines, perspective has been a hotly contested concept. For
ethnographers, the principal concern with perspective is whether any analyst can claim to
speak for an entire culture. Even the convention of participant-observation, which in classical
ethnography was deemed to provide a sufficient degree of ethnographic authority, has been
challenged by postmodernists and others as insufficient to provide the authority necessary
to deliver viable cultural interpretations. Just "being there," it turns out, is not enough after
all. In particular, the specter of Western ethnographers speaking for non-Western cultures
has precipitated charges of ethnocentrism and colonialism. See CLIFFORD, supra note 12, at
22 (arguing that "the West can no longer present itself as the unique purveyor of
anthropological knowledge about others"); see also id. (noting the problems associated with
cross-cultural interpretations after the "breakup and redistribution of colonial power in the
decades after 1950"). Where judicial interpretation of cultural symbols is concerned, we are
not faced with issues of cross-cultural comparison, colonialism, and ethnocentrism. And, as
already mentioned, the authority to interpret is a given for courts; it is part of the judicial
power.
295. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 13.
296. Id. at 14. As one practitioner summarized this concept:
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requires, at a minimum, that the interpreter avoid prejudgments
and interpretive biases.297
Returning once again to the cockfight, Geertz's observation and
thick description of the ritual are intended to reach an understand-
ing of the event from the villagers' perspective, through the lens of
local knowledge-including, but not limited to, local myths and
symbol structures. Geertz seeks to distinguish "between what
appears to be going on to us and what is going on for the
Balinese."298 In order to achieve, or at least attempt to achieve, this
insider's perspective, the interpretive ethnographic model requires
that interpreters thickly describe symbolic gestures in terms of the
constructions they imagine communicators, worshipers, and joiners
to place upon their own actions.299
Geertz is not suggesting that ethnographers simply make things
up. But as he acknowledges, the ethnographer is in the business of
producing "fictitious" accounts-"in the sense that they are 'some-
thing made,' 'something fashioned'-the original meaning of
fictio-not that they are false, unfactual, or merely 'as if' thought
experiments."0 0 And he concedes that the etic, or outsider's,
perspective is essentially unavoidable as one fashions an account of
a culture and its symbols. Thick descriptions, Geertz notes, are
The ethnographer is interested in understanding and describing a social and
cultural scene from the emic, or insider's, perspective. The ethnographer is both
storyteller and scientist; the closer the reader of an ethnography comes to
understanding the native's point of view, the better the story and the better the
science.
FE7rERMAN, supra note 10, at 12.
297. See FETTERMAN, supra note 10, at 33 (noting that ethnographers must "suspend
personal valuation of any given cultural practice").
298. JAMES BOHMAN, NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: PROBLEMS OF INDETERMINACY
127 (1991). Of course, this is not to contend that the rendered interpretations are, in fact, the
interpretations of the "native." The ability to speak for, or to, cultural rituals and symbols
continues to be debated among interpretivists, who purport to access meaning, and
postmodernists, who deny the authority of the interpreter to lay claim to meaning. See
CLIFFORD, supra note 12, at 10 (arguing that ethnographic texts are "constructed domains
of truth, serious fictions"). Geertz would concede that the villagers are free to reject his
rendering of their ritual. The interpretation is an attempt to uncover local meaning, not
necessarily a definitive account of it.
299. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 15.
300. Id.
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"anthropological because it is, in fact, anthropologists who profess
them."30
1
Thus, the cockfighting monograph, though it strives for emic
understanding, is, unavoidably, produced by an outsider. The
ethnographer makes sense of the data from his own perspective,
which is unavoidably social scientific. 0 2 Similarly, judges utilizing
the interpretive model will make sense of the data from their own
perspective, which is, of course, juridical. As discussed below, with
regard to interpretation, neither ethnographic nor judicial inter-
pretation is an exercise in search of "pure" objectivity.30 3 As one
practitioner explains: "Ethnography is neither subjective nor
objective. It is interpretive, mediating two worlds through a
third." 4 Judicial interpretation necessarily must mediate in a
similar fashion. There is, in sum, no use entertaining the false
notion that interpretive bias can be wholly overcome, or that
interpreters can literally become part of the culture they are
interpreting, or see things precisely as the actor or communicator
sees them. But even conceding the unavoidability of the etic
perspective, judicial interpretations, like ethnographic ones, can be
emic in a meaningful sense, and can advance our knowledge of
cultural symbols.
4. Symbolic Meaning and Interpretation
What factfinding, thick description, and the adoption of an emic
perspective ultimately build toward is the final convention or
element of the model, its culmination-the interpretation of
symbolic meaning. Meaning is, of course, a highly complex concept,
one that has confounded, and continues to divide, philosophers,
social scientists, and others.0 5 It is beyond the scope and purpose
of this Article to engage fully the intricacies of meaning. But where
symbolic communication is involved, it is imperative to try to reach
301. Id.
302. See FETTERMAN, supra note 10, at 21.
303. See, e.g., AGAR, supra note 210, at 19 ("Ethnography no longer claims to describe a
reality accessible by anyone using the right methods, independent of the historical or cultural
context of the act of describing.").
304. Id.
305. See generally BOHMAN, supra note 298, 102-45.
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an understanding of the meaning of the symbol used. Constitutional
doctrine seems tacitly to accept that this is so. Courts seem to
accept that the meaning of sacred symbols and associational
membership is highly relevant to the First Amendment inquiry.
Still, through indifference and avoidance, symbolic meaning in
these contexts is not fully explored and developed. The meaning of
symbolic conduct although highly relevant to the First Amendment
inquiry, is also routinely avoided.
If, however, courts are going to seek an understanding of
expressive meaning, it is important to appreciate what this will
entail for constitutional decision making, and for constitutional law.
With regard to the First Amendment, current doctrine asks only
whether an actor intended to communicate some message; it does
not inquire as to the substance of the message itself. The interpre-
tive method will require that courts take the leap from simply
assuming a message to actually recovering the messages sought to
be conveyed by a chosen symbol. For sacred symbols, courts already
inquire as to the meaning of the symbols; but their method for doing
so allows secular context to trump or diminish religious content.
The interpretive method will require a fundamental reconsideration
of this perspective and approach. Finally, associational hierarchies
currently are permitted to define their own meaning, without
consideration of the meaning of membership from the perspective
of the rank-and-file. The interpretive model will require closer
judicial observation of associational cultures, and interpretation
based upon that observation. In sum, the move toward meaning will
entail changes in the way courts currently assess symbolic mean-
ing.
Before these doctrinal changes can be implemented, however,
courts need a method for approaching meaning systematically. As
conceptual background, what courts must be concerned with here
is the recovery of meaning where one actor or institution communi-
cates some idea, concept, or emotion to an audience. Specifically,
they must be prepared to interpret communications accomplished
with symbols or signs. Thus, courts must be prepared to separate,
and separately consider, the meaning of the sign or symbol itself,
what the actor meant by using the symbol, and the significance of
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the fact that the actor used this symbol in this particular context. °6
More importantly, there are complexities of perspective for courts
to consider as well. Actors, of course, have their own understanding
of the meaning of their gestures. 30 7 So, too, however, do observ-
ers-the audience to whom meaning is communicated. Finally,
there is the point of view of the sociological, or, in the present case,
judicial observer. Symbols thus "stand in a context of meaning that
is on the one hand an expressive scheme for the sign-user and on
the other an interpretive scheme for the sign-interpreter." 8 There
are, in short, a range of circulating meanings for any particular
communicative gesture.
Recognizing that none of these meanings can be discounted or
ignored entirely, which of these meanings is to be the focus of
inquiry? The previous section indicated a partial answer:
ethnographers seek to render emic, or insider, interpretations.
Constitutional doctrine, insofar as it expresses a preference,
suggests that it is the actor's or institution's perspective which is of
greatest moment. Even the law of sacred symbols acknowledges
that the Establishment Clause inquiry must at least include a
consideration of the effect of any display on religious and cultural
insiders.3 ' Thus, the ethnographic model and constitutional
doctrine seem to suggest a common focal point of inquiry.
But it is folly to think that an observer, whether one in the
audience or an even less direct social or judicial observer, can fully
comprehend and understand the subjective meaning of the ac-
tor/communicator. This sort of "primordial" meaning, which takes
place as the actor gestures and reflects on her own gesture, is
beyond recovery; it would, in essence, require that the observer
become the communicator. 310 The "approximate value" of another's
306. See SCHUTZ, supra note 218, at 107 (discussing these aspects of the interpretation of
signs).
307. This assumes that the gesture had some meaning for the actor in the first place. It
may be that the gesture was a wholly absentminded act, or was otherwise meaningless from
the actor's perspective. Although this may be the case in wider ciltural exchange, it is
unlikely to be true with regard to symbolic gestures which implicate First Amendment
concerns. The actors in the cases discussed in this Article generally intended to communicate
something.
308. SCHUTZ, supra note 218, at 217.
309. See supra Part I.F.
310. See SCHUITZ, supra note 218; id. at 99 ("The postulate, therefore, that I can observe
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meaning is all that can possibly be recovered."' Even the sociologi-
cal observer, when living among the natives, is not privy to the
whole of native culture. The judicial observer is, of course, even
further removed from the sort of direct personal observation that
permits the ethnographer to note winks, nods, and other expres-
sions. The observation that is possible is too indirect to make any
claim to recovery of subjective meaning. Nor, however, as the
ethnographic model suggests, can interpreters simply rely upon
their own "objective" interpretations of symbolic gestures, affected
as these are by the context or background of the interpreter.
As Geertz pointed out, however, meaning is public. People
communincate, culturally, by means of shared codes and conven-
tions. As an interpretivist, and a holist, Geertz claimed to render a
single interpretation of a cultural symbol, rather than adhering to
a multi-meaning, relativistic framework which allowed for multiple
interpretations. Thus, Geertz purports in the cockfight monograph
to render the meaning of this ritual for the Balinese. Geertz's take
on meaning has precipitated a fair amount of controversy. Specifi-
cally, Geertz's holism, like others, has been criticized sharply by
postmodernists, who deny the authority of the interpreter to render
unitary, "correct" interpretations of cultural phenomena.3 12
This, then, is one place to be especially clear about the implica-
tions of the ethnographic approach for judicial interpretations.
The model being advanced in this Article does not adopt Geertz's,
or anyone else's, holism. Although it advocates interpretation, this
Article recognizes that there are various circulating meanings
for most gestures. Sometimes these meanings will diverge, and
sometimes they will not. But just as the actor's subjective meaning
is beyond recovery, no claim to the "correct" interpretation can be
sustained. The idea is to recover or expose the most plausible
meanings among those for whom the gesture has meaning. This will
be done, as suggested, through the conventions of factfinding and
"thick" descriptions of participant behavior, participant reports
(testimony), and other cultural circumstances.
the subjective experience of another person precisely as he does is absurd.").
311. Id. at 109.
312. See, e.g., CLIFFORD, supra note 12, at 21-54 (analyzing ethnographic authority).
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That there are various meanings does not preclude understand-
ing, or lead to a hopeless relativism. Judges can intentionally
pursue and grasp genuine understanding because meaning is,
ultimately, inter-subjective-it is based upon the shared experi-
ences of the actor and the observers.31 Again, this is not to suggest
that meaning is unitary, that there is a "truth" to be recovered. But
meanings can be accessed, recovered, and judged according to
intersubjective conventions. Courts can, for instance, "infer, on the
basis of indirect evidence, the typical subjective experiences
[participants] must be having."""4 They, like other social observers,
can make use of "personal ideal types" to fashion interpretive
schemes. 15 Judges can draw upon, among other things, their own
knowledge of "protesters," for example, in seeking access to their
symbolic meanings. Insofar as a potential meaning is consistent
with the behavior of an ideal type, it is entitled to some weight.
Insofar as it is not, there may be reason to question the putative
meaning. This does not entail relying exclusively on stereotypes or
thin ideal types. But these sorts of interpretive schemes help to
make the grasping of meanings possible. They routinely allow for
discourse and communication.
In sum, the interpretive method requires that judges recover the
range of circulating meanings for each gesture. The goal is to choose
the most plausible intersubjective meaning among the available
circulating meanings. Thus, the judicial task is first to recover
available meanings through the conventions of detail and descrip-
tion, and then to sift, analyze, and weigh them with reference to the
behavior and other evidence pertaining to the participants and the
culture. The meaning chosen will not be that of the actors them-
selves, nor solely that of the interpreter, but will be "derived from
the shared language and social groups in which [the actors] are
313. See SCHUTZ, supra note 218, at 119-20 (noting that signs are interpreted with
reference to previous, shared experiences).
314. Id. at 143. As Schutz explains, "subjective experiences can only be known in the form
of general types of subjective experience." Id. at 181. The interpreter, in other words, must
make judgments based upon her knowledge of the shared social world.
315. See id. at 185-94 (discussing ideal types).
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socialized."" 6 In this manner, an objective context of meaning will
be fashioned from various subjective meaning-contexts. 17
With these observations concerning meaning, we can turn now to
the convention of interpretation itself. For Geertz and interpretive
ethnographers, the study of culture is "not an experimental science
in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning." 311
Unabashedly, Geertz announced: "It is explication I am after,
construing social expressions on their surface enigmatical."319 It is,
similarly, with reference to the background on and limitations of
meaning set forth above, judicial explication and construction that
is the proposed goal with regard to symbolic gestures under the
First Amendment.
The construction of enigmatic social expressions has both func-
tional and communicative components. On the functional level,
Geertz, like other interpretivists, uses the concept of translation
of literary texts to flesh out his interpretive agenda. "Doing
ethnography," he wrote, "is like trying to read (in the sense of
'construct a reading of') a manuscript-foreign, faded, full of
ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious
commentaries, but written not in conventionalized graphs of
sound but in transient examples of shaped behavior."320 Note that
the textual metaphor works in more than one direction. All
ethnographies are both studies and texts. The ethnographer studies
the culture as text, and then produces her own text.32'
Beyond translation and production of text, interpretive ethnogra-
phy is a means by which researchers communicate with those
whose behavior is enigmatic, as well as communicate with others
interested in understanding a culture's symbolism. Indeed, one of
316. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISMAND ASOCIAL
THEORY OF LAW 77-78 (1997); see also SCHiTZ, supra note 218, at 218 ("It should here be
emphasized that I, the interpreter, do not interpret alone and that your product as a thing
in the world belongs not only to my private world but to the one intersubjective world
common to us all.*).
317. SCHlTZ, supra note 218, at 223.
318. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 5.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 10. For a treatment of constitutional interpretation as "translation," see
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX L. REV. 1165 (1993).
321. See generally JOHN CLIFFORD & GEORGE MARCUS, WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS
AND PoLirics OF ETHNOGRAPHY (1986).
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the overarching goals of interpretive ethnography, particularly an
ethnography which focuses on symbols and symbolic gestures, "is
the enlargement of the universe of human discourse."122 Geertz
posits that this is a task "to which a semiotic concept of culture is
peculiarly well adapted." 23 Ethnographic interpretation, thus, is
concerned with "tracing the curve of social discourse; fixing it into
an inspectable form."32' Similarly, this should be one goal ofjudicial
interpretation; that is, to recover social discourses from subcultures
generally unfamiliar to judges, and perhaps to the wider culture as
well.
In order to fix social discourse into an inspectable form, therefore,
it is necessary to translate or interpret enigmatic signs. In order to
understand how this is accomplished, a rudimentary understanding
of the basics of semiotics, otherwise referred to as the science of
signs, is required. 25 The details of the process by which signs are
translated into meanings, or possible meanings, is far too complex
for present purposes. A rudimentary understanding of semiotics,
however, will assist in further explicating the model's interpretive
element.
Charles Sanders Peirce, one of the founders of the semiotic
discipline, conceived of a "sign" as "something by knowing which we
know something more." 26 A slanted tree, as signifier, signifies wind
direction, its signified. A red nose signifies drunkenness. Street
signs signify such ideas as direction, danger, or instruction. Words
signify concepts, and so on. As Geertz emphasizes, we use such
signs all the time in our culture. Recall that he maintains that
these and other symbols are often necessary for our very survival.
Peirce recognized that there are various levels and depths of
understanding of signs and symbols. In simple terms, a burning
cross, for example, is processed through three levels of under-
standing. There is an initial recognition of the event ("firstness"),
322. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 14.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 19.
325. In this analysis, I am using "semiotics" in its broadest sense: "all forms of formation
and exchange of meaning on the basis of phenomena which have been coded as signs."
JOHANSEN & LARSEN, supra note 215, at 3.
326. Id. at 25 (quoting 8 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED WORKS OF CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE 227 (Arthur W. Burks ed., 1958)). For a detailed examination of Peirce's
semiotics, see generally FLOYD MERRELL, PEIRCE, SIGNS, AND MEANING (1997).
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followed by the formation of some rudimentary thought about the
event ("secondness'), and, finally, an interpretation ("thirdness).327
Peirce is perhaps best known for the triadic relationship he
described to both illustrate and analyze the progression from sign
(firstness) to meaning (thirdness). He posited three elements on the
path to interpretation: (1) the sign is the representamen, which
represents something else, (2) the object is what the sign stands for,
and (3) the interpretant is the possible or potential meaning for
which the sign allows. 2 The interpreter accesses meaning, or
potential meaning, by moving in the triadic relationship from
representamen to interpretant.329
A few examples from the doctrine of symbolic gestures will help
illustrate the triadic relationship. Sleeping in the park, as the
protesters did in Clark,"0 is a sign or representamen. On one
reading, the object for which this particular sign or symbol 331 stands
is homelessness.332 The interpretant, or possible meaning, is the
plight of the homeless and governmental inaction in the face of that
plight. In another example, the burning cross in Black3 3 1 is a sign
or representamen, its object is racial antagonism, and its possible
meaning is a specific offer or threat of violence. 3 4 Similarly, the
striptease is a sign, the object of which is female sexuality, and one
possible meaning of this gesture is an offer of sexual intercourse.
This simplified conception of semiotic interpretation suffices to
illustrate the task at hand, namely, to turn signs or signifiers into
possible meanings. The goal or purpose of the interpretive model is
327. See MERRELL, supra note 324, at 25.
328. JOHANSEN & LARSEN, supra note 213, at 26-27.
329. Peirce and other semioticians have focused principally on linguistic signs and
concepts, but the triadic relationship also can be applied to symbolic gestures.
330. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1984).
331. Peirce used "symbol" in a precise manner as part of a detailed typology of signs. I
mean to use it in this analysis to stand in for my concept of symbolic gestures. This concept
roughly corresponds to Peirce's concept of symbolic signs, which he conceived as gaining
meaning through social convention, as opposed to similarity to the object (what he called
"iconic" signs) or some cause-effect relationship ("indexical" signs). See JOHANSEN & LARSEN,
supra note 211, at 32. Of course, as Peirce noted, signs can be a combination of all three of
these basic types. Id. at 52.
332. Clark, 468 U.S. at 291-92.
333. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
334. See id. at 1541-42 (noting language in Virginia cross-burning statute that "[ainy such
burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence to intimidate a person or group of persons").
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to improve the interpreter's ability to read signs. In other words, to
provide for at least a rudimentary "semiotic competence."
335
Without delving too deeply into the distractions and complica-
tions of semiotic terminology, however, it is imperative to recall
the basic goal of the anthropo-semiotic method. Judges should act
"to reduce the puzzlement ... to which unfamiliar acts emerging
out of unknown backgrounds naturally give rise."336 Consulting all
available forms of cultural evidence, the judge should seek to turn
the gesture "from a passing event, which exists only in its own
moment of occurrence, into an account, which exists in its inscrip-
tions and can be reconsulted."337 Again, it is important to emphasize
that judges are not expected to create the sort of interpretive
monograph an ethnographer would produce after having devoted
months or years of field research and observation. The "account" the
judge gives is what appears in the judicial opinion and is based
largely upon other accounts given by ethnograpers, historians, or
other observers.
With regard to the ends sought, namely, the reduction of
puzzlement and the recording of accounts, Geertz notes: "A good
interpretation of anything-a poem, a person, a history, a ritual, an
institution, a society-takes us into the heart of that of which it is
the interpretation."3 "' This explains why the other elements of the
interpretive model, that is, accumulation of detail, thick descrip-
tion, and emic understanding, are so critical to the interpretive
task. An interpretive explanation of a symbolic gesture "trains its
attention on what institutions, actions, images, utterances, events,
customs, all the usual objects of social-scientific interest, mean to
those whose institutions, actions, customs, and so on they are."
3 9
To summarize the Geertzian concept of descriptive interpretation:
"[T]here are three characteristics of ethnographic description: it is
interpretive; what it is interpretive of is the flow of social discourse;
and the interpreting involved consists in trying to rescue the 'said'
335. See JOHANSEN & LARSEN, supra note 213, at 30 (defining "semiotic competence").
336. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 16.
337. Id. at 19.
338. Id. at 18.
339. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 12, at 22.
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of such discourse from its perishing occasions and fix it in perusable
terms."34O
With this understanding of the interpretive function and some
appreciation for the notion of semiotic competence, let us consult
one last time, before moving on to more concrete First Amendment
problems, Geertz's cockfight monograph. As said earlier in the
discussion of thick description, Geertz hints early in the monograph
that what is seen when one observes the Balinese cockfight only
appears to be roosters fighting; it is, he posits, actually men.34 The
earlier mentioned description of cultural myths, customs, history,
and behavior is offered to support this interpretation. But the
interpretation does not end with men engaged in a show of mascu-
linity, that is, men being men, as it were. The cockfight, as the
richness of detail suggests, is a far more nuanced and complex
ritual. Geertz ultimately comes to the anthropo-semiotic point:
An image, fiction, a model, a metaphor, the cockfight is a means
of expression; its function is neither to assuage social passions
nor to heighten them (though, in its playing-with-fire way it
does a bit of both), but, in a medium of feathers, blood, crowds,
and money, to display them.342
Recall Geertz's puzzlement over Balinese wagering, which
seemed all out of proportion to villagers' income.3 " The explanation
for such substantial, center-focused wagering, he says, "lies in the
fact that in such play, money is less a measure of utility, had or
expected, than it is a symbol of moral import, perceived or im-
posed."344 Geertz then proceeds to offer a list of "facts," or what
might better be labeled "observed conventions," which he has
recorded and which he claims support his thesis regarding the
symbolism of both the wager specifically and the cockfight gener-
ally.3" In other words, having been brought to this central aspect
of the cockfight ritual by the descriptive convention, Geertz
340. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 20.
341. GEERTZ, supra note 23, at 417.
342. Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
343. See id. at 426.
344. Id. at 433.
345. See id. at 437-41.
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proceeds to interpret the wagering itself in the same fashion, that
is, with still more descriptive detail.
What the detailed descriptions of the ritual itself, its context, and
the seemingly out-of-proportion central bet signify, Geertz claims,
is the Balinese status system or hierarchy. The cockfight is, as
Geertz notes, a form of expression.34 According to Geertz, what it
"talks most forcibly about is status relationships, and what it says
about them is that they are matters of life and death."347 In Peircian
terms, the cockfight (representamen) indicates status (its object),
which leads to the possible interpretation that status is a matter of
life and death in Balinese culture (the interpretant). For Geertz, the
importance of status, then, at last solves the mystery of the
seemingly irrational "deep play" the villagers exhibit in their
wagering. To be sure, as Geertz points out, no one's status actually
changes as a result of the cockfight.3 48 The villagers wager much
because much is (symbolically) at stake. 49
One further observation about Geertz's interpretation of the
cockfight is in order. It did not escape Geertz's notice that the
cockfight, like other symbolic gestures, speaks through emotion and
drama. What the cockfight, as "collective text" and social structure,
"says it says in a vocabulary of sentiment-the thrill of risk, the
despair of loss, the pleasure of triumph.""'0 Because of this, the
ritual is nothing less than a form of "sentimental education" for the
villagers.3 5' Geertz thus has captured not only one interpretation of
what is being said, but at the same time has exhibited an apprecia-
tion of how meaning is actually being conveyed. This is precisely the
sort of appreciation that thus far has eluded courts in their
treatment of symbolic gestures.
As indicated, no summary of Geertz's monograph can convey its
thickness, or its interpretive rigor. The monograph provides an
example of the use of factfinding, description, emic perspective, and,
ultimately, interpretation to access enigmatic symbolism. The
346. See id. at 424 (describing the cockfight gathering as an "articulate" form which
focuses on, and brings into being, "the celebration of status rivalry").
347. Id. at 447.
348. Id. at 434.
349. See id.
350. Id. at 449.
351. Id.
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reader may be convinced that the cockfight is expressive in the
sense Geertz posits, or the reader may remain unconvinced that the
cockfight is anything beyond bloodsport. The interpretation must be
judged with reference to the accumulation of detail and emic
description which Geertz provides. The reader must determine
whether the behavior of the participants and the "piled-up struc-
tures of inference" '2 support Geertz's interpretation,just as readers
and commentators must determine whether a court's rationale and
factual exposition support its legal interpretation.
Even if the interpretive model provides a basis for interpretation
of enigmatic cultural rituals and symbols, there likely will be
skepticism with regard to the model's adaptability to judicial
interpretation and First Amendment concerns. Part III seeks to
demonstrate that courts can indeed make an interpretive turn with
regard to symbolic gestures. It does so by revisiting the gestures
first described in Part I and applying the interpretive ethnographic
model to them.
III. SYMBOLIC GESTURES REVISITED: TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT
ETHNOGRAPHY
The interpretive approach or model emphasizes the following: (1)
the primacy of symbols and systems of symbols in cultural analysis
and discourse, (2) the similarity of tasks facing ethnographers and
judicial interpreters when faced with enigmatic cultural symbols,
and (3) the plausibility of ethnographic and judicial interpretation
of symbolic meaning. Drawing on ethnographic lessons, methods,
and principles, this Part applies the interpretive model to First
Amendment symbolic gestures. After first delineating the appropri-
ate scope of the model's application, the Part turns to the heart of
the ethnographic model, namely, thick description and interpreta-
tion, as applied to First Amendment symbolic gestures."3 The Part
concludes with an examination of some anticipated objections to
judicial interpretation of symbolic meaning. These objections, while
352. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 7.
353. My discussion of factfmding and emic perspective, the other two elements of the
model, are incorporated within the examination of what I view as the core elements of
description and interpretation.
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not without merit, should not deter courts from addressing and
engaging symbolic meaning.
A. Legally Uncontested and Contested Meanings
Although this Article proposes to alter the doctrine of symbolic
gestures to a degree, the interpretive model is not intended to apply
each time a symbolic gesture raises First Amendment concerns.
There is no need to throw common sense out the window, nor to
engage in unnecessary descriptive or interpretive work, every time
a nonverbal gesture is implicated. Some symbols more or less speak
for themselves; they are "uncontested" in the legal sense of the
term. The ethnographic model should be used only when courts
confront legally contested symbolic meaning.35" '
1. Legally Uncontested Symbolic Meaning
There are some symbolic gestures that require little or no
description, elaboration, or judicial interpretation. For these
gestures, the symbolic meaning is inherent; it is readily accessible
to courts from the most basic of facts. More importantly, there is
usually no legal contest as to the substance of the message being
conveyed by means of these gestures.
Certain pickets or parades, for example, speak clearly through
the display of posters or signs. Whatever message the assemblage
is intended to convey is, most likely, represented in the written
content on the posters. Even without written confirmation, the
immediate context, such as a labor dispute or a holiday procession,
will often suffice to convey the symbolic meaning for purposes of the
legal proceedings. 5 '
354. Of course, from a hermeneutical perspective, meaning is always contested. See
GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 12, at 5 (stating hermeneutics is "the understanding
of understanding"). Here I am using "meaning" and "contest" in a manner which makes these
terms accessible to, and useful for, constitutional analysis, not philosophical or hermeneutic
debate.
355. This will not always be the case, however, as the GLIB case demonstrates. See Hurley
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). In GLIB, the
narrow record was insufficient to render an interpretation of the meaning of the parade. Id.
at 561 (stating the facts in the case). The Court held that no interpretation was required; so
long as the parade had some message, the government could not force organizers to carry
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Similarly, civil rights protests, such as the sit-ins which took
place during the height of the civil rights contest in the South,
speak rather clearly on their own. The contexts, both immediate
and, more broadly, cultural, provide courts with sufficient informa-
tion to recover the most, if not only, plausible symbolic meaning of
such gestures. In Brown v. Louisiana, for example, black library
patrons refused to leave the reading room, an obvious objection to
segregationist library policies.35 Insofar as the Court harbored any
doubts as to the meaning of this gesture of protest, the participants
themselves testified that the sit-in was intended specifically to
communicate a message of protest against the library's segregation-
ist policies.51
Other symbolic gestures similarly convey rather obvious mean-
ings. Gestures of protest which have been utilized in times of war
and other cultural unrest generally fall into this category. For
example, there was no legal contest concerning the symbolic
meaning of the wearing of black armbands in Tinker... or the
attachment of a peace symbol to the U.S. flag in Spence.319 In both
cases, the symbols were inherently expressive within their social,
cultural, and historical contexts. Moreover, the speakers testified
messages they did not desire to support. Id. at 575.
356. 383 U.S. 131, 141 (1966).
357. See id. at 160-61 (Black, J., dissenting). As Brown demonstrates, the ethnographic
model should not obscure more direct forms of proof concerning communicative intent, where
these are available and more or less resolve the matter of symbolic meaning. In O'Brien, as
in Brown and other cases involving inherently expressive gestures, symbolic meaning was
itself legally uncontested. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court knew
what O'Brien, the draft card burner, was communicating in part because he explained his
own subjective meaning in his testimony. See id. at 370. This testimony, along with the
historical context, cleared up any mystery concerning the symbolic meaning of burning a
draft card, making a thick or elaborate description of context and symbol entirely
unnecessary. This is not, however, to concede that O'Brien was rightly decided. For one
thing, the Court may be faulted for ignoring or shading a significant portion of the context,
namely, Congress' motivation for acting against the specific gesture of draft card
"desecrations." There is, however, little doubt that O'Brien got his message across and that
the Court took it into consideration, even if the message was ultimately given little weight.
There is little doubt, too, that the Court was unimpressed with O'Brien's symbolic gesture,
and that its perspective, or bias, undoubtedly had something to do with the outcome in the
case. Although the Court might be accused of semiotic insensitivity, it remains doubtful
whether thick description and emic interpretation would have had any effect on the outcome
in O'Brien.
358. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
359. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
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with respect to their intended messages, 60 thus removing any
remaining symbolic uncertainty. Everything that was needed to
understand the symbolic meaning of these gestures could be found
within the record of proceedings.
2. Legally Contested Symbolic Meaning
With regard to symbolic meaning, the foregoing are the "easy"
cases. Not necessarily easy to decide, but hardly challenging in
their semiotics. Most gestures do not, however, essentially speak for
themselves. It often may be clear that communication or expression
is intended, but in many symbolic gesture cases the content of the
communication is a matter of dispute. For this set of gestures, the
interpretive model is implicated. To resolve the legal contest, there
must, or at least should be, an interpretation of symbolic meaning.
There are various types of legal contests concerning meaning.
The dispute might be a disagreement regarding the specific
message at issue, as with cross burning or the symbolism of a flag.
There may be a contest regarding whether the gesture is intended
to be expressive at all, as with nude dancing. In the case of the
Establishment Clause, there is nearly always a dispute regarding
what message a sacred symbol conveys to "insiders" and "outsid-
ers." With regard to associations, there is a contest over the
expressive message the group wishes to convey, or a dispute as to
whether allowing one to join is inconsistent with the general
meaning of membership.36'
For gestures involving legally contested meaning, a simple
empirical examination and description of the event, in the form of
a casual perusal of "the record," cannot lead to a recovery of
symbolic meaning. Gestures cannot, for example, be categorized
as "threats" this easily. Even noncategorical First Amendment
treatment requires that courts more systematically assess meaning.
In order to both avoid sanctioning restrictions based solely on
aesthetic bias and engage in honest balancing, courts should at
least consider the notion that the act of dancing in the nude
360. See id. at 408; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
361. See supra Part I.
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expresses something, 62 or that the sleeping protest in Clark was
something other than a matter of function or convenience.163 Even
gestures which on their face do not appear to signify anything
profound can be packed with symbolic meaning. 64 Courts simply
cannot access the "said" of these contested gestures without
interpreting meaning.
Nor can the courts do so in areas other than expressive conduct.
Sacred symbols cannot be interpreted based solely on their
appearances. There is, as the Court seems sometimes to recognize,
no avoiding interpretation of their cultural meaning. Similarly,
the meaning of membership must be accessed in order to resolve
the legal contest over exclusion. As categories, therefore, sacred
symbols and membership decisions require an interpretive effort.
Their symbolic meaning is usually legally contested.
All of these actions, symbols, and icons speak, but what they say
is legally contested, in a way that armbands, peace symbols, and
civil rights sit-ins are not. All of these symbolic gestures require
interpretation in order to resolve the legal contest over meaning. It
is this group of gestures for which the interpretive model is
intended, and for which it holds the greatest promise.365
362. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560 (1991).
363. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
364. For example, what message, if any, does a panhandler convey by the act of begging?
Does a gay man or woman convey something beyond simple affection by displaying affection
toward a partner? See David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to
Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 319 (1994) (arguing that displays of affection by homosexuals signify more than
mere affection in some contexts). Do inner city minorities who run from the police convey
something other than their possible guilt? See Lenese C. Herbert, Can't You See What I'm
Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POLY 135 (2002) (arguing that flight signifies fear of authorities).
365. There is an exception which applies to a discrete subset of contested gestures. I have
already mentioned West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which
demonstrates that the fundamental constitutional principle of noncoercion can render
interpretation unnecessary. In Barnette, the principle that the government cannot coerce
any message or belief rendered the specific meaning of the flag irrelevant. See id. at 642. The
treatment of parades rests upon a similar principle. In GLIB, the Court held that the
meaning or the "collective point" of the parade did not matter, and that the parade did not
have to speak with a single voice in order for its message to receive First Amendment
protection. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
569-70 (1995). The fundamental principle which trumped interpretation in GLIB was that
a parade organizer, not the government, chooses the collective message. Id. at 574.
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B. Symbols of Violence and Hatred
The discussion which follows applies the interpretive model to
symbolic gestures, beginning, immediately below, with various
forms of expressive conduct, proceeding to sacred symbols and,
finally, the meaning of membership. The aim, broadly speaking, in
revisiting symbolic gestures is to demonstrate that interpretation
of symbolic meaning is within the grasp, the competence, of the
judiciary. Nothing radical is being proposed, as all of the conven-
tions of the interpretive model are familiar to courts. The doctrinal
and discursive benefits of the interpretive model will be discussed
in Part IV.
1. Ritual Cross Burning
This Section begins with a consideration of symbols which are
often understood to convey messages of hatred and violence. Cross
burnings, the use of Nazi paraphernalia, and, for some, the
confederate flag are deeply disturbing symbols. As mentioned,
understanding these symbols can be literally a matter of life and
death for those threatened. As far as the Constitution is concerned,
these symbols test the limits of the First Amendment's guarantee
of untrammeled expression. Courts thus must be sensitive to the
symbolic meaning of these gestures. If they are to be placed beyond
the First Amendment's protection, there must be a close examina-
tion of their meaning. The interpretive model offers a means for
undertaking this examination.
As mentioned, Black, in which the Court held that the act of
burning a cross could be prohibited as a "true threat,"366 stands out
as an exception to the general doctrines of interpretive indifference
and avoidance. Insofar as Black demonstrates semiotic sensitivity
and competence, it holds out the possibility that symbolic meaning
can be recovered judicially. If the Court's interpretation is plausible,
the opinion represents evidence that an interpretive perspective is
a viable alternative to interpretive indifference and avoidance.
There is, of course, no guarantee that courts will duplicate Black's
method in future cases. In fact, chances are quite good that they
366. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1549-50 (2003).
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will not do so. Because the issue in Black was categorical prohibi-
tion under the First Amendment," 7 the Court was unable to avoid
meaning. In many other speech contexts, meaning can be, and
indeed continues to be, avoided or treated carelessly. The Court's
approach may, it is hoped, inspire a new judicial attention to
symbolic meaning.
Let us now examine the Court's interpretation of the meaning of
cross burning. As noted, Justice Thomas put the Court on the path
to interpretation of ritual cross burning in Pinette, which held that
the Klan could not be prohibited from erecting and maintaining a
cross on public property.3" The Court treated the matter as
involving the cross as a sacred symbol, an icon which implicated the
Establishment Clause.6 9 Recall, however, that Justice Thomas
was not satisfied with that approach, as he did not view Pinette
as an Establishment Clause case at all. In his concurrence, Justice
Thomas started from this premise: "The cross is associated with the
Klan not because of religious worship, but because of the Klan's
practice of cross burning. "37 From this premise, Justice Thomas
went on to describe very briefly both the origins of cross burning,
starting in the reconstruction South, and how the practice of cross
burning has been utilized by the Klan "as a symbol of hate."37'
The Court took up Justice Thomas' approach in earnest in Black,
where the expressive act of cross burning was implicated directly.
Virginia enacted a statute which prohibited cross burning with "an
intent to intimidate a person or group of persons. 37 2 The Court held
that the First Amendment does not prohibit states from banning
the act of burning a cross.373 To reach this conclusion, the Court
could not rely on ipse dixit or the mere observed act itself. The
symbolic meaning of ritual cross burning thus became the focal
point of the case.
367. See id. at 1541.
368. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
369. See id. at 761 (noting the State's interest in declining to endorse a particular religion
for the Establishment Clause).
370. Id. at 770 (Thomas, J., concurring).
371. Id. at 771 (Thomas, J., concurring).
372. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542. The statute ultimately foundered on a procedural issue,
specifically the treatment of cross burning as itself prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate. Id. at 1544.
373. Id. at 1549.
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Despite the obvious disparity of the objects under consideration,
there is a marked similarity between the Court's description of
cross burning and Geertz's cockfight monograph.374 The Court
began with the local context-the circumstances which gave rise to
the dispute-and moved, as Geertz did in his description, in
concentric circles. 75 The goal, in each instance, was to translate a
seemingly enigmatic occurrence.
With regard to immediate context, Black led a Klan rally of
twenty-five to thirty people, in an open field on private property and
with the owner's permission. 376 A few curious motorists stopped to
ask the sheriff, who had been called to the scene and was observing
from a distance, what was happening on the property.377 There were
several houses in the immediate area, and there was testimony
from at least one neighbor who heard the Klan members making
racist statements and criticizing President and Hillary Clinton.378
Beyond this basic record, the Court had only a description of the
cross burning itself:
374. With regard to description, legal opinions obviously are limited in ways
ethnographies are not. For example, no court can provide a 1000-page monograph concerning
any particular symbol. This level of thickness is not required in order to effectively apply the
interpretive model to symbolic gestures. What is required is something resembling the
"reasoned elaboration" legal process scholars once touted as an antidote to legal realist
claims that rules and judicial opinions are not, in themselves, significant. See STEPHEN M.
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN
INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 121 (2000) (noting that "the central message of legal process theory
is opposed to legal realism: legal rules and judicial opinions matter"). Elaboration, according
to process theorists, could provide an objective foundation for constitutional interpretation.
See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 26-35 (1959) (criticizing the Brown v. Board of Education opinion for lack of reasoned
elaboration). It is in the spirit of the legal process school of thought, and specifically its
emphasis on transparency and elaboration, that I will be proposing a judicial version of thick
description. It is, ultimately, reasoned interpretation that I am pursuing. I have no desire to
enter the debate between process theorists, realists, and postmodern schools of thought. One
thing seems certain after decades of argument and counterargument-none of these schools
has laid to rest fundamental concerns about constitutional indeterminacy, judicial activism,
or neutral principles of adjudication and interpretation. We should, in my view, choose from
each of them what seem to be their strongest concepts and prescriptions, for example,
skepticism from realists and postmodernists, and methods from process theorists.
Elaboration works well here as a methodological analog to thick description.
375. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1541-43.
376. Id. at 1542.
377. Id.
378. Id.
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At the conclusion of the rally, the crowd circled around a 25- to
30-foot cross. The cross was between 300 and 350 yards away
from the road. According to the sheriff, the cross "then all of a
sudden ... went up in a flame." As the cross burned, the Klan
played Amazing Grace over the loudspeakers.379 Ultimately, the
sheriff, who had been watching from a distance, entered the
property and arrested Black under the Virginia cross-burning
statute. ° After a trial, Black was found guilty and fined
$2500.381
Thus far, then, the Court's description indicates that people have
been engaged in cross burning for apparently illicit reasons, but
little else about the ritual itself. One can readily imagine that
racism is present, perhaps there is even the threat of violence, but
from the limited facts of record we do not have a deep understand-
ing of the symbolism which inheres in the act of burning a cross.
Something more plainly was required if states were to be granted
the authority to proscribe an admittedly expressive act categori-
cally.
That something more is Part II of the Black opinion, which is in
the nature of a brief judicial monograph on ritual cross burning.38 2
Having described only the readily observable, empirical facts, the
Court began not where Justice Thomas did in Pinette-the recon-
struction South-but in the fourteenth century, where Scottish
tribes used burning crosses as signals.83 Further, as Geertz did
with the cockfight, the Court noted that cross burning has been a
subject of artistic expression; for example, the ritual was put to
dramatic and effective use in Sir Walter Scott's Lady of the Lake.3" 4
379. Id. (citations omitted).
380. Id.
381. In a second consolidated case, three men attempted to burn a cross on the lawn of an
African American neighbor. Id. at 1542-43. The attempt was apparently the culmination of
a dispute among the neighbors concerning the firing of shots in a backyard. Id. at 1543. The
attempted cross burning likely was intended as retaliation for a complaint about the
shooting. Id. The three men who attempted to burn the cross were not affiliated in any way
with the Klan. Id. Two of the men were charged with attempted cross burning under the
Virginia statute. Id. One pleaded guilty, reserving his right to challenge the statute; a trial
ended in a conviction of the other. Id.
382. Id. at 1544-47.
383. Id. at 1544.
384. Id.
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The Court began, in other words, to place this symbol in cultural
context, beginning with distant cultures. There, to participants,
ritual cross burning was an object of some aesthetic value and
significance. It did not, for these cultures at least, involve racial or
tribal animus, nor the threat of violence.
Of course, the Court was not asked to interpret the meaning of
cross burning to fourteenth-century Scots. In this country, in
American culture, cross burning, as the Court noted, is "inextrica-
bly intertwined with the history of the Ku Klux Klan."385 This is a
critical link; it provides what for the Court would be the critical
perspective from which to examine ritual cross burning. The
question thus became: What did cross burning mean to members of
the Klan? This link or premise drew the Court into a description of
the history of the Klan and, ultimately, of its "reign of terror." 8
Thus did the Court proceed, by a variant of "thick" description, from
fourteenth-century Scotland to turn of the twentieth-century
America.
As the Court noted, the "first Klan," which, according to histori-
ans, operated roughly between 1866 and 1915, did not engage in
cross burnings.387 The "second Klan," however, commonly integrated
cross burning into its terror repertoire, initially burning crosses "to
celebrate the execution of former slaves."3" The association between
the Klan and cross burning appears to have been solidified in our
culture, the Court observed, in artistic expression-with the release
in 1915 of the film "The Birth of a Nation," which showed Klan
cross burnings and incorporated the image of the burning cross into
advertising for the film." 9 So as for cockfights, so too for cross
burnings-the observations and descriptions of the interpreters
navigate, among other things, cultural myths, imagery, even
entertainment.
The Court proceeded to note that the second Klan, which shared
the racist ideology of the first, added cross burning to its ritualistic
program. The first cross burning, the Court reported, took place
385. Id.
386. Id. (quoting STETSON KENNEDY, SouTHERN ExPOsURE 31 (1991)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
387. Id. at 1544.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1544-45.
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"when a Georgia mob celebrated the lynching of Leo Frank by
burning a 'gigantic cross' on Stone Mountain that was 'visible
throughout' Atlanta."390 Stone Mountain was also, the Court pointed
out, the site of the first Klan initiation ceremony, where Klan
members took the oath while a cross burned.39 ' Beyond ceremony,
the Court noted that the second Klan's penchant for violence was
well-documented, and cross burnings were often used "as a tool of
intimidation and a threat of impending violence." 92 Drawing on
anecdotal and other sources, the Court offered several dramatic
examples of cross burnings which targeted churches, synagogues,
housing projects, a union hall, and the home of a union leader. 93
The Black Court next proceeded to a description of cross burnings
during the post-World War II period. 94 These burnings, the Court
established, whether expressly tied to the Klan or not, were also
directed toward black targets, and they too carried at least an
implicit threat of harm. Indeed, it was this rash of incidents which
prompted Virginia to enact its first cross-burning ban. 95
Placing cross burning in wider perspective still, this time
jurisprudential and historical, the Court observed that after
Brown v. Board of Education 3 " and the inception of the civil rights
movement, Klan violence in general, and cross burnings in particu-
lar, increased dramatically.3 9 "Members of the Klan," the Court
wrote, "burned crosses on the lawns of those associated with the
civil rights movement, assaulted the Freedom Riders, bombed
churches, and murdered blacks as well as whites whom the Klan
viewed as sympathetic toward the civil rights movement."398
Thus, from one perspective, ritual cross burning has been a
cultural symbol of hatred, racial animus, and violence. But cross
burning was not, the Court noted, expressive only of violence. For
some, its meaning was primarily ideological. Cross burnings united







396. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
397. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1545-46.
398. Id.
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Klan members in thought, as well as deed. "Throughout the history
of the Klan," the Court noted, "cross burnings have also remained
potent symbols of shared group identity and ideology." 99
For still others, cross burning was expressive of spirituality. It
was a ritual of faith, a familiar symbol often used in Klan ceremo-
nies: "Typically, a cross burning would start with a prayer by the
'Klavern' minister, followed by the singing of Onward Christian
Soldiers. The Klan would then light the cross on fire, as the
members raised their left arm toward the burning cross and sang
The Old Rugged Cross."'o° According to the Court, the burning cross
ultimately became "a symbol of the Klan itself and a central feature
of Klan gatherings."° 1 The cross burning ritual, an advertised event
in some communities, became, in the Court's words, "the climax of
the rally or the initiation."40
2
"For its own members," the Court observed, "the cross was a sign
of celebration and ceremony. "43 Delving deeper still into Klan
ideology and practice, the Court noted that the Klan constitution
(the "kloran") describes the "fiery cross" as the "emblem of that
sincere, unselfish devotedness of all klansmen to the sacred purpose
and principles we have espoused."40 4 The Court looked to other Klan
documents as well, including newsletters and magazines, which it
noted have been published under the name "The Fiery Cross."0 5
As the Klan's power began to wane, the Court explained, cross
burning became a symbol of political protest for its members. 4 6
Klan members burned crosses to protest state anti-masking bills
after World War II, and during the civil rights struggle cross
burnings were a beacon of membership, an invitation to join the
effort to fight desegregation.0 7 For example, the Court noted in its




403. Id. (emphasis added).
404. Id. (quoting The Ku Klux Klan Hearings Before the House Committee on Rules, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 114, Exh. G (1921)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
405. Id.
406. Id. at 1544-46.
407. Id. at 1546.
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description that crosses were burned after the Nixon-Kennedy
debate as a sign of support for Nixon.40 8
After it accumulated the details of the ritual, and described its
place in American culture, the Court then came finally to interpret
the "said" of the burning cross.4"9 The Court ultimately interpreted
this gesture as Justice Thomas did in Pinette-as a powerful
"symbol of hate."41 It recognized that "cross burnings have been
used to communicate both threats of violence and messages of
shared ideology. " 4" The Court concluded, however, that at their
core cross burnings have predominantly "embodied threats" to those
targeted; threats with, as the Court noted, "special force given the
long history of Klan violence." 2 On the basis of this interpretation,
the Court held that the states may ban cross burning as a symbolic
act intended to threaten."3
This may seem a tremendous expenditure of energy for a ritual
which many would immediately interpret as racist and threatening.
But note that the Court recovered several plausible meanings for
the gesture of cross burning. If courts are to interpret polysemous
symbols, especially where their interpretations may result in the
categorical denial of constitutional protection for a gesture, they
must rely upon something more than presuppositions or gut
feelings. It is the accumulation of detail and description which
ensures that there is a basis, grounded in evidence, for the Court's
interpretation of symbolic meaning.
Judged by the conventions of the interpretive model, Black is
largely a methodological success. The opinion offers detailed
context, going well beyond the record in the case.41' The Court
consulted historical, anecdotal, institutional, and other sources in
building context for its ultimate interpretation." 5 It did not create
its own study of the symbolic gesture; rather, the Court located
others' studies of the symbolic gesture in order to render an
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 771
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
411. Id. at 1545.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 1547-49.
414. See id. at 1544-47.
415. Id. at 1544-47.
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interpretation. 16 As Geertz did with respect to the cockfight, the
Court gained an understanding of the specifics of the gesture itself,
its history, its appearance in literary references and film, govern-
ment attempts to regulate it, and, finally, a broader cultural picture
into which the gesture "fits." Within the limitations of judicial
opinion writing, there is "thick" description of the gesture of cross
burning.
So the Court's methodology appears to be sound. But what about
its interpretation of the meaning of ritual cross burning? Does it
comport with what the ehtnographic model suggests are sound
interpretive principles?
The first thing to note is the Court's sensitivity to the polysemous
nature of the symbol. The Court is able to recover various circulat-
ing meanings for cross burning-violence, ideology, spirituality, and
political protest."7 Thus, the Court has not avoided any particular
meaning, or treated any plausible meaning with bias or indiffer-
ence.
Having recovered several available meanings, the Court next had
to choose the most plausible meaning from among these. Generally
speaking, in order to make this choice the examiner must consider
some or all of the following: the symbol itself, the use of the symbol
by the particular actor, and the use of the symbol in a particular
context. Each of these perspectives might yield differing interpreta-
tions.
The Court, although it was asked to determine only whether the
symbol itself could be categorically proscribed, examined each of
these perspectives. The Court reviewed the symbol itself and the
contexts in which it had been used. Most importantly, however, the
Court made meaning more concrete by examining the use of this
symbol by a particular actor. The Court sought to link the symbol
with the Klan, and then proceeded to assess the burning cross as a
symbol of Klan membership, ideology, politics, and violence."" This,
then, is the specific perspective from which the Court chose to
examine the symbol: What did cross burning mean to the Klans-
man? Much turned, then, on the strength of the connection between
416. Id.
417. Id. at 1547-49.
418. Id.
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the Klan and the symbol. The Court made a strong case that
throughout American history and experience, the burning cross has
been linked with the Klan.419 It is for members of this group that
the symbol carries meaning. As the Court acknowledged, actors
other than Klan members have used the burning cross. 4" But, as
the Court pointed out, their use of the symbol generally has
coincided with the Klan's use, rendering their meaning similar to,
if not identical with, Klan meaning.421 Thus, the Court proceeded to
use Klan meaning as a proxy for others' meaning.
Having made this connection, the Court next relied, in part, upon
ideal types: What experience would the typical Klansman have had
with this symbol?422 But the Court did not rely solely upon ideal
types. The culture has experienced cross burnings for more than a
century. This is, thus, a shared, intersubjective experience. The
Court was able to rely upon this common cultural experience in
rendering its ultimate interpretation of cross burning. To its
credit, the Court appeared to exhibit no bias, aesthetic or other-
wise, toward this ritual, in keeping with the conventions of the
ethnographic model. It examined the ritual in all of its various
contexts, and extracted a number of circulating meanings.
This raises the issue of the Court's ultimate choice of meaning.
In the end, the Court agreed with Justice Thomas's conclusion in
Pinette that cross burning is a symbol of hate and violence;
specifically, it is a symbol of racial hatred and race-motivated
violence. 423 To be sure, cross burning does not have this particular
meaning for all who use the symbol. There is no means, however,
for recovering a unitary meaning for this or any other symbol. The
question is whether, as among the available meanings the Court
has recovered, a race-motivated threat of violence is the most
plausible meaning which can be ascribed to this gesture both for
the "speaker" and, ultimately, for the "listener" as well. Has the
Court offered sufficiently thick description to support the piled up
inferences which lead to an understanding of this particular
meaning? Assuming one accepts the Court's linkage of the symbol
419. Id. at 1544-47.
420. See id. at 1544.
421. Id. at 1544-47.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1546.
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with the Klan, it would seem so. The meaning the Court chose is
also generally consistent not only with ideal types, but also with the
behavior of the participants and the expected effect of this symbolic
act on targeted listeners. That cross burning is a "true threat" thus
seems to be the most plausible meaning, even if not the only
meaning, for this symbol.424
2. The Confederate Flag
For many, "Dixie," the Confederate flag, is similarly situated to
ritual cross burning as a racially divisive and threatening symbol.
Flags are powerful, emotive, and often provocative symbols.
Especially for many African Americans, "Dixie" signifies hate,
racism, division, and perhaps even the threat of personal violence.
To others, however, the flag is an historical artifact, a symbol of
patriotism and ancestry. Thus, like ritual cross burning, display of
the Confederate flag raises difficult interpretive issues.425
424. Id. at 1548.
425. For those who are skeptical of the judicial capacity to render an interpretation of
something as politically and ideologically charged as a flag, the dissenting opinions in
Eichman and Johnson, the flag burning cases, are well worth considering. See United States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,319-24 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 421-39 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). In Johnson, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Stevens rendered interpretations of the national flag which, so far as
is apparent, were not contested by their colleagues. Their opinions emphasized the flag's
cultural significance from the Revolution to the present, describing its function in times of
war and peace, and its power to convey, in literature, song, and other cultural forms, the
concept and ideals of an entire nation. Id. at 421-29 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing
role ofnational flag in Revolutionary, Civil, and World Wars, and in peacetime); see also id.
at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the flag "signifies the ideas that characterize the
society that has chosen that emblem as well as the special history that has animated the
growth and power of those ideas"). The concept of insider perspective can be difficult to
assimilate where some flags are concerned. With regard to the Confederate flag, we might
want to know whether the flag, like the cross, has been effectively co-opted by those with
violent or other evil intentions. With regard to the national flag, the matter is somewhat
more complicated-the emic, or insider, perspective would seem to require consideration of
the whole of society; it is the nation which speaks through this symbol. As noted, the majority
did not contest the flag's symbolism, or offer its own interpretation. See id. at 397-420. The
majority feared that if it were to render an interpretation and rely upon it to prohibit flag
burning, the justices would be "forced to consult [their] own political preferences." Id. at 417.
But no more so than in Black; there the Court demonstrated the possibility of interpreting
without reference solely to "political preferences." See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1547-49. And no
more so than in Judge Posner's concurrence in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, which is
discussed infra and which demonstrated how thick description might allow courts to
2350
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No court has ever attempted to describe or interpret this symbol,
and no one, at least to date, has been prohibited from displaying
it in any context.426 James Forman, Jr. has argued that any state
government that displays the Confederate flag is constitution-
ally required, under the First Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, to remove it. 427 His argu-
ment against display of the Confederate flag is in one sense
narrowly contextual; the specific flag he is objecting to was
displayed over the Alabama capitol at the direction of segregationist
Governor George C. Wallace, who at the time was anticipating a
visit from Robert F. Kennedy, then the U.S. Attorney General."'
The flag was raised on the morning of Kennedy's arrival, about the
same time that a floral wreath was placed over the Jefferson Davis
gold star memorial.429 In this instance, the message of defiance was
difficult to misunderstand.
Forman does not appear, however, to be limiting his argument
solely to this narrow context, but rather to be advancing an
interpretation of the Confederate flag which would preclude its
display, at least by the government, under any circumstances. To
that end, Forman provides a relatively brief description of the flag's
cultural context. ° He describes the Confederate flag as a "rallying
symbol for Confederate troops," and the flag's representation of "a
history of resistance to change in the twentieth century." 8' Like the
burning cross in Black, the Confederate flag is linked by Forman to
"the Klan, skinheads, and other white supremacists opposed to
overcome raw preferences and biases. 904 F.2d 1081, 1089-1105 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring). This is not to say that the government should be permitted to prohibit flag
burning; the reason it may not do so, however, cannot be that the Court lacks a systematic
means of interpreting this symbol. The interpretive model can be used to access meaning,
even of symbols as charged as the national flag. What one does with that meaning, how one
treats it, is, as Johnson and Eichman demonstrate, a matter of constitutional principle.
426. One court has held, without delving into the socio-historical context of the flag as
symbol, that flying "Dixie" above the state capitol dome is not a violation of the First or
Fourteenth Amendments. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1562-66 (1lth Cir. 1990).
427. James Forman, Jr., Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag From
Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 506 (1991).
428. Id. at 507-09.
429. Id. at 508.
430. Id. at 513-14.
431. Id. at 513.
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black demands for equality and constitutional protection."'3 2
Forman seems to suggest that, like the cross, the Confederate flag
has been coopted by those with evil intent. It is threatening,
evocative of racism and, perhaps, of racial violence.
Forman suggests that "Dixie" can be understood in the manner
in which the Supreme Court came to terms with the symbolism of
racial segregation in Brown v. Board of Education-by paying close
attention to the historical and societal context of the symbol. 3"
Viewed in this manner, Forman argues that the flag, as a symbol,
offends the Constitution's equality principle. The societal and
cultural reality, he says, makes it "impossible to view the Confeder-
ate flag as a symbol that affects all races equally or as one that
creates problems only for those incapable of handling their own
emotions .434
But ultimately Alabama's flag, the one which prompted Forman's
analysis, is linked to Wallace, and his unique message of defiance.
Forman's description is compelling enough, perhaps, in this specific
context, to support his interpretation. What Wallace himself meant
by the display was unmistakable. But what of the symbolism of the
Confederate flag in broader cultural contexts? Might it, like the
burning cross, be prohibited as a display, perhaps as a "true threat"
to the safety of African Americans? This seems to be one logical
extension of Black, or at least we can imagine that there will be
those who see it that way.
One response might be that cross burning is monosemous, while
the Confederate flag, which has an historical origin, is polysemous.
But recall that the Black Court interpreted the burning cross not
only as a threat, but also as an expression of ideology, spirituality,
and political opposition. The key to the Court's interpretation of
cross burning as a threat, what tipped the balance, was the whole
of its description, the place and use of cross burning in our culture
as a signifier of threats of violence. Analysis of the Confederate flag
432. Id.
433. Charles Black popularized this view of Brown in his famous defense of the decision,
which focused specifically on the societal realities of segregation. See generally Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
434. Forman, supra note 427, at 513. One commentator similarly has suggested that
cultural anthropology can access the social reality of "unconscious" racial discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987).
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must, if it is to result in a defensible interpretation, proceed in the
same fashion.
Forman's description is, thus, too limited, conclusory, and
argumentative to suffice as thick description. It is not "thick"
enough to provide us with the "piled-up structures of inference and
implication" required to render an interpretation of symbolic
meaning. 3 5 As mentioned in the discussion of thick description,
there is not a priori an amount of thickness which is required to
support a chosen meaning.46 At the least, however, there must be
answers to the questions that were examined in detail in Black. A
court should not examine the symbol in the abstract. Who has used,
and is using, the symbol? For what purpose(s)? In what rituals or
contexts? Can it be linked firmly to the Klan, or skinheads, such
that it is their perspective from which a court should be interpret-
ing meaning? As Black demonstrates, the choice of perspective and
the use of ideal types often will dictate the choice of meaning. 7
Because of its centrality, there must be thick description to support
the choice of perspective as well.
In addition to details to support a choice of perspective, the court
would also need to provide the remaining context for the symbol.
How, if at all, has the symbol been treated in the larger culture-in
the arts, for example, or in entertainment? What did the Confeder-
ate flag represent in 1865? In 1965? What is the history of efforts
to regulate this symbol? Most importantly, perhaps, what does it
mean, from the perspective of those for whom it expresses, today?
In all likelihood, this symbol, like others, has various meanings.
What are they?
It may well be, as Forman suggests, that the Confederate flag has
been coopted as the ritual cross burning was-by racists, Klansmen,
and others with evil, perhaps threatening, intent."3 8 Indeed, the
paths of these symbols may cross in a considerable number of
contexts. But to be valid, an interpretation which is based upon this
particular perspective must first make the necessary link or
connection, as the Court did in Black, between actors and symbol.43 9
435. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 7.
436. See supra Part II.B.2.
437. See Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1544-47 (2003).
438. Forman, supra note 427, at 513-16.
439. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1544-48.
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Further, any description of the Confederate flag must be bal-
anced-a telling of both, or all, sides of the flag's story, not just the
one that suits the interpreter's ends or biases. An exegesis of the
Confederate flag must at least acknowledge that this symbol,
however repulsive to most, is not one of hate or division for all
viewers or "speakers.""° It carries a variety of meanings. One of the
advantages of the interpretive model is that it lessens the tempta-
tion to rely on aesthetic and other biases. If a court, after rigorous
factfinding and emic description, cannot find a basis for rendering
an interpretation of the Confederate flag as a threat, then those
who wish to display this symbol must be permitted to do so. But at
least the interpretive effort will help to explain why the symbol has
been used and by whom, and perhaps why it cannot be simply
removed from public discourse.
3. Symbols of Nazism
In the wake of Black, there will likely be increased attention
given to the status of the swastika, another potential symbol of
hate, evil, and violence. The symbol undoubtedly is representative
of hatred and violence to many. Again, as with cross burning and
"Dixie," however, this symbol has various meanings which must be
considered.
This is not to suggest, of course, that interpretation is not
possible. The swastika, as symbol, can be understood. But again,
courts must distinguish among the meaning of the symbol itself, its
use by a particular actor, and its use by an actor in a particular
context. Within these gradations, a true understanding of the
symbol is most likely in the latter circumstance, where actor and
context are clearest. As Black demonstrates, perspective is con-
trolled to a large degree by the relevant constitutional doctrine. If
the matter is one of incitement, a court must know what the
particular user of the symbol meant in the particular context. If it
is one of categorical threat, as in Black, then the relevant perspec-
440. I am thinking here mostly in terms of private displays of the Confederate flag, rather
than governmental displays. Obviously, as Forman's account suggests, the government can
display the flag with evil intent. But the Wallace debacle, let us hope, is a special case.
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tive might be broader, perhaps linking the symbol with a particular
group or groups.44'
The challenge for courts, who, like the rest of us, are assuredly
not strangers to this symbol or its history, would be to access the
meaning of the swastika, and to do so without invoking interpretive
biases. The interpretive model suggests one means for doing this.
It requires decryption, elaboration, and explanation of why this
symbol threatens like a burning cross (if it does) or otherwise
carries a prohibited meaning within a relevant context.
C. The "Said" of the Striptease
In contrast to Black, the Court's treatment of symbolic nude
dancing exhibits the far more typical judicial interpretive indiffer-
ence. Here the constitutional rule is not categorical, but rather
requires a balancing of speech interests with governmental
interests.4 2 Following this standard approach the Court in both
Barnes and Pap's was sharply divided as to whether a state may
ban nude dancing under a general prohibition on public nudity.44
The disagreement had everything to do with whether this genre
of dance conveyed a distinct message and whether the state had
targeted the dancing because of its message or for some other
reason. The plurality in both cases was unwilling to ascribe any
specific message to nude dancing, preferring instead to suppose, as
is customary in most expressive conduct cases, that nude dancing
expresses something, and to balance from that supposition.444 This
supposition was followed by the predictable determination that the
441. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1544-48.
442. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277,289 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 565-68 (1991).
443. See Pap's AM., 529 U.S. at 281. Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Burger joined with
respects to Parts I and II and in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and
Breyer joined with respect to Parts III and IV. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Souter filed an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Ginsburg joined. Id. In Barnes, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court in
which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined. Justices Scalia and Souter filed concurring
opinions while Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 560-62.
444. See Pap's AM., 529 U.S. at 289; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565.
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regulation of the gesture was unrelated to the suppression of
expression and, what is more, that the regulation posed only an
indirect, even trivial, burden on expressive interests. 45 The
dissenters argued, thinly and in summary fashion, that the state
sought to regulate nude dancing's expression of some amorphous
aspects of "eroticism" or "sensuality."446
This Article suggests that there is a third way available to courts
to resolve the interpretive dilemma in cases where the conduct is
plainly expressive, but the message uncertain. The interpretive
model enables courts to engage meaning, rather than default to the
doctrine of interpretive indifference. Fortunately, where nude
dancing is concerned, there is a good, if rather unusual, example
from judicial work product to draw upon. In his concurrence in
Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, the lower court decision in
Barnes, Judge Posner attempted to recover the meaning of the
striptease."7 His approach offers some insights into the plausibility
of an ethnographic model for symbolic gestures.
What animated the interpretive approach for Judge Posner was
the district court's conclusion that nude dancing is not expressive
activity at all, but merely conduct, and crude conduct at that, which
is unprotected by the First Amendment.44 Judge Posner found this
conclusion "indefensible and a threat to artistic freedom."449 As with
Geertz's cockfighting monograph, a summary cannot do justice to
the thickness of the description in Judge Posner's Miller concur-
rence, which runs approximately ten pages and is packed with
extra-record data, argument, rhetoric, observations, and asides. A
summary will, however, provide a sense of the descriptive and other
conventions being advocated in this Article.
Judge Posner's "thin" description of the striptease, apparently
based upon a videotape of the performances, was characteristically
straightforward:
The dancers were presentable although not striking young
women. They danced on a stage, with vigor but without accom-
445. See Pap's AM., 529 U.S. at 292-93; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570-71.
446. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 592-93 (White, J., dissenting).
447. 904 F.2d 1081, 1089-1105 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring).
448. Id. at 1090.
449. Id.
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plishment, to the sound of a jukebox, and while dancing they
removed articles of clothing (beginning, for example, with a
glove) until nothing was left.450
The dancers' compensation, the record indicated, was tied to the
number of drinks they induced customers to purchase.45' Judge
Posner conceded at the outset that if the district court "had said
that the dances in issue are not classy, [it] would have been on
sound ground."452 Neither the name of the venue (the "Kitty Kat
Lounge") nor the context in which the dancing occured, he admitted,
"promise[d] high culture." 5 3 But in contrast to the plurality in
Barnes, which stopped cold its analysis of the "said" of the strip-
tease at this aesthetic boundary, 54 Judge Posner was only begin-
ning his interpretive journey.
Judge Posner's thick description began not with the striptease
itself, but by standing back to take in the cultural significance of
the more general aspect of nudity. In our culture, Judge Posner
submitted, a striptease which ended in complete nudity would have
been deemed obscene as recently as thirty years ago. 5 He di-
gressed briefly into a description of our changing cultural mores
regarding nudity, including a description of the changing states of
dress, and undress, from the repressed Victorian England to the
present condition. 56 He colorfully stated, "today many decent
women appear in public in states of undress (mini-skirts, hot pants,
slit skirts, body stockings, see-through blouses, decolletage
becoming outright topless evening wear) that would have been
considered nakedness, or the garb of prostitutes, thirty years
ago." 57 Thus, Judge Posner concluded-based, it appears, upon his
own observations of cultural mores-that a striptease which ended
only in partial nudity "might lack erotic punch today."4
58
450. Id. at 1091.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 1090.
453. Id. at 1090-91.
454. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568-70.
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One gathers from the tone of his description that Judge Posner
might object personally to this decline in cultural modesty, but he
never said so in his opinion. Indeed, he took his task to be the
description of a cultural phenomenon from the perspective of those
who disrobe, not the rendering of a personal judgment on their state
of undress. Like it or not, Judge Posner seemed to be saying,
nudity, or lack of modesty, has gained a cultural foothold. Whatever
"class" or lack of it inheres in nude dance performances, Judge
Posner felt obliged to examine the striptease as an art form, not a
cultural calamity. 59
Indeed, this is precisely what Judge Posner's thick description
accomplished-an interpretation of nude dancing, purportedly from
the perspective of the dancers, as a form of artistic expression.
Putting nudity to the side, at least for a moment, he began his
description of dance with the debut of erotic dances as public
performances "in the satyr plays of the ancient Greeks." 6 ° After a
period of Christian suppression, Judge Posner noted, these
dances "reappeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries."6 1 Judge Posner described some early precursors to the
striptease, like "fan dancing" and ballet dancing-both of which
were characterized, he notes, by scanty dress.6 2 He briefly de-
scribed erotic dances in non-Western cultures as well, such as belly
and fertility dances.6 3
So the reader is informed that we are talking about not only
nudity, but dance as well, and artful dance at that. Judge Posner
was building toward an interpretation. He proceeded to consider the
artistic elements of dance, which he described, not incidentally, as
"a medium of expression, of communication." 64 With regard to the
"said" of dance, he stated: "What it expresses, what it comimuni-
cates, is, like most art-particularly but not only nonverbal
art--emotion, or more precisely an ordering of sights and sounds
that arouses emotion."'65 So he too, like the Black Court, grasped
459. Id. at 1091-93.
460. Id. at 1089.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 1089-90.
463. Id. at 1090.
464. Id. at 1091.
465. Id.
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the inherent emotive element of symbolism. To support this
semiotic-emotive perspective, Judge Posner cited authorities on
ballet which claimed that this form of dance communicates "formal
fantasy" and evokes emotion through precise movement.
66
Through description, Judge Posner linked the elements of nudity
and dance, in the process linking the striptease to other genres of
mainstream artistic dance. The product of this descriptive and
interpretive combination of dance and nudity is the "erotic dance."
Judge Posner offered this descriptive explanation of the genre:
Erotic dances express erotic emotions, such as sexual excitement
and longing. Nudity is the usual state in which sexual inter-
course is conducted in our culture, and disrobing is preliminary
to nudity. But of course nudity and disrobing are not invariably
associated with sex. The goal of the striptease-a goal to which
the dancing is indispensable-is to enforce the association: to
make plain that the performer is not removing her clothes
because she is about to take a bath or change into another set of
clothes or undergo a medical examination; to insinuate that she
is removing them because she is preparing for, thinking about,
and desiring sex. The dance ends when the presentations are
complete. The sequel is left to the viewer's imagination.
4 67
Although, as Judge Posner noted, it is tempting to dismiss the
music and the dancing of the striptease as mere window dressing-
"figleaves to conceal the absence of figleaves"-"they are what make
a given female body expressive of a specifically sexual emotion."'
The dance, he said, is "the ensemble of the music, the dance, the
disrobing, and the nude end state; it is more erotic than any of its
components; and what makes it more erotic than the body itself, or
the disrobing itself, is, precisely, that it is expressive of erotic
emotion." 69
Judge Posner's description thus explicated the "'tease' in strip-
tease."4 70 The tease, it turns out, was the message of the erotic
dance, or at least one possible message. In basic semiotic terms,
466. Id. (quoting EDWIN DENBY, DANCE WRITINGS 507, 509 (1986)).
467. Id.
468. Id. at 1091-92.
469. Id. at 1092.
470. Id. at 1091.
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then, the striptease was the sign, female sexuality was the object,
and an emotive-if fictitious---offer of sex was the interpretant, or
possible meaning. As for the constitutional issue before him, Judge
Posner readily concluded that in no sense could nude dancing be
considered merely unexpressive conduct outside the protection of
the First Amendment.47' He had used the conventions of thick
description and interpretation to expose the fallacy of that position;
he claimed to have accessed the "said," the message, of the strip-
tease.472
The Miller concurrence demonstrates how description, and the
other elements of the interpretive model, fight aesthetic and other
biases which persist in the doctrine of interpretive indifference. On
the one hand, Judge Posner noted, we are, as a culture, highly
anxious about nudity, an anxiety with deep roots in Christian
thought.4 71 On the other hand, most in our broad culture can accept
that the nude form, particularly the female form, is an appropriate
subject of artistic expression. Judge Posner spent some time, for
example, discussing "Venus with a Mirror," which, he said,
communicates and expresses "a complex of feelings-"of volup-
tuousness, sensuality, beauty, harmony, sumptuousness, sexual
allure (we know what Venus is the goddess of)." 474 If "Venus"
communicates, Judge Posner reasoned, then so too does nude
dancing-and, perhaps surprisingly to many, in a like manner. As
the judge reads the canvas, so too does he read the striptease-as
canvas, or text, or whatever convention is most comfortable. The
point is that this judge read it, interpreted it, and translated it.
By describing and interpreting, Judge Posner quite forcefully
made the point that there is no place for judicial biases with regard
to the "classiness" of a gesture, or its relative aesthetic value to a
supposed artistic culture. The judicial art ofjudgment and interpre-
tation is not the same in character, nor significance, as that of the
art critic or social commentator. There is simply no principled way,
471. Id. at 1093.
472. This is not to say, of course, that the government necessarily has prohibited the
striptease based upon its message. But recovering that message is antecedent to a full
consideration of the interests being balanced. In other words, we ought to at least know what
message is in play in making the constitutional assessment.
473. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1104 (Posner, J., concurring).
474. Id. at 1094.
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Judge Posner argued, to distinguish between"upper-class and lower
class nonobscene erotica."475 "The practical effect of letting judges
play art critic and censor," Posner argued, "would be to enforce
conventional notions of 'educated taste,' and thus to allow highly
educated people to consume erotica but forbid hoi polloi to do the
same."
476
Now, to say that Posner engaged some of the conventions of the
interpretive model is not to say that there are no flaws in his
interpretation. For one thing, the link between the striptease and
other forms of dancing, such as ballet, seems far more tenuous than
the Black Court's connection of Klansmen to ritual cross burnings.
Insofar as Judge Posner used that purported link to establish the
perspective from which to derive symbolic meaning, his ultimate
interpretation is open to some criticism. Perhaps more seriously,
Judge Posner's examination of meaning seems myopic and chan-
neled; he seems more interested in debunking the notion that the
striptease is not a form of expression than in uncovering all of this
symbol's available meanings. This, of course, was a function of the
narrow issue which had prompted Judge Posner's description,
namely the district court's insistence that nude dancing is not
"speech." For some-dancers and observers alike-the performance
may have no meaning at all, or at least likely will not have the
artistic meaning Judge Posner settled upon. How, for instance, does
Judge Posner square the fact that the dancers' compensation is
linked to induced drink purchases with his interpretation of
symbolic meaning?
More troubling still, there was some evidence that the dancers
themselves had no expressive intent; indeed, they appeared to
concede as much in the lower court. This raises the sticky question
of whether actors "have epistemological authority with regard to
meaning for them."4 77 Can an interpreter/judge essentially reject
the interpretation of the actors themselves as "incorrect" or
"mistaken"? Posner's zeal to take the striptease to new heights of
meaning raises this fundamental methodological question. It
highlights the importance, again, of perspective. Again, perhaps
475. Id. at 1098.
476. Id.
477. TAMANAHA, supra note 314, at 79.
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Judge Posner did not feel it necessary to consider the perspective of
the dancers themselves, inasmuch as the district court seemed to
suggest that the striptease could never be expressive.
It is imperative that courts recognize that the grasping of
an understanding of meaning requires that courts recover as
many available meanings as are plausible within a given context.
Interpretation is the choice of one such meaning as the most
plausible. With the striptease, Judge Posner ignored the fact that
for many dancers, the striptease either means nothing or is a
functional means to a financial end. To undertake the interpretive
effort validly, a judge would need to contend with all of the
available meanings. He would need to explain why the meaning he
has chosen is the most plausible, in light of the testimony of the
dancers themselves, the financial bartering of nudity for drinks,
and the overall context and behavior involved. Judge Posner made
a solid, thick case for expression with respect to the symbol in the
abstract, but he made a much weaker case for meaning by these
dancers, or to these patrons, in this particular context.
Even with these flaws, Judge Posner's efforts point in the right
direction. First, he exhibits a lack of interpretive bias, or at least a
suppression of the intrepreter effect. We know a great deal more
about the possibilities of meaning as a result of his thick description
of nude dancing. And we now have a record to assess in order to
judge the plausibility of his ultimate interpretation of meaning. At
the least, then, it is far more difficult to simply dismiss the
striptease as an artless behavior with no expressive content
whatsoever.
D. Other Symbolic Expressive Activity
The interpretive model may strike some as overly labor-intensive.
After all, we all know that cross burnings are inherently threaten-
ing. But the point is precisely that interpreters cannot rely solely on
their own self-interpretations. Meaning is public; thus, interpreters
should consult public sources of knowledge in order to understand
the meaning of a symbol. Meaning is intersubjective; thus judges
can render interpretations based upon shared cultural experiences.
Further, this labor ought to be expended, because what we are
talking about is suppressing symbolism, and, with it, symbolic
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discourse. Before that occurs, courts, like ethnographers, should
engage in symbolic discourse to discover what it is that is being
said, and why. There should be no eliding meaning where symbols
are utilized to convey ideas.
To be effectual, however, description need not always be so thick
or intensive as in the examples I have cited thus far. The thickness
of any description obviously will depend upon the complexity of the
symbol and its contexts, both immediate and more general.
Sometimes what is most needed is not a full-blown judicial
monograph, akin to Black or Judge Posner's Miller concurrence, so
much as a filling in of discrete contextual blanks and ellipses, or
even just a slight change of perspective.
In Clark, for example, the semiotic dispute was rather straight-
forward: Did sleeping on the National Mall represent a functional
protest strategy or a specific expressive message?.. Interpreting
sleep as merely a functional element of the protest essentially
would guarantee that the protesters would come up short in the
balancing calculus. This is, in fact, essentially what occurred. The
Court balanced a seemingly weak interest in the form or function
of the symbolic protest against governmental interests relating to
preservation of the national parks, and, quite predictably, the
government prevailed.
Whether a thicker description would have altered the outcome is
debatable. But the decision to deny the protesters their symbolic
protest would have been more legitimate if the Court had bothered
to balance with a more complete understanding of symbolic
meaning. The Court failed even to mention one important aspect of
the context-the history of litigation surrounding the Mall itself,
which included several prior lawsuits by homeless advocates.479
What this says, or should have said, to the Court was that this was
no ordinary park, but was sacred ground to the protesters. The
reason, of course, that the place was considered so special involves
a consideration of the Mall and its place at the seat of government.
As the D.C. Circuit stated, the Mall "is the symbolic locus of the
478. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294-96 (1984).
479. See Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright,
J., concurring) ("There is an unmistakable symbolic significance in demonstrating close to
the White House or on the Capitol grounds which, while not easily quantifiable, is of
undoubted importance in the constitutional balance.").
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first amendment."48 ° The Supreme Court failed even to acknowledge
the significance of place, much less to describe it with any thickness
of detail.
This descriptive failing turned out to be significant. There is, of
course, a vast communicative difference between sleeping on the
Mall and sleeping in a vacant lot or a backyard. The meaning, or at
least one of the meanings, of this specific mode of demonstration
was that the government, and not some other party, had neglected
homelessness issues and the homeless themselves. This was a
political protest, in other words, that depended heavily upon place
to carry an effective message. It was not so much the sleeping that
was significant, but the actors who were doing the sleeping and the
reasons why they chose this particular symbol for this particular
context.
This was not the only interpretive failing in Clark. Also missing
in Clark was a description of the broader cultural context in which
this symbolic vigil was to take place. There was no description of
the homelessness problem in the city, or the country, no description
of the societal effects of this problem, nothing to indicate in any
tangible way that the Court understood the specific plight of these
protesters. All of this descriptive omission and normative bias, of
course, made it all too easy for the Court to declare summarily that
the homeless were not entitled to the most effective means of
communicating their message, as if they were seeking some
privileged position among speakers.
If all of this sounds like a call to contextual sensitivity, that is
because in large measure this is precisely what is advocated. The
context includes not only the physical context of the protest, or
parade, for example, but also the meaning-contexts implicated.
Courts must be able to separate the subjective meaning-context of
the gesturer, which is unavailable to them, from their own self-
interpretations, which also represent incomplete understandings
of symbolic meaning. It is, again, intersubjective understanding
courts ought to be pursuing. The available meanings of the
sleeping protest were mainly two-an expression merely of func-
tional necessity, or an expression of civil protest. Choosing the
480. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 599 (1983) (en banc) (per
curiam).
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most plausible from these two available meanings should not be
difficult. Not only do we have the testimony of the protesters
themselves, but there is also a history of past behavior, a history of
place (the Mall), and a context which indicates that these ideal
types (the homeless and their advocates) wished to use a symbolic
gesture to make a political point.
In sum, the aim of this Section has been to demonstrate that a
First Amendment ethnography for "expressive conduct" is viable.
Whether the product is a full-blown monograph, as in Black, or
simply a fuller, more empathic, description, as might have occurred
in Clark, the interpretive model offers a path to the recovery of
symbolic meaning. Translation of these gestures leads to discourse,
and discourse, in turn, leads to an understanding of cultures and
cultural symbolism heretofore treated by courts with indifference.
E. The Semiotics of Sacred Symbols
This Article does not limit the interpretive model to symbolic
conduct. Ethnographers have extensive experience interpreting
sacred symbols and rituals as well, and judges can learn from their
efforts and perspectives. Anthropological approaches to religion,
and religious symbolism, are as varied as they are with respect to
other cultural phenomena."' It is beyond the scope of this Article
to examine these approaches, or their findings, in any detail. Since
it is still symbols-in this instance, crucifixes, crbches, menorahs,
and the like-that are being considered, no broad change of focus or
methodology is required. This Section considers the application of
the interpretive model to sacred symbols.
Interpreting sacred symbols is a messy-and risky-business for
courts for two principal reasons. First, Establishment Clause
doctrine is notoriously indeterminate. The Supreme Court contin-
ues to pluck its way toward the core values of the Establishment
Clause, but it has not yet satisfactorily come to grips with the
tensions created by public displays of religious symbolism. Second,
judicial interpretation of sacred symbols is, not surprisingly, hardly
481. For a recent treatment of the various approaches, see generally A READER IN THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF RELIGION (Michael Lambek ed., 2002).
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an accepted convention.'82 Courts understandably do not wish to
become national theology boards, issuing purportedly definitive
accounts of religious symbols and events. Notwithstanding these
challenges and concerns, this Section seeks to establish that the
interpretive model can lead courts toward a viable ethnography of
sacred symbols.
As noted, among the many approaches that have been suggested
to capture the essence of the Establishment Clause, Justice
O'Connor's "endorsement" test seems to have the greatest
support on the current Court. The crux of the test is found in
Justice O'Connor's observation in Lynch v. Donnelly that the
Establishment Clause "prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing
in the political community."' Endorsement of religion, in Justice
O'Connor's formulation, is an explicitly semiotic concept-it sends
a "message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community," and sends the reverse
message to religious adherents--"that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community."'
The endorsement test focuses on both governmental purpose and
effects, or, as the doctrine has developed, perceptions, but it has
been utilized mainly to examine the latter. This is hardly surpris-
ing, as any inquiry regarding the government's purpose is likely to
result in indeterminacy. Thus, as the test has developed, what has
become of greatest concern is the symbolic message received, and
its effects on political status in the community. Further, although
the effects test initially appeared to call for an examination of the
perceptions of actual people, Justice O'Connor later clarified that
the endorsement test takes into account only the perceptions of the
fictional "objective observer," who is apparently endowed with some
limited local knowledge, along with a passing appreciation for the
values inherent in the Free Exercise Clause.8 5
482. For a discussion of the pitfalls associated with interpretation of sacred symbols and
rituals, see generally NANCY JAY, THROUGHOUT YOUR GENERATIONS FOREVER: RELIGION,
SACRIFICEANDPATERNITY 13-16 (1992). The significance and potency of religion and religious
symbols in American culture are discussed in CHARLES H. LONG, SIGNIFICATIONS: SIGNS,
SYMBOLS, AND IMAGES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION (1986).
483. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
484. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
485. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
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In sum, as things now stand, whether a creche like the one in
Lynch has a forbidden meaning,' 8 or sends a prohibited message,
nominally requires an examination of both the government's
purpose in using a sacred symbol, rather than a secular one, and an
examination of the message an "objective observer" would perceive
is being communicated. As the description in Part I demonstrated,
both the purpose and effect inquiries are influenced substantially
by the notion, now unfortunately enshrined as establishment
doctrine, that local context-trees, reindeer, elephants, clowns, and
the like--can, in effect, desacralize sacred symbols. The upshot,
where some secular purpose, as is generally the case, can be
ascertained orjudicially imagined, is that judges (who, in effect, act
as the fictional "objective observers") will only in the rarest of
circumstances perceive an unconstitutional establishment from the
display of sacred symbols. s7
We scarcely can hope to find an authoritative means of resolving
the meaning of sacred symbols. 88 What we can hope for, however,
and what the interpretive model requires, is a rigorous examina-
tion of sacred symbols which seeks recovery of all plausible,
available meanings for such symbols and an interpretation which
judges these meanings with reference to behavior, context, and
intersubjective knowledge. This necessarily will mean acknowledg-
(concurring injudgment invalidating statute permitting moment of silence for private prayer
in public schools and announcing the "objective observer" test). In addition to having some
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, the objective observer supposedly is acquainted
with the "text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute." Id.; see also Sante Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (quoting O'Connor's "endorsement" and
"objective observer" tests with approval). This constitutional fiction was deemed necessary
so that the observer would not view all religious acknowledgment and accommodation as an
unconstitutional establishment of religion. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 76, 83.
486. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671 (describing the display).
487. The opposite conclusion will be reached only where a sacred symbol appears
unadorned or unaccompanied by plainly secular objects as, for example, where a crucifix is
displayed at a courthouse on its own. This is a testament to the religious power of the sacred
symbol, and to the secularizing power, under current doctrine, of objects like elephants,
reindeer, and talking wishing wells. See id. (providing a description of secular elements
surrounding the crbche).
488. See, e.g, Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of
Religion: An Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53,
83 (1990) (noting the variety of messages usually conveyed by sacred symbols); Steven D.
Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No
Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 323 (1987) (arguing that the cultural meaning of
religious symbols is inherently ambiguous and contested).
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ing, rather than diminishing and disregarding, sacredness. Still, the
interpretive approach need not result in courts assuming the
functions of a judicial theology board. But it must, if we are to move
beyond rawjudicial preferences, presuppositions about religion, and
desacralizing fictions, offer a means of knowledgeably adjudicating
the semiotics of sacred symbols.
A reexamination of Lynch will demonstrate how the conventions
of the interpretive model will assist courts in assessing both
purposes and effects, within current establishment doctrine. A thick
description of the creche and the display context likely would have
altered the result in Lynch. Chief Justice Burger's description of the
creche in Lynch was as thin as one can possibly render, short of
ignoring the presence of the creche altogether. The creche was
described repeatedly as a "passive" secular symbol, by which the
Court apparently meant to suggest that the symbol does not "speak"
to anyone about religion, but is rather something of an inert
historical depiction.'89 The symbol was, in addition, according to the
Court, a small part of the larger cultural celebration of Christmas,
a traditional and largely secular holiday season."9° So there were
two contexts to be examined when assessing the government's
purpose in utilizing the creche-the larger holiday "season" and the
local display, which purportedly represented that season.
To begin with the larger canvas first, Justice Brennan's dissent
cast serious doubt upon the majority's historiographical conclusion
that Christmas is a traditional, and traditionally celebrated and
accepted, secular holiday.49' Chief Justice Burger's interpretation,492
which was based upon shoddy cultural and historical research,
lacked descriptive clarity and rigor. It seemed to be based upon
little more than the interpreter's own preconceptions and biases. A
thick description of the Christmas holiday would have demon-
strated that the holiday lacks the tradition, the universal accep-
tance, the majority ascribed to it.493 This casts the first hint of doubt
489. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685-86.
490. Id.
491. See id. at 710-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
492. Id. at 676-78.
493. For an account of the history and symbolism of Christmas, see WILLIAM SANSOM, A
BOOK OF CHRISTMAS (1968).
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upon the government's argument that the purpose of using a creche
was simply to celebrate an accepted cultural tradition.
What is more, however, is that there was no description of the
creche beyond its immediate context.494 It is important to recognize
that the majority in fact rendered an interpretation of the creche
display. But again, the Court's interpretation does not appear to be
supported by anything other than the religious preconceptions of
the interpreter. There is no accounting for the sacredness of the
symbol. At a minimum, a description of the creche must account for
the fact that this symbol depicts the birth of Jesus Christ, an event
which has sacred meaning for all Christians. As Justice Brennan
explained in his Lynch dissent, "[ilt is the chief symbol of the
characteristically Christian belief that a divine Savior was brought
into the world and that the purpose of this miraculous birth was to
illuminate a path toward salvation and redemption. For Christians,
that path is exclusive, precious, and holy."495 This aspect of sacred
meaning is wholly missing from the majority's interpretation.
This is not to suggest that the Court was obligated to, or could,
discover precisely what the cr~che means, or to render a unitary
interpretation of meaning. It was not necessary to go quite so far,
however, in order to consider the possibility that the creche is more
accurately characterized as a religious, not an historical, symbol. As
evidence for this possible meaning, Justice Brennan noted that the
creche is a sign that, for Christians, has a well-recognized inter-
pretation or possible meaning-the "path toward salvation and
494. A word about semiotic methodology in this context is necessary. The Court's
description of the creche pretended to be holistic, but was remarkably thin. Chief Justice
Burger's description, in addition to relying upon questionable historiography concerning
Christmas, conveyed only the nature, number, and size of the figures which constitute the
display. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671 (describing the crbche). The Lynch Court gave undue
weight, in describing the creche, to its immediate context, while offering no description at
all of the origins or sacred context of the symbol. See Jamin B. Raskin, Polling
Establishment: Judicial Review, Democracy, and the Endorsement Theory of the
Establishment Clause-Commentary on Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 761, 770
(2001) ("[W]hat counts for Establishment Clause scrutiny is not the semiotics of the whole
scene, but the semiotic meaning of adding particular religious elements to it."). The crbche
became, through the Court's description, not only passive, but neutral as well. What
neutralized the cr~che's sacredness, according to the Court, was the presence of reindeer,
clowns, elephants, and other secular symbols which have been placed near it. See Lynch, 465
U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This is dilution by descriptive association, not holistic
analysis.
495. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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redemption."'96 Even a rather thin description would have revealed
that the creche itself is not merely a traditional symbol, but a
"recognizably religious element" of the display.497 This further
rebuts, if it does not altogether defeat, the town's assertion that it
chose the creche merely to celebrate history or acknowledge
tradition. Its purpose plausibly might have been something else;
one plausible interpretation is that the town sought to celebrate the
Christian faith-precisely what the endorsement test would appear
to forbid.
Even more fundamentally, however, since it is effects, rather
than purposes, which usually dominate the establishment inquiry,
the perspective from which the symbol is viewed is of paramount
importance. The effects inquiry requires that the interpreter shift
focus, from the purpose of the government as speaker to the effect
the symbol has on the perceiver or viewer.498 Thus, there are two
symbolic meanings in play-the meaning to a potential insider and
the meaning to a potential outsider. But this is where the endorse-
ment test's inquiry concerning meaning takes a wrong turn. Both
insiders and outsiders apparently are endowed with only the
fictional makeup of the objective observer, which, while it may
include some local and constitutional knowledge, does not include
any appreciation for the sacredness of religious symbols, nor any
capacity for transcendental belief. Of course, as noted, courts
cannot access the "primordial" understanding of either insiders or
outsiders. But by objectifying the observer completely, the Court
has ensured that sacred meaning will be ignored. It has removed an
important set of meanings from the interpretive calculus.
This removal necessarily biases the interpretive endeavor in
favor of secularization of sacred symbols. For believers, the "mes-
sage" of the creche, as Justice Brennan stated in his Lynch dissent,
"begins and ends with reverence for a particular image of the
496. Id.
497. See Raskin, supra note 494, at 770 (arguing that so long as there is a "recognizably
religious element in such a display, it constitutes an impermissible endorsement").
498. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (articulating endorsement
test subsequently applied by majority of Court). I recognize that religious insiders are not
necessarily the ones who control the display or send the message. But sacred symbols
communicate to, and thus have meaning for, principally those who can decipher and
appreciate the message being sent. It is their perspective which should control the "effects"
inquiry.
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divine."499 The concept of sacredness is what distinguishes creches
from Santas, reindeer, and garland. As Justice Brennan explained
the distinction:
Unlike such secular figures as Santa Claus, reindeer, and
carolers, a nativity scene represents far more than a mere
"traditional" symbol of Christmas. The essence of the cr~che's
symbolic purpose and effect is to prompt the observer to
experience a sense of simple awe and wonder appropriate to the
contemplation of one of the central elements of Christian
dogma-that God sent His Son into the world to be a Messiah."°
It is difficult to know for certain whether Justice Brennan was
justified in the strength of his convictions, whether in fact this was
"the essence" of the creche. But his description finds support in the
works of those, like Geertz, who have studied sacred symbols; it at
least begins to capture the power sacred symbols have been shown
to have for believers.5 0 '
Reexamined from the perspective of the insider-believer, the
cr~che is neither mere passive history nor neutral heritage, but an
active, sacred symbol representing a particular set of divine,
transcendental beliefs. The message believers might be said to
decipher from the display of such a holy icon is that the state views
their faith not with indifference or hostility, but with something
more akin to approval. It should come as no surprise then, that, as
the district court found in Lynch, "most observers understood the
creche as both a symbol of Christian beliefs and a symbol of the
city's support for those beliefs."0 2
A realistic examination of effects must take into consideration
that sacred symbols like crosses and cr~ches are hardly passive to
those who believe in them. When state officials recently threatened
499. Id. at 717 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
500. Id. at 711 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
501. See A READER IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF RELIGION, supra note 481, at 4 ("Good
anthropology understands that religious worlds are real, vivid, and significant to those who
construct and inhabit them and it tries, as artfully as it can, to render those realities for
others, in their sensory richness, philosophic depth, emotional range, and moral
complexity."); see also GEERTZ, supra note 236, at 132-40 (describing emotions evoked by the
wajang, or puppet show, a Balinese religious ritual).
502. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 705 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to remove the Ten Commandments display from an Alabama
courthouse, the faithful reacted with fervent emotions, as if their
very faith was under attack.50 3 Courts must seek to recover the
meaning of these symbols to the religious. As explained, Geertz's
study of religious symbols and rituals indicates that sacred symbols
literally order the personal worlds of the faithful.50 4 Sacred symbols
explain the inexplicable; they motivate action and generate
emotion.
Sacred symbols are, thus, fundamentally different from the
symbols to which the Court routinely compares them-paid
chaplains, currency inscriptions ("In God We Trust"), public
expenditures for textbooks and other benefits, and proclamations
of Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays. These gestures, which
merely recognize a religious heritage, do not pack any emotional or
motivational punch. They are truly passive, incapable of generating
emotions, influencing moods, or providing transcendental explana-
tions of the grand mysteries of life. The creche and the Command-
ments, whatever they ultimately signify, do not belong to this
category of symbols. The benefits that their display confers upon
religious believers cannot legitimately be dismissed as merely
"incidental."" 5
In sum, although the Lynch Court worried aloud that focusing
solely on the creche would "inevitably lead to its invalidation under
the Establishment Clause,"5° it chose a path of interpretive
avoidance which, equally inevitably, allows the display of sacred
symbols. In the process, the Court simultaneously favored and
insulted believers by embracing the fiction that sacred symbols are
so powerless, so passive, that they can easily be muted by clowns,
trees, reindeer, and other secular symbols. In utilizing this
approach, the Court avoided the sticky issue of sacred meaning, but
at the cost of a defensible interpretation of the symbolism of the
crbche.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court's other major sacred
symbol case, demonstrated that the interpretive model is a bundle
503. See supra note 138 (describing recent controversy over the Ten Commandments
display).
504. See GEERTZ, supra note 238, at 127.
505. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
506. Id. at 680.
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of conventions, and must be applied as a whole.0 7 InAllegheny, the
Court examined separate creche and menorah displays. 8 The
plurality simply followed Lynch's approach to the creche, which this
time was displayed all on its own, without the secular cover the
Court relied upon in Lynch to drain the symbol of religious mean-
ing.09 The unmistakable message to government: If you are going
to display a sacred symbol, a determination of secular meaning
follows only from the display of clowns, trees, and other secular
symbols. By contrast, the Court painstakingly described the
menorah's sacred origins and nature, including references to the
symbol in the Talmud, a description of Jewish law, and the meno-
rah's place within the holiday of Chanukah, which also was
described in some detail.510 But the plurality, following Lynch, once
again purported to desacralize the symbol with a secular fig leaf-a
forty-five foot Christmas tree, to be precise."1 ' Thus, although the
plurality provided the very sort of thick description of the menorah
which the Lynch Court avoided with respect to the creche, it once
again avoided the semiotic meaning, to believers, of adding the
menorah to the display, opting instead to focus solely upon the
semiotic meaning of the entire display.
The interpretive model offers a corrective to this form of interpre-
tive avoidance. The model begins from the premise that meaning
matters and, more importantly, that meaning is not unitary. The
government's purpose, its meaning, in choosing the creche as a
display, varies. Either the government sought to celebrate Christ-
mas generally, or it sought to say something in particular about
religion. To even begin to resolve this dispute, courts must access
not only the secular history of the holiday, but also the possible
meaning of using a sacred symbol in the particular context of the
holiday display. Insofar as sources cast doubt upon the govern-
ment's assertions regarding the place of the Christmas holiday in
our culture, there is reason for skepticism. Insofar as an examina-
tion of the creche reveals that it is more than a symbol of tradition,
this evidence tends to rebut the government's explanation. Insofar
507. See 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
508. Id. at 578-87.
509. Id. at 598-602.
510. Id. at 582-87.
511. Id. at 614.
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as the creche has characteristics that distinguish it from other
symbols which are purportedly similar, there is more reason still to
doubt the government's stated purpose. In this way, inference piles
upon inference until the most plausible meaning for the sacred
symbols is recovered.
In addition to purpose meaning, however, courts also must
examine effects meaning. This meaning is, by definition, varied.
The endorsement test requires that courts consider the possible
meaning of the display to both potential outsiders and potential
insiders. At the same time, however, the effects test effectively
merges the two by miscasting the inquiry as one regarding the
meaning of the symbol to the reasonable observer. This under-
emphasizes one significant available meaning-that taken from
the display of sacred symbols by those who are believers. It is
imperative that this meaning not be ignored.51 Although it is true
that courts cannot know the literal meaning of sacred symbols for
believers, they can factor this meaning into the inquiry by means of
ideal types, as well as anthropological and other knowledge. Courts
can achieve intersubjective meanings in this fashion, as they can for
symbolic gestures like cross burning and nude dancing. But first
they must consider all available circulating meanings, a task
currently made impossible under the endorsement test.
Application of the interpretive model does not place courts in the
untenable position of acting as theology boards. Rather, it merely
requires that they apply the endorsement test from a vantage point
which is most likely to reveal governmental purposes in displaying
sacred symbols, and offers meaningful access to the effects mean-
ings associated with such displays. In sum, the interpretive model
will not lead to definitive accounts of sacred symbols, but it will
lead to more defensible interpretations of those symbols than does
the current doctrine of interpretive avoidance.
512. This is not a prescription for some sort of reverse minority veto of religion in the
public square, where the presence of a few insiders or believers dooms the display. It is likely
that menorahs tend to be displayed in or near Jewish communities, and creches in or near
Christian communities. Indeed, looking to outsider stigma, as the Court typically does, is far
more likely to result in a sort of heckler's veto of religion, where a few outsiders would
control the display of religion in the public square. The emic perspective results, as the
Establishment Clause contemplates, in the protection of minorities.
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F. The Meaning of Membership
Finally, this Section briefly revisits the expressive association
cases by applying the interpretive model to the symbolism of
membership. The First Amendment protects a freedom of associa-
tion, which the Court has held includes the right to exclude certain
would-be members from an association or organization. 513 As it was
for symbolic conduct and sacred symbols, symbolic meaning is
important to an appreciation and understanding of this constitu-
tional right.
Whether an association has a right to exclude depends, in large
part, on its ability to demonstrate that inclusion will adversely
affect its expressive message. Thus, what it means to be a member
of the Boy Scouts, for example, or a Jaycee matters for purposes of
the First Amendment. This is a critical inquiry in association cases
like Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, where the association argues that admission of a certain
person or group of persons would adversely affect the group's
function and articulation of a coherent association message.5 14 The
state, on the other hand, has an important interest in preventing
illicit discrimination against groups like women and homosexuals.
So courts again are faced with the question of how to access the
symbolic meaning of a gesture, here the act of joining an organiza-
tion.
As in other symbolic gesture contexts, however, the Court has
treated meaning here with indifference and avoidance. Specifically,
it has not sought to discover what membership means to those who
join, but rather to leave the meaning of membership up to associa-
tional hierarchies. The interpretive model can assist courts in
making difficult decisions about the symbolic meaning of member-
ship. Specifically, the interpretive model directs courts in this and
other contexts to first consider the various possible meanings of
membership and then to choose the most plausible meaning from
among these. Once again, it must be emphasized that there is no
claim that membership means one and only one thing to all
513. See infra notes 514-21 and accompanying text (discussing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640 (2000)).
514. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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concerned. Rather, what is sought is the most plausible meaning
from among the available circulating meanings.
Among the recent association cases, Dale brought associational
tensions, and the significance of meaning, into sharpest relief.515
The Boy Scouts wanted to exclude Dale, an avowed homosexual,
from the organization on the ground that homosexuality is incom-
patible with Scout membership.516 There are two principal perspec-
tives from which the Court might have approached meaning. The
first, and the one chosen by the Court, is the management or
corporate governance perspective. The other principal perspective
is that of the rank-and-file members, who presumably joined the
institution based, in part, on the values and other things that
membership represents.
The Court essentially permitted Scout leadership, with virtually
no judicial review, to define its own meaning. In concluding that
discrimination against homosexuals was integral to the Scouts'
message, the Court repeatedly relied upon organizational leader-
ship's assertions, most of which were made at or near the time of
the litigation, that Scout membership entailed moral cleanliness, a
condition the leadership held to be incompatible with homosexual-
ity.517 Thus, the Court accepted one available meaning of Scout
membership--"moral cleanliness."518
Of course, Scout leaders represent the organization, and their
beliefs concerning the symbolism of Scout membership should not
be ignored entirely." 9 From an interpretive perspective, however,
515. Roberts and the other association cases which focused on gender raised the same
interpretive issue-what does membership in the Jaycees, or the Rotary Club, mean to those
who join? See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 632-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
516. Dale, 530 U.S. at 643-44.
517. Id. at 650.
518. Id.
519. The claim to interpretive legitimacy might be stronger where leaders are elected to
their positions. This was apparently not the case with respect to the Scouts. One might object
that if leaders are not permitted to define meaning as circumstances require, they will be
forced to take positions on all manner of issues in anticipation that their right to exclude
might someday be challenged. I fail to see the danger in this; an association ought not be
allowed to assert a constitutional right to exclude classes of putative members where they
have given the matter no thought whatsoever prior to having their supposed right
challenged. Insofar as the leadership is forced to define the meaning of membership in
advance, perhaps members will be clearer as to what sort of association it is that they have
joined; to the extent that members object to the meaning the leadership has adopted, they
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deriving the meaning of membership solely from the self-serving
statements of institutional leadership would be tantamount to
studying a tribe or village solely by interviewing its elders or
officials, who, in addition, have been provided with advance notice
of the subjects of inquiry and their significance to the examiner's
research agenda. This is a prescription for bias or, at least, an
interpretive method which is unlikely to recover the most plausible
meaning of membership. It is, after all, the meaning of an institu-
tional culture that is the focus of inquiry. Skimming, and relying
upon, the assertions of the leadership, without even checking those
assertions against the various contextual facts of membership, falls
well short of an appropriate analysis of meaning. 20 In sum, Dale's
"corporate governance" model recovers only one possible meaning
of Scout membership, and not a very plausible one at that.52 1
Using the interpretive approach, what is needed is a recovery
of as many plausible meanings as are available. This necessarily
means that in addition to the management perspective, the Court
should have inquired as to the rank-and-file perspective as well.
This would entail the same sort of examination of meaning as that
undertaken with respect to symbolic acts and sacred symbols.
Primarily, the convention of thick description would call for an
accumulation of the details of membership and, ultimately, an
interpretation of meaning from the perspective of the members
themselves. 522 This meaning could then be compared to and
contrasted with the meaning articulated by management. The most
plausible meaning, again, would be the one that is consistent with
participant behavior, documentary evidence, and intersubjective
understanding.
can seek a change of meaning, or leadership--or they can simply exit the organization.
520. The Court's concern that inquiry into the meaning ofmembership will impermissibly
interfere with organizational autonomy was misplaced. The meaning of membership is a
contested issue; there is no basis for simply deferring to the organization under these
circumstances. Wholesale deference of the sort utilized in Dale leaves the state at the mercy
of associational claims of meaning which threaten to undermine legitimate interests in
combating discrimination.
521. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations,
9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 596 (2001) (criticizing the Dale Court's analysis of Scout
membership).
522. See id. at 607-13 (arguing in favor ofa member-centric interpretation of associational
speech interests).
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There is ample evidence available for courts to recover the
symbolic meaning of membership from the participant's perspec-
tive. There are the facts with respect to the members themselves:
Who are they? Why do they join? How do they become members?
There are the many details of membership itself-the goals,
beliefs, oaths, rituals, publications, and ceremonies, which together
comprise the symbolism of membership in the association.523 Recall
in this regard the attention the Black Court paid to the rituals,
publications, and ideologies of Klan membership.524 There must be
testimony from the "field" concerning how the members themselves
perceive the mission or message of the organization; what sort of
organization did they believe they were joining? There must be an
examination concerning what the members in fact do, as members,
to further the goals of the association. Finally, there must be an
effort to situate the association culturally. As with the Klan, what
is the public face and message of this organization? What is its
history? How does it portray itself, and how does that portrayal
square with the meaning of membership?
This sort of thick analysis may require more labor than courts
are perhaps accustomed to, but to approach the matter as the Dale
Court did fails to engage seriously the social discourse of associa-
tions-what they are saying to putative members, and the rest of
us as well. Justice Stevens' Dale dissent was far more sensitive to
the complexity of meaning than the majority's approach. 525 Al-
though his description lacked certain details--evidence relating
to the views of the members themselves, for example-Justice
Stevens demonstrated the plausibility of applying something like
the interpretive model to the symbolism of membership. Rather
than rely, as the majority did, on the assertions of Scout leader-
ship, Justice Stevens examined data-oaths, mission statements,
handbooks, testimony, and other sources."' He did so holistically,
with a view to the larger "text" of membership, rather than through
a partial selection shaded to coincide with leadership views on the
meaning of membership.
523. This is the approach the Court took in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984), where it found no evidence in the record that inclusion of women as full voting
members was incompatible with membership in the Jaycees. See id. at 627.
524. See supra notes 382-98 and accompanying text.
525. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 663-700 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
526. See id. at 663-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Based upon his holistic analysis of Scout membership, Justice
Stevens concluded that there was no support for the assertion that
the Scouts seek to convey any message with regard to sexual
orientation, much less one which requires the exclusion of homosex-
uals.527 The evidence, the data, led him to an interpretant, or
possible meaning, of membership far different from the one the
Court ultimately credited-one, perhaps, of "service to the commu-
nity, leadership, self-reliance, and the appreciation of nature."528
This semiotic conclusion, which is based upon observation, fact-
finding, and description, is epistemologically preferable to the
majority's unsupported interpretant, an expression of homophobia
based upon supposition, conjecture, and leaders' assertions.
The Court need not have written an exhaustive monograph of
Scout membership in order to have more accurately accessed its
meaning. It might have discovered the most plausible meaning
among those available simply by reviewing the materials Justice
Stevens described in his dissent. In any event, there was little, if
any, evidence to support management's purported meaning. The
behavior of the members, their oaths, and the other context was
inconsistent with an exclusionary message, particularly one based
upon sexuality. By treating the meaning of Scout membership with
indifference, and by avoiding other, more plausible meanings, the
Court was able to wrench the admonition that Scouts be "morally
straight" from its context. 529 This approach exhibits precisely the
sort of defects which led to the desacralization of religious symbols.
By taking an interpretive, ethnographic approach to membership,
courts can correct for this sort of skewing and muffling of the
discourse of membership. They can help us to understand what it
means to join. And they can more accurately and legitimately
adjudicate the constitutional rights to join and to exclude.
527. Id. at 670-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Appropriately, Justice Stevens did not refuse
to credit the assertions of the Scout leadership altogether, but, rather, analyzed those
assertions in light of his overall description of membership. Id. The assertions were laid side-
by-side with the facts of membership; they were, in the end, hypotheses discounted by the
facts of membership. Id.
528. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 521, at 608.
529. Dale, 350 U.S. at 650.
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G. Some Final Thoughts on Interpretation and "Meaning"
To this point, this Article has made clear that the interpretive
approach does not lead to unitary, "correct" interpretations of
meaning. Meaning is far too variant and complex for claims of this
sort.53 0 Still, ethnographers and judges can seek to better under-
stand, with respect to enigmatic gestures, what the devil is going
on. They can render interpretations based upon the various
available plausible meanings for a gesture. Because this is the most
likely aspect of the foregoing analysis as to which objections will be
raised, this Section offers some final thoughts on interpretation and
meaning. Specifically, it addresses what are likely to be the two
most likely objections to judicial interpretation of the sort I
have proposed-that courts lack the institutional competence
and authority to interpret symbolic meaning, and that symbolic
meaning is hopelessly indeterminate.
1. Semiotic Competence and Interpretive Authority
Interpretation is enormously complicated for social scientists,
as well as for natural scientists, who are trained in interpretive
techniques and labor under standard conventions and, to some
extent, shared languages. It can present even greater difficulties for
interpreters who may lack such training and evaluative constraints.
Judicial interpretation is certainly less constrained than scientific
interpretation. This does not mean, however, that judges lack
semiotic competence, a shared interpretive language, or evaluative
constraints. Indeed, judicial interpretation has all of these things,
which, although different in both kind and degree from their
scientific counterparts, suffice to provide a basis for the interpreta-
tion of symbolic meaning.
Interpretation lies at the core of the judicial function. Every
statute, provision, and rule-not to mention the myriad acts,
intentions, documents, instruments, and other ambiguous signs
which courts routinely interpret-has a range of possible meanings.
Despite interpretive, semiotic, socio-psychological, and other points
of indeterminacy, courts interpret these signs and symbols because
they are called upon to do so, even if imperfectly. Things could
530. On the complexity of meaning, see generally OGDEN & RICHARDS, supra note 224.
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scarcely be otherwise. To avoid the interpretive task on so large a
scale is, in effect, to avoid judging altogether.
The centrality of interpretation is as pronounced in constitutional
law as in other areas, such as statutory interpretation. On one
view, constitutional law is the collective interpretations of courts.5 3'
The meaning of "liberty," for example, or "due process," or "equal
protection," results from an iterative process of judicial interpreta-
tion, as well as an ongoing constitutional discourse among courts,
governments, and citizens. Of course, some would suggest that the
difficulties in interpreting open-ended, amorphous constitutional
guarantees are insurmountable, and that courts should abandon
the interpretive function. This Article, of course, does not embrace
such defeatism. Nor should such objections deter courts from
interpreting enigmatic symbolic gestures, which give rise to their
own discourse.
To a large degree, interpretation and meaning are constitution-
ally unavoidable when it comes to symbolic gestures. Black
demonstrates this. So do the Court's decisions respecting sacred
symbols and the meaning of membership. What is missing is a
systematic method for recovering symbolic meaning, one which
requires the consideration of a range of possible meanings, rather
than one which permits courts to pick and choose which meanings
to consider. The intrepretive model provides this sort of discipline.
No special training is required for courts to engage the semiotics
of gestures in the manner here proposed. Interpreting symbolic
meaning through application of the interpretive model requires only
that courts utilize skills and conventions with which they are
intimately familiar-fact gathering, detailed description, logic,
analysis, and persuasion. Thus, the interpretive ethnographic
model does not stretch institutional competence. Indeed, it is much
closer to the traditional functions of judging than are natural
science concepts like causal reasoning, falsifiability, ratios, and
equations, which, as I have suggested elsewhere, have begun to
eclipse qualitative methods like description in constitutional
interpretation.3 2
531. This is not to ignore that the other branches of government, as well as myriad
governmental officials, are responsible for making constitutional law. However, the
conventional conception of this body of law is rooted in judicial decisions and, hence, judicial
interpretations.
532. See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and
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Perhaps, however, the objection might not be to interpretation
per se, but to interpretation specifically of cultural meaning.
Sanford Levinson, addressing the example of the Confederate flag,
asserts that courts should avoid "the politics of cultural
meaning."5 33 The concern seems to be that courts will find them-
selves routinely engaged in the interpretation of highly charged,
culturally situated symbols. The underlying fear seems to be for
judicial legitimacy; courts, thus, ought to avoid the controversy of
cultural meaning for their own preservation.
We need only consult the products of the Supreme Court's most
recent term to reject any judicial boundary which is drawn at "the
politics of cultural meaning." Lawrence v. Texas, 34 which overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick,3 5 interpreted the "liberty" guarantee in the
Due Process Clause to preclude the government from interfering
with private, consensual sex.5 6 In a pair of highly anticipated
affirmative action cases-Grutter v. Bollinger537 and Gratz v.
Bollinger"3 -the Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to
permit taking race into account as one factor in university admis-
sions decisions.53 These decisions are every bit as controversial,
perhaps even more so, as an interpretation that the Confederate
flag is the "semiotic signifier of an entire system of racial oppres-
sion," 40 that cross burning is the semiotic signifier of a true threat,
or that the striptease is the semiotic signifier of a fictitious offer of
sex. "Liberty" and "equality" are symbolic guarantees which directly
implicate the "politics of cultural meaning."
Whether or not decisions like Lawrence, Grutter, and Gratz are
characterized as salvos in the ongoing "culture wars," there is no
question that they represent interpretations of hotly contested
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115 (2003); see also Shari Seidman Diamond &
Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713,715-16 (2001) (arguing that
surveys, which can be examined with reference to social science benchmarks such as sample
size and sampling techniques, can authoritatively establish unconstitutional endorsement
of religion).
533. Levinson, supra note 1, at 1106.
534. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
535. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
536. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
537. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
538. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
539. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2411; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325.
540. Levinson, supra note 1, at 1100.
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cultural meanings. Nor are these decisions aberrations; cultural
and political interpretations are common in constitutional law, as
lightning rods like Roe v. Wade54' attest. Far from avoiding "the
politics of cultural meaning," modern courts regularly embrace,
interpret, and even define it, and they do so utilizing a variety of
intrepretive methods. Historiography accounts in large measure for
the interpretation inLawrence,542 and Roe is grounded (precariously
for some) upon a hybrid of medical and legal research.543 These
interpretive methods and analyses are subject to criticism-the
historical claims can be checked, even falsified, for example-but
judicial authority to interpret the Constitution is still largely,
although of course not uniformly, accepted.
There will surely be room, as noted below, to contest judicial
interpretations of symbolic meaning, just as there will be contests
regarding the Court's interpretation of liberty and equality. But
properly utilized, the interpretive model presents no cause for a
strong interpretive skepticism. Even Professor Levinson, who
apparently rejects judicial interpretation of symbolic gestures, is
forced to concede that "good facts" exist from which a court might
interpret Alabama's display of the Confederate flag as the "signi-
fied" of racial oppression.5 44 More generally, he refuses, in the end,
to embrace a "universal skepticism" with regard tojudicial interpre-
tation of symbolic meaning.
545
Professor Levinson is correct to resist a universal skepticism with
regard to symbolic meaning, although this Article ventures further
to reject this sort of skepticism entirely. We cannot avoid the fact
that courts are already interpreting constitutional meaning
generally, and symbolic gestures specifically. What we should seek
is the best interpretation, and what we should be focusing on is not
whether courts should interpret, but how they should do so. As has
been urged throughout this Article, the interpretive model will
improve upon judicial understanding of meaning; it will not make
it unitary, foolproof, or definitive.
541. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
542. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80.
543. Roe, 410 U.S. at 141-47.
544. Levinson, supra note 1, at 1104 (internal quotation marks omitted).
545. Id.
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2. Judging Meanings
Postmodernists have done much to cast doubt upon the interpre-
tation of meaning in a variety of disciplines, including the interpre-
tive ethnography upon which the suggested model is based. James
Clifford and other postmodernists have been unsparing in their
critique of interpretive ethnography, arguing that it is undermined
by interpretive bias, produces a false sense of cultural stability and
universality, and is constituted by, and ultimately supportive of, an
ethnocentrism which corrupts cross-cultural comparisons.54 The
entirety of this debate between interpretive and postmodern
ethnographers is beyond the scope of this Article. But the claim,
often made, that no interpretation of a symbol can be favored over
any other aims at the heart of the interpretive model. It therefore
must be addressed.
Professor Levinson raises the hermeneutic indeterminacy
objection in his discussion of the Confederate flag: "If, though,
multiple interpretations are genuinely possible, if the flag is truly
polysemous, then how precisely can a federal court (or anyone else)
justify in effect negating all other interpretive possibilities save the
particular one that it chooses to privilege?"547 Professor Levinson
thus places courts (and the rest of us) within the "hermeneutic
circle," the convention typically invoked to represent the indetermi-
nacy and circularity of interpretation.4 Courts which choose a
546. See CLIFFORD, supra note 12, at 37-41.
547. Levinson, supra note 1, at 1102.
548. For a detailed consideration of the hermeneutic circle, see BOHMAN, supra note 298,
at 113. Briefly, the circle posits as follows: "Everything is interpretation, and interpretation
is itself indeterminate, perspectival, and circular." Id.; see also, e.g., HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD 265-91 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1989).
To flesh out this concept just a bit, the hermeneutic circle, according to one contemporary
philosopher, consists of three basic elements, or theses: (1) incompleteness; (2) background;
and (3) justification. BOHMAN, supra note 298, at 105-06. Incompleteness refers to the fact
that all interpretations are partial, given that an interpretation of each of the parts depends
upon an interpretation of the whole, and vice versa. Id. The element or thesis of background
holds that all interpretations take place against a background of unspecifiable assumptions
and presuppositions, "a network of beliefs and practices not always fully available to the
agent." Id. at 105. Or, to borrow a Geertzian turn of phrase once again, the ethnographer
interprets "winks upon winks upon winks." GEERTZ, supra note 15, at 9. Finally, to bring us
to Levinson's specific question, there is the element or thesis of justification. How can we
justify an interpretation made within the hermeneutic circle if "there is no metalanguage
outside of it in which neutral justification is possible[?]" BOHMAN, supra note 298, at 106; see
also 2 Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE
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meaning from among possible meanings, he suggests, necessarily
have "negated" all other meanings.
The flaw is both in the framing of the question and its implica-
tions. First, I will discuss the implications. If meaning is to be
jettisoned as indeterminate, what remains of a discipline, what
content does it have?549 The question is particularly germane to
constitutional law which, again on one view, consists of a collection
of interpretations of constitutional meaning rendered by courts over
time. Without interpretation of meaning, then, there would be no
constitutional doctrine. Similarly, the doctrine of symbolic gestures
is empty, or nearly so, precisely because meaning has been
consistently avoided, belittled, or treated with indifference. As I
argue below, courts cannot, or at least should not, "balance" without
a sense of the content, or weight, they are placing on the expressive
end of the scale. Nor should they permit associations to skirt
governmental prohibitions on discrimination by deferring to
institutional leaders on the meaning of membership. Nor should
they desacralize sacred symbols for fear of becoming theology
boards.
But what of the question: How can courts "privilege" and "negate"
meanings? This Article has accepted, indeed embraced, the concept
of various meanings. Every symbolic gesture exhibits, in essence, a
"democracy of meaning." " The process of judging meanings does
not involve the "negation" and "privileging" of meanings. These
terms imply finality and the prospect of unitary meaning. These
results already have been rejected as unattainable. As one considers
symbolic meaning, there are, as Geertz put it, "methodological
pitfalls to make a Freudian quake." 5' From the beginning, with
Peirce, semiotics has similarly acknowledged the inherent indeter-
minacy of meaning; the interpretant represents only a possible or
potential meaning of a sign. As Geertz summarized the interpretive
task: "Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings,
assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from
the better guesses, not discovering the Continent of Meaning and
HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 13, 55-57 (1985).
549. James Bohman singles out rational choice and ethnomethodology as disciplines of
thought which, while attempting to remove meaning from their programs, simultaneously
empty them of all content. See BOHMAN, supra note 298, at 108-09.
550. TAMANAHA, supra note 314, at 81.
551. GEERTZ, supra note 23, at 452.
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mapping out its bodiless landscape."55 2 Judicial opinions, too, are
guesses at meanings. A court which makes an educated guess from
socially situated and constructed data makes no pretense to
rendering the one "true" meaning of any gesture any more than the
same court can purport to finally settle the meaning of "liberty" or
"privacy." 553
In sum, this Article has parted company with ethnographic
method insofar as it makes any claims to unitary meaning. Possible
meanings must be recovered and tested in comparison to other
plausible meanings. There are more or less plausible meanings,
not "privileged" and "negated" ones. This is true for the symbolic
meaning of constitutional provisions as well; there are more or less
plausible meanings of "liberty," not meanings which are entirely
negated as a matter of law. Fundamentally, the goal is not to
render the meaning, but the most plausible meaning among the
available alternatives.
The question, then, assuming the available circulating meanings
can be recovered, is whether there is a sound basis for choosing
the most plausible meaning from among them. Examples from
both law and ethnography demonstrate that such a basis exists,
that interpretations can be "evaluated as right or wrong, or better
or worse."554 Much depends on the context which is provided
through the convention of thick description. This is the evidence
against which any interpretation will be judged.
"Interpretations which are inconsistent with the behaviour
observed are highly suspect; this includes interpretations which
arbitrarily fail to consider integral aspects of the behaviour, or
which point to aberrational or unusual behaviour as support for a
thesis which purports to describe the meaning of the whole."55
Ethnographers engage in such judgments all the time. Laura
Nader, for instance, claimed that the "consensual orientation" of the
Zapotec symbolized "a Christian-based, 'anti-hegemonic' strategy to
552. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 20 (emphasis added).
553. As Geertz wrote in WoRKs AND LIVEs, in which he examines the history of
ethnographic writing: "The moral asymmetries across which ethnography works and the
discoursive complexity within which it works make any attempt to portray it as anything
more than the representation of one sort of life in the categories of another impossible to
defend." CLIFFORD GEERTZ, WORKS AND LIVES: THE ANTHROPOLOGIST AS AUTHOR 144 (1988).
554. TAMANAHA, supra note 314, at 82.
555. Id.
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keep the colonial legal system at bay.""5 6 A later observer, examin-
ing the same data, concluded that Nader's interpretation was
inconsistent with the actors' behavior, and "was instead a projection
by Nader of her own concerns."5 7
Courts can rely on similar methods and standards. Thus, for
example, an interpretation of a sacred symbol which fails even to
consider the sacred aspects of its meaning is suspect. Judge
Posner's interpretation of the striptease, which failed to consider,
or at least minimized, the financial quid pro quo-an integral
aspect of the behavior under observation-is suspect to some
degree. His interpretation may be suspect as well because it
purports to ignore evidence that the actors themselves had a
different meaning, or none at all; thus, Posner's interpretation of
symbolic meaning may have "little or no connection to the meanings
for the actors involved.""5 8 An interpretation of cross burning which
is inconsistent with other, previous, interpretations may be suspect
for that reason.5 9 There are standards by which to judge these, as
other, interpretations of meaning.
What the interpreter is (or should be) after is a reading or
translation that is epistemologically and otherwise defensible.
What the interpretive model aims for are defensible interpretations
which can, if necessary, be falsified, or revised, through a process
of public adjudication. In the end, a judicial interpretation, like an
ethnographic one, is only as valid as the compilation of evidence,
description, and reasoning that supports it. 5 60 The object is to
persuade observers, readers, and participants that meaning has
556. Id. at 22; see also Laura Nader, The Anthropological Study of Law, AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST, Dec. 1965, at 3-32.
557. TAMANAHA, supra note 314, at 82; see also Peter Just, History, Power, Ideology, and
Culture: Current Directions in the Anthropology of Law, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 373, 373-411
(1992) (critiquing Nader's interpretation).
558. TAMANAHA, supra note 314, at 83.
559. See id. (suggesting that the best way to evaluate interpretations is to compare them
against other interpretations on various criteria, such as which has better explanatory power
and predictive capacity").
560. This is not to diminish or discount the power of rhetoric or authorship. As Geertz
notes in his analysis of ethnographic writing, rhetoric, style, and personality often have as
much to do with the persuasiveness of an interpretation as participant-observation, or the
mass of evidence or power of logic which accompanies the interpretation. See GEERTZ, supra
note 559, at 138-40. In this regard, Judge Posner's erudite "monograph" on the striptease
comes to mind.
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been accessed in this case, based upon this evidence-not to deliver
interpretive edicts which settle meaning once and for all.
What this means, of course, is that judicial interpretations are
falsifiable, and hence revisable. The fact that interpretations are
revisable no more undermines or scuttles the interpretive model
than the tenuousness of construction of concepts like "liberty" or
"commerce" undermines the entire enterprise of constitutional
interpretation. Even precedents, as to which there is presumably a
strong interest in interpretive stability, are-thankfully-revisable
and falsifiable. Bowers, for example, was contested and revised
in Lawrence, through a public process of adjudication of its
historiographic and other claims.56' Similarly, the meaning of the
striptease is contested, but until someone offers a more valid
interpretation of the striptease than that rendered in Judge
Posner's Miller concurrence, this interpretation should be consid-
ered valid. So too with the Black Court's interpretation of the
burning cross, which is subject to revision precisely because it is
thickly articulated and elaborated. The creche and the menorah
may validly be deemed deeply religious symbols to believers unless
and until contrary interpretations cast doubt upon that meaning.
The Boy Scouts might ultimately prevail in convincing a court that
their organization represents a certain sexual ideal, but that
meaning is certainly not apparent from even a thin, much less a
thick, description of current membership.
The important point is that these interpretations can be con-
tested because they are the product of thick description and
elaboration, rather than unstated background premises and
aesthetic biases. Like other valid legal and constitutional interpre-
tations, they are elaborated, transparent analyses which can be
examined for their evidentiary and interpretive soundness. They
either convince and persuade, or they do not. The law lacks neither
the common language nor the processes for analyzing the rigor
and soundness of such interpretations. To be sure, the analysis is
hardly scientific-but it is not meant to be. It is, like analysis of
ethnographic writing, more in the nature of literary critique, the
561. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478-81 (2003) (challenging the
historiography relied upon in Bowers).
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analysis of the persuasiveness of a text, opinion, or argument.562
This is familiar judicial and scholarly ground.
The preceding is sufficient to rebut the assertion that judges are
trapped within the hermeneutic circle. Interpretations, whether
of constitutional phrases and provisions, symbolic acts, sacred
symbols, or membership, will always remain contested to a degree.
What Geertz has said of the science of anthropology is undoubtedly
true with respect to the decidedly unscientific enterprise of
constitutional interpretation: "[Ainthropology is a science whose
progress is marked less by a perfection of consensus than by a
refinement of debate. What gets better is the precision with which
we vex each other."563 The most ethnographers and judges can hope
for is that "revisable, well-warranted interpretive claims may be
put forward and criticized."564 We have the tools for establishing
which interpretations are better, and which are worse. The price of
whatever imprecision inheres in interpreting is small relative to the
cost of continuing on a course, with regard to symbolic gestures, of
interpretive avoidance and indifference.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF
GESTURES
To this point, the Article has focused mostly on the plausibility
of applying the interpretive model to symbolic gestures. It concludes
with a summary of the hoped-for benefits from that application.
A. Rejecting Avoidance and Indifference-Recalibrating the First
Amendment Hierarchy
Recognizing the centrality of symbols in cultural discourse is a
significant first step in redesigning the doctrine of symbolic
gestures. Straight away, the interpretive model presents an agenda
which differs in significant respects from the current doctrines of
interpretive avoidance and indifference. The interpretive model is
semiotically sensitive; it embraces meaning, rather than avoiding
it or treating it with carelessness or indifference. The first thing the
562. For a discussion of this point, see GEERTZ, supra note 553, at 140.
563. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 29.
564. Id.
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interpretive model accomplishes, thus, is to bring symbols into a
position more commensurate with their expressive and cultural
significance.
Judicial indifference toward and avoidance of meaning denigrates
symbols in ways which are not immediately apparent. Diminishing
symbols and symbolic meaning leaves us with a very "thin"
conception of what it means to communicate through gestures. By
avoiding a finding of meaning, courts silence important discourses
and speakers. Thus, one of the appeals of the interpretive model is
that it gives courts the tools, and perhaps the fortitude, to partici-
pate in a discourse which they have largely avoided. It allows courts
to communicate with, or at least to conceptualize communicating
with, "the other"-those who reside in cultures that are unknown,
foreign, and often marginalized under the First Amendment.
It bears considering what accounts for the current second-
class status of symbols under the First Amendment. This hierarchy,
which originated in the free speech area, has over time been
extended to sacred symbols and symbolic association. The hierarchy
was flawed when it originated, and it remains so. Words, of course,
are nothing other than verbal symbols-they stand for or represent
something, to paraphrase Peirce.5" 5 Yet words are treated as core
First Amendment concerns, while symbols are denigrated or treated
with indifference. What accounts for the differential treatment of
oral symbols (words) and nonverbal symbolic gestures?
There appear to be three primary obstacles to a full appreciation
of symbolic gestures. The first, addressed above, is the unfounded
leap from the indeterminacy of meaning to a universal skepticism
with regard to interpretation of all symbolic gestures. Once courts
recognize that they are not being called upon to "privilege" or
"negate" meanings, nor to settle meaning for all time, but only to
choose the most plausible meaning among those currently available,
perhaps this obstacle will be removed. This objection should not
deter courts from interpreting symbolic gestures, whether they
consist of conduct, the display of sacred objects, or something else.
The second thing which tends to drag symbols down is the
unfounded judicial fear that full recognition of symbolic expression
565. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 33 (1973) (describing oral speech as the use of symbolic
sounds).
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would somehow leave much harmful conduct outside the reach of
legitimate regulatory concerns. This is a particular concern where
symbolic conduct is at issue. The Court made clear in O'Brien its
discomfort with conceding that all conduct communicates, even if
this is so. 66 For then, even socially harmful conduct, such as violent
crime, would be entitled to constitutional protection. This would
make it practically impossible for the judiciary to administer claims
of expressive conduct.
Why these arguments maintain any hold either on doctrine or
the judicial imagination is an utter mystery. The Court itself
suggested a means of closing the feared floodgates in Spence, where
it required as a preliminary matter that symbolic gestures be
intended to communicate something and that an audience would
likely understand what was being communicated. 67 Most violent
crimes would fail either one or both elements of this definition of
"speech." Further, as a matter of now settled First Amendment
doctrine, not even verbal speech is entitled to absolute First
Amendment protection. As Professor Nimmer argued in one of the
earliest defenses of symbolic expression, all symbols which
communicate-whether words or gestures-are subject to regula-
tion if the state's interest is strong enough.568 So long as the state
566. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
567. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
568. See Nimmer, supra note 565, at 44-46. Thus, by merely acknowledging the
communicative aspect of gestures, courts do not necessarily commit themselves to protecting
all forms of expression. I have presented cockfighting as an interpretive act, for example, but
I would not suggest that the state has only an anti-speech interest in regulating this
symbolic ritual. The prohibition, in the United States and elsewhere, is based upon, among
other things, an aversion to animal cruelty and interests in public health and safety. See,
e.g., Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (arguing that bullfighting, which conveys "grace, courage, suffering, fear, beauty,
cruelty, splendor, and machismo," is plainly expressive, yet just as plainly proscribable by
the state based upon health and safety concerns). Consider as well the argument that when
urban youths flee the police, they are communicating something other than guilt, or potential
guilt. See Herbert, supra note 364. This is precisely the sort of argument that most concerns
courts. The interpretive model must be applied with some common sense and judgment. It
does not jettison basic First Amendment principles; it works within them. With regard to
flight, as an initial matter it is doubtful that the youths can meet the Spence standard-that
they intended to communicate something to an audience that was likely to understand the
message. Let us assume this hurdle is cleared. Perhaps an emic, thick description of the
plight, and flight, of urban youths would yield an interpretation of meaning beyond
guilt-perhaps, as the commentator suggests, a (well-founded) fear of the police. This would
make the balancing calculus fairer, if only because it places something on the youths' end of
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demonstrates that it has a "non-speech" interest in regulating, the
regulation, whether of verbal or nonverbal expression, will likely be
upheld. 69
The third obstacle to an appreciation of the communicative
substance of symbolic gestures is judicial bias against "unconven-
tional" cultures and their methods of communication. This, again,
is of particular concern where speakers use conduct, rather than
words, to express themselves. It seems safe to assume that those
who conceived the First Amendment did not have sleeping or nude
dancing foremost in their minds. To purists or skeptics, the very
notion that nude dancing, for example, is constitutionally protected
speech is difficult enough to accept. But to say that the striptease
expresses something concrete and specific is, no doubt, odder still
to those who want to preserve expressive protection for some formal
category of conventional "speech."
As Judge Posner explained, the notion that nude dancing is art
strikes judges as ridiculous in part because most of us are either
middle aged or elderly men, in part because we tend to be snooty
about popular culture, in part because as public officials we have
a natural tendency to think political expression more important
than artistic expression, in part because we are Americans-
which means that we have been raised in a culture in which
puritanism, philistinism, and promiscuity are complexly and
often incongruously interwoven-and in part because like all
lawyers we are formalists who believe deep down that the words
in statutes and the Constitutions [sic] mean what they say, and
a striptease is not a speech."'
the scale, if it indeed belongs there. Even so, we must still ask whether the government's
interest in approaching these youths is content neutral, or, in Nimmer's parlance, is
associated with a "non-speech" interest. See Nimmer, supra note 565, at 38. The interest in
law enforcement would appear to meet that standard. Now, even if the youths are expressing
their fear, I suspect most courts still would conclude that the government's interest in law
enforcement outweighs the expressive interest of those who fled the scene. Although we are
better off acknowledging that a message is being conveyed, the First Amendment is not so
hopelessly inflexible that it constrains government simply because a message can be
perceived.
569. See Nimmer, supra note 565, at 38 (defining "non-speech" interest in regulating
expression as "an interest by the state in suppressing or regulating a nonmeaning effect").
570. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1100 (Posner, J., concurring).
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But neither were the Framers, in all likelihood, thinking of art,
music (which can be verbal or nonverbal), and non-nude dancing, if
they in fact narrowly conceptualized "speech." Yet, as Judge Posner
persuasively argued in his Miller concurrence, no one seriously
contends that these cultural symbols are entitled to less than full
First Amendment protection.5 7' All of the traditional rationales
that have been generated to defend expression-for example, the
generation of a marketplace of ideas, self-fulfillment, and self-
governance-apply with at least equal weight to symbolic
gestures.572 Perhaps, then, judicial acceptance of gestures like nude
dancing is withheld, as Judge Posner suggested, because judges,
drawn from a cultural elite, do not see the value, aesthetic or
otherwise, in them.
The interpretive model is offered, in part, as a prescription for
such raw bias. Ethnographers can teach something by their
willingness to understand foreign cultures and their symbolic
gestures. By requiring detached observation and thick, emic
description of symbolic gestures, the interpretive model will force
courts to confront symbolic meaning, and to do so, one hopes, not
based solely upon self-interpretation but in part from the perspec-
tive of those for whom the gestures have meaning. This is, necessar-
ily, challenging work. Judges should confront their biases, and
seek to overcome them, by engaging in rigorous analysis of the
gestures which appear most enigmatic to them, and often to us.
As ethnographers have struggled with the "other" in their dis-
course, so too must judges, and for much the same reasons. As
ethnographers seek to transcend the ethnocentrism which threat-
ens their discourses, courts should seek to transcend this verbal-
centrism, which invariably results in a fractional First Amendment
discourse.
It is hoped that the interpretive model will result in greater
appreciation and understanding not only of the substance of
gestured communication, but also of the emotive power of symbols.
More than "mere" words, symbolic actions especially, but also
sacred symbols and, to a lesser extent, even membership, pack
571. Id. at 1096, 1098 (Posner, J., concurring).
572. See Nimmer, supra note 565, at 33-34 ("Most would agree that it is the freedom to
express ideas and feelings, not merely the freedom to engage in verbal locutions, which
constitutes the core meaning of the first amendment.").
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emotive content which, as Professor Nimmer noted, "can be fully as
important as the intellectual, or cognitive, content in the competi-
tion of ideas for acceptance in the marketplace."573 In this
regard, Black is something of an improvement on Barnette and
other symbolic gesture precedents, which failed, it seems, to fully
appreciate the emotive element of symbolism. Unconventional
modes of expression generally are utilized because conventional
modes fail to carry messages effectively, not to strain governmental
resources or place property or people in harm's way. Sacred symbols
evoke emotions in the faithful. They are sometimes used for this
very reason. Even membership can be infused with an emotive
significance which arises from common goals, comradery, and esprit
de corps.
A failure to appreciate symbols, and symbolic power, has wrongly
pushed symbolic gestures to the bottom of the speech hierarchy.
Symbolic gestures are treated as unworthy, inaccessible, and nearly
valueless forms of expression. Yet to those who use them, symbolic
gestures are critical, fundamental, sometimes even world-ordering
vehicles of communication and meaning.574 Courts should ask, as
Geertz and interpretive ethnographers have: What is the "said" of
this gesture? What does the symbol mean to those who are gestur-
ing, or observing, to believers in the sacredness of sacred symbols,
to joiners of associations?
B. Constitutional Balancing and Semiotic Precision
Interpretation and meaning are often unavoidable where
symbolic gestures are concerned. This is undeniably true where a
gesture is alleged to be categorically proscribable as was true of
cross burning in Black. But it is also true with regard to other
symbolic acts, which should not be dismissed or "balanced" without
some effort being made at translation. Meaning is already at the
heart of the Establishment Clause, even if the Court treats it
573. Id. at 34.
574. This is so not in the same life-or-death sense Geertz stresses in his consideration of
symbol systems, but gestures nevertheless enhance communication in significant ways. See
supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text. Sometimes verbal symbols do not suffice to carry,
or fall short of encapsulating, a message or expression. So speakers turn to other
means-they gesture, order their lives by sacred icons, and join together with others to make
a collective point.
2394 [Vol. 45:2261
TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT ETHNOGRAPHY
carelessly or seeks to avoid it entirely. And it resides near the core
of the associational right as well, at least in instances where groups
seek to exclude others.
Placing symbolism where it belongs has implications for constitu-
tional decision making. Right now, speech gestures are balanced
away rather easily. In most gesture cases involving symbolic
conduct, for example, the interests of the state are arrayed against
unknown and undifferentiated "messages" delivered via unconven-
tional and, thus, largely underappreciated channels of expression.
There is, of course, the typical acknowledgment that the gesture
speaks, without any concern for what it is saying, or why it is being
said in this manner. As the course of adjudication has demon-
strated, a judicial approach which is reluctant, to say the least, to
ascribe specific messages to symbolic gestures cannot but end in a
determination that the state has not targeted any particular
message.
Courts need to remove the thumb from the constitutional scale.
Fundamentally, how can we know whether the government is
pursuing, to use Nimmer's phraseology, a "non-speech" or an "anti-
speech" interest if we remain wholly ignorant of the message, or
"meaning effect," that is intended? 75 It is easy to conclude that no
message is targeted where none is translated. This explains, in
part, why nude dancing has been such a vexing issue for the Court.
On one side are those justices who, while willing to "count" nude
dancing as speech, refuse to interpret it as conveying a specific
message, and thus invariably conclude that only a non-speech
interest is implicated. On the other side are those justices who see
a specific message and conclude that it is this message, not the
mere state of nudity, which the state seeks to prohibit. Both sides
may be faulted-the message avoiders for avoiding the critical issue
of meaning, and the message perceivers for failing to support their
interpretation with sufficient evidence. But as between these
positions, at least the perceivers attempted an honest balancing of
interests. Judge Posner, who delivered an imperfect interpretation
of his own, at least demonstrated in Miller how balancing might be
more honestly and effectively pursued where meaning is more
systematically and carefully engaged. 7 1
575. Nimmer, supra note 565, at 38.
576. See supra Part III.C.
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The same sort of skewed, warped balancing occurs in member-
ship cases. The First Amendment protects the right of association,
but the right is not absolute. Expressive rights must be balanced
against state interests in, for example, the prohibition of discrimi-
nation, whether based on race, gender, sexual orientation, or some
other trait. Where an association claims that such state interests
infringe its freedom of expressive association, the symbolic meaning
of membership is implicated directly. If courts are to balance
expressive and state interests, they should inquire as to what
membership means to those who join, not only to those for whom
winning the litigation is paramount. The corporate governance
model improperly places a thumb on the organization's side of the
scale. This does not suggest that courts ignore governance mean-
ings, but only that those meanings are only some of the available
circulating meanings which must be assessed and placed in the
constitutional balance.
As mentioned, the interpretive model is also likely to provide a
better understanding of the emotive significance of symbolic
gestures. This has important implications for balancing as well.
In the usual case, as in Clark, symbolic gestures packed with
emotion and feeling are drained entirely of their emotive content.577
Gestures are calibrated at the level of a whisper, even if they may
be shouting something important. Without any effort to access
meaning, these gestures are readily reduced to conventional pleas
which may be made elsewhere, even if they are desperate cries for
help made in the only outlet, and in the only manner truly available
to the speaker for a particular message. Regulations, almost by
definition, become "incidental" burdens on expression (again, of
what?), outweighed by substantial governmental interests which




Further, a consideration of context is supposed to be part of the
basic inquiry under Spence.17s As they sidestep meaning, however,
577. See supra notes 485-86 and accompanying text.
578. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1991) ("It is impossible to
discern, other than from the text of the statute, exactly what governmental interest the
Indiana legislatures had in mind when they enacted this statute, for Indiana does not record
legislative history, and the State's highest court has not shed additional light on the statute's
purpose.").
579. See supra note 71.
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courts paint context out of the picture. What little context remains
is limited to the barest of particulars and the thinnest of descrip-
tions. The homeless want to sleep in a park, but which park, and
why? The Boy Scouts want to exclude homosexuals, but why and
according to which precepts of membership? Dancers strip, but is
there anything to how they do so? In each case, the expressive
interest cannot be adequately described or weighed without this
critical contextual information. We have a notion (a "firstness") of
sleep, dancing, and scouting, but we cannot come close to reaching
its meaning ("thirdness") without context, without description.
The same problems with emptying symbols of their emotive and
contextual aspects have arisen with respect to sacred symbols, like
crbches and menorahs. Under current doctrine, whether these
symbols offend the Establishment Clause depends almost entirely
on the immediate context of their display, and the effect of the
display on rational or reasonable outsiders. This is so despite the
fact that the Court's -own "endorsement" test contemplates a
consideration of the insider's perspective. That, as demonstrated,
is precisely what is left out of the "objective observer" formulation.
These are, after all, religious and cultural symbols; they have
significance beyond their proximity to reindeer and clowns. Sacred
symbols may convey nothing to all but the most offended "reason-
able" nonbelievers. But they convey deep emotions and transcen-
dental beliefs to the faithful. Without an appreciation of their
meaning to believers, sacred symbols have been thinned to near
nothingness, and denigrated in the eyes of those, as Geertz
explains, for whom these symbols provide meaning for life experi-
ences and explain the otherwise inexplicable.8 0 Courts have all but
ignored the "said" of sacred symbols, their sacredness, under the
endorsement test.
In sum, by recognizing that meaning matters, the interpretive
model simultaneously reduces the influence of judicial biases and
presuppositions, evens out the process of constitutional balancing,
and puts the sacred back in sacred symbols. It does so by providing
a method for accessing meaning, the missing link in symbolic
gesture cases.
We must, of course, have realistic expectations about what the
model can produce. Judges, like ethnographers, cannot render
580. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
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definitive or unitary accounts of meaning. But neither are they
bound to indeterminacy within the hermeneutic circle. Constitu-
tional interpretation must be more flexible than that if constitu-
tional law is to survive. We do not, because we cannot, insist upon
a definitive account of "liberty" under the Due Process Clause.
Similarly, we do not, because we cannot, insist upon a definitive
account of the meaning of cross burning, or nude dancing, or the
creche, or Scout membership. What we can insist upon is a
reasoned explication of meaning, based on evidence, which can be
inspected according to the usual conventions ofjudicial persuasive-
ness and legitimacy. If need be, these overt explications could then
be revised or reversed.
The alternative to conscientious interpretation of meaning is
presently before us-a general disrespect for symbolism and
careless interpretation which elides sacred influence and cheapens
the message of membership. Judges who refuse to study, to
describe, and to face up to the interpretive challenge are left only
with the compass of their own biases and preferences. Even if the
interpretive model will merely serve to rescue us from this course,
it is well worth considering.
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